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ABSTRACT
The lack of real and speedy success in the implementation of Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) in small firms has been a cause for concern for the author for some 
years. Whilst much has been written about the implementation of Management 
Information Systems and about Advanced Manufacturing Technology in large firms, 
the literature on small firms is very sparse, and the implementer has nowhere to go 
for guidance.
This research looks at the implementation of CAD in six small firms against the 
background of the current literature in associated areas. It focusses on the aspects of 
implementation most commonly featured in the implementation texts, developing 
some 32 Propositions on the basis of the six cases.
A  review of the propositions suggests a parallel between their sequence and what 
may be regarded as a "traditional" business plan, which addresses the questions:
- where are we now? '
- where do we want to go?
- how do we plan to get there?
- what steps must we take?
- how will we know when we get there?
The link between the propositions and the structure is strong, and the consequence 
is clear. If the propositions indicate a structure, then a structure developed 
specifically to incorporate the propositions should result in a methodology for 
implementation.
The framework for this methodology is developed, based upon five phases or stages:
- strategy
- company audit
- design
- action
- review
The framework has been tested and amended, and the inputs to the phases have 
been identified. Sources for these inputs have also been specified where necessary.
The framework provides a significant step forward in the understanding of Computer 
Aided Design implementation in small firms. In particular:
- it is constructed using "hard" data
- it provides guidance on a "best" way of implementing
- it forms the basis of an implementation "toolkit"
- it addresses the needs of the small firm, which can least afford specialist 
help and can least afford failure.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Author is a Director of a management consultancy company 
based in the North of England and providing a wide range of 
services to manufacturing companies predominantly throughout the 
UK. Operationally, the Author is responsible for two Divisions of 
the Company. One of these, the Technology Division, has a high 
profile in the field of Computer Aided Design (CAD).
A typical project for a company would involve a number of days on 
site, learning about the products, their design parameters, the types 
of design and draughting work normally carried out, the organisation 
of the drawing office and its relationships with other departments.
In particular, the relationships between design, manufacturing and 
planning departments would normally be of interest, since CAD is 
often seen as a bridge between these departments.
Over the years the Author has become aware of a number of 
problems associated with the successful implementation of CAD.
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In particular, he has been concerned at the low level of systems 
integration tackled and achieved by these companies, as some of the 
texts discussed later seek to demonstrate that higher levels of 
integration lead to greater benefits.
As a consultant, the Author’s role usually ceases once the system has 
been specified, benchmark demonstrations have been completed and 
quotations have been obtained.
Feedback on success or failure is therefore not often available. 
Indeed, when following up on projects after some months have 
elapsed, it is often clear that many of the benefits have not been 
obtained, yet those responsible for the system are reluctant to admit 
it.
As will be seen in Section 2.2, integration can be regarded as a 
multi-stage process. Of the 20 projects carried out by the author in a 
two year period, only two had developed to a  high level of 
integration with any success. Ten of the systems had achieved 
satisfactory performance at low levels of integration. That is to say 
the implementation team had reached the targets they had set 
themselves of achieving linked systems. Some of the ten companies 
had gone further to produce non-graphical information from the 
systems.
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Of the remainder, two were experiencing problems with achieving 
the higher levels, five were having problems with low levels and one 
had been abandoned as a total implementation failure. Some of 
these projects are discussed in a later section.
This was a far from encouraging picture, and clearly something was
going wrong between the selection of a technically competent system
and its final implementation. It was against this background that the
case material was developed which forms the basis of this work.
* ^
The amount of literature on the implementation of integrated CAD 
systems in small businesses is very small indeed, although some work 
has been carried out on integration in larger firms. Therefore it was 
decided that an appropriate way forward would be to carry out a 
review of the cases to identify and define the common threads.
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Whilst CAD integration per se had been neglected, Computer Aided 
Production Management (CAPM), Information Technology (IT), 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT), Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems (FMS) and Materials Requirement Planning 
(MRP) implementation were well documented in larger firms, if not 
in small ones (i.e. less than about 200 employees), and parallels were 
therefore sought between these, which are in essence integrating 
technologies, and CAD.
Integration is discussed further in Section 2.2, but it is wofth 
examining briefly at this stage what is meant by integration. Any 
system which crosses traditional functional boundaries can be 
regarded as potentially integrating. For instance IT pervades a 
number of functional areas, CAPM as a minimum involves Sales, 
Planning, Manufacturing, Stores and Purchasing. Both of these are 
integrating technologies.
CAD qualifies as an integrating technology once it grows beyond the 
Electronic Drawing Board stage, and takes in Design, Development, 
Draughting and, with CAM, parts manufacture.
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The structure of this work is as follows:
Chapter two reviews the literature on implementation of 
technologies of all types, but concentrates on the integrating 
technologies. In doing this it demonstrates how this work will extend 
the knowledge and in what areas.
Chapter three defines and defends the methodology used in the 
work, and in particular the principle of moving from a relatively 
small base of case material to theory. It also examines* th ^  
alternative methodologies available.
Chapter four consists of a number of case studies, one per company, 
selected to show a broad spectrum of problem areas and 
demonstrating a common need for an integrated system.
Chapter five develops a number of propositions from the data 
gathered in the preparation of the case studies. It looks at such 
areas as organisation structure and familiarisation with high 
technology.
Chapter six develops a structure for a methodology for the 
implementation of CAD in small companies, and suggests how this 
should be developed into a management tool. It also suggests 
suitable areas for further research.
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2.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY - THE CURRENT
LITERATURE
Literature on the implementation of Computer Aided Design and 
integrated systems tends to be somewhat sparse, and it has therefore 
been necessary to look for parallels in similar technologies. In 
particular, the field of Information Technology (IT) has proved to be 
well documented, and appears to be very similar so far as the 
complexity and major implementation issues are concerned.
When we come to implementation and integration of systems in 
small businesses the literature is minimal, and a much wider sweep is 
needed, to encompass such integrating technologies as Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems, Materials Requirements Planning, Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology and the like as well as the literature on 
technological innovation.
Whilst there may be dangers in translating experience in one 
technological field to another, there would seem to be some aspects 
of implementation which are technology independent. For example, 
the training aspects of implementation, and the planning for change.
It is these aspects which make a wide sweep of the literature 
meaningful.
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So far as possible, the search has concentrated on literature no more 
than about ten years old, ie post 1980, on the assumption that 
technological change may well have invalidated some aspects of the 
work done prior to this.
2.1 System Justification
In the author’s experience, companies rarely if ever implement 
systems or purchase items of capital equipment without first 
justifying the expenditure. ^
With a piece of machinery, the justification is often very simple - it 
produces items at a particular rate, allowing the Company to cut 
costs or to m eet a particular schedule.
Systems, however are never quite so simple, and much research has 
been done into the justification of systems investment. However, the 
literature on justification for investment in Computer Aided Design 
is sparse, and it is therefore necessaiy also to look to the 
microelectronics and information technology fields, where empirical 
data has been more readily available.
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Bessant reports on a variety of case studies carried out for the 
D epartm ent of Trade and Industry, Anglo-German Foundation, 
Policy Studies Institute and the United Nations (in Winch (ed)
1983a ppl4ff), and describes 12 common motives for the adoption of 
I.T. based manufacturing innovations. Many of these would appear 
to be directly relevant to CAD implementation. These include:
* savings on direct labour costs
* savings on skilled labour (coping with skill
shortages by using the capacity of I.T. to ^
embody skills within the software)
* savings on indirect labour (through improved 
reliability, easier maintenance, outline 
monitoring etc.)
* improvements in machine operation - greater 
accuracy, flexibility etc.
* reduced cycle times
* space savings
8
The remaining six factors which are of less relevance are:
* shorter set-up
* improved reliability, easier maintenance
* improved production control, better information 
availability
* energy savings
* material savings
* improvements in process safety
It is, of course, possible to find close parallels even for these six 
points
Gerwin and Tarondeau (1982) in Gerwin (1988 p90) found from 
their studies of computer integrated manufacturing systems that half 
the firms adopted computerised systems in a bid to reduce 
production related uncertainty. Bessant and Dixon (1982) note that 
manufacturing innovation produces an overall trend towards 
increasing operation controllability, but stop short of claiming this as 
a justification for implementation.
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Hage (1980) and Zaltm an et. al. (1973) both emphasise the 
relationship between a performance gap and motivation for 
innovation. A performance gap is the perceived difference between 
aspiration and achievement resulting from an increase in aspirations 
or a reduction in performance.
Gerwin (1984) found evidence of both these factors in computerised 
manufacturing technology, but does not claim that the resultant 
performance gap has been a prime motivator.
In terms of Computer Aided Design justification, Primrose et. al. 
(1985 pp 293,294) have listed the benefits which may be derived 
from a successful implementation, and whilst this may enable a 
company to identify the areas of potential saving, no specific claim 
has been made that any of these factors have been or would be used 
for justification.
Senker (1984b pl38) emphasises the benefits of integration of CAD 
with manufacturing processes, and reductions in design lead times. 
H e claims that several existing users are likely to expand their 
systems because they have found significant benefits in 
competitiveness, including substantially shortened tender 
documentation prepared more quickly.
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He also notes that knowledge of successful applications is spreading 
rapidly through the industry via personal contacts, journals, 
exhibitions, conferences and through the efforts of the system 
suppliers.
Carnall and Medland (1984 p52) cite a survey by Coopers and 
Lybrand which discusses the use of the Productivity Ratio as a 
justification factor. The Productivity Ratio is defined as the time 
required to complete a task using CAD compared with manual 
methods. The report notes that productivity claims su d T as^ il for 
detail draughting are rarely supported by good evidence. Carnall 
and Medland argue that the benefits of CAD are too complex and 
interdependent to make justification purely on the basis of 
Productivity Ratios.
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Arnold and Senker (1982a) in Carnall & M edland (1984 p53) report 
four main areas of benefit:
* increased productivity within the design and 
drawing function
* improved design quality
* improved links between design and manufacture
* indirect benefits flowing from the process of 
introducing computers, leading to a review of
design systems, improvements in access to data * ^
and so on.
However, they claim that most of the CAD systems investigated by 
them had been cost-justified on the basis of saving draughting 
labour, despite the lack of evidence of this being the most productive 
use of CAD, but perhaps because of the ease of quantification.
They argue that this narrow justification could inhibit the reaping of 
other benefits.
In their paper for the EITB, Arnold and Senker (1982b) in Arnold 
(1983 p36) list four motivations for the involvement in CAD, by 
industrial sector.
12
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The largest positive identified motivator (eight out of twenty six 
cases) related to lead times and threats to viability. Some distance 
behind (five cases) related to flexibility of design and complexity.
The third factor (four cases) was a need to reduce dependence on 
contract draughtsman or to meet a skill shortage. However, the 
largest group (nine cases) covered the category including 
experimental implementations or where the motivation was unclear. 
Arnold (1983 p36) has his own list of benefits, which may or may not 
be related to motivation, and which includes: *
* increased productivity reduces design cost, speeds documentation 
and reduces lead times
* high productivity allows firms to tender for more jobs
* accuracy and presentation of tenders is improved and more design 
work is possible at the tender stage, impressing potential 
customers
* CAD installations are perceived as "high technology"
Kaplinsky (1982) points out that users cannot calculate the exact 
benefits likely to arise from a CAD implementation because the 
available benefit will relate to the efficiency of the newly organised 
design process and cannot therefore be assessed. This issue is dealt 
with in further detail elsewhere.
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Technological justification, then, appears to be a minefield, where 
system proponents are, in many cases, pushed into claiming savings 
in draughting labour time - a moot point amongst most researchers.
When it comes to financial justification, hackles are raised by the 
need to use "traditional" accounting procedures. Primrose et. al. 
(1985 pp92,93) hint at the potential problem of justification by 
criticising companies who do not take a company-wide look at the 
costs and benefits. They claim those who invest in major capital 
projects without a detailed financial appraisal run a number of risks.
The first is that they may invest in a project which is incapable of 
generating an adequate return on capital. The second is that they 
might invest in a project which does not represent the best potential 
application, failing to identify the project offering the greatest return. 
The final risk is that they may refrain from investing in a project, 
even though such an investment would be more advantageous than 
continuing with current practice.
In order to identify the company wide benefits they have identified 
16 cost factors for CAD and 29 areas of potential benefit. They 
claim that the costs and benefits can be quantified with sufficient 
certainty - and with a sufficiently low level of uncertainty - to enable 
a sound justification to be made.
14
They note that non-discounting methods such as payback and 
accounting rate of return are inappropriate because of the protracted 
nature of the benefits, and suggest the use of Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) techniques, measuring Net Present Value (NPV) or Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR), which are 
"...acceptable to accountants...".
Senker (1984a p228) takes a similar line on the use of payback for 
CAD justification, but also criticises the use of DCF as being an 
inadequate method. DCF, he states, encourages projects* which yield 
quick returns, since anticipated profits for future years are heavily 
discounted. This may happen regardless of whether the project is 
vital to the future of the Company.
He also criticises the emphasis on profit-centre control, which may 
reduce cooperation between divisions with the subsequent tendency 
to discourage managers from promoting projects which depress 
short-term profitability. This despite the potential long-term 
benefits.
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Hayes and Abernathy (1980 pl64), similarly argue that short-term 
financial measurements and ’management by numbers’ have been a 
feature of management in the US in recent years. The use of the 
profit centre as a primary unit of managerial responsibility has led to 
a greater dependence upon short-term financial measurements such 
as Return on Investment (ROI) for the evaluation of managers’ 
performance. This in turn has caused managers to make financially 
’safe’ investment decisions at the expense of projects with larger but 
longer term payoffs.
Gerwin (1988 p91) notes that:
"since short run quantifiable factors will be emphasised by 
strategic management in making capital investment decisions, 
computerised technology will be discounted. Its primary 
advantage of flexibility is a long- run intangible consideration".
Meredith and Hill (1987 p58) argue that justification techniques 
appropriate for low-level systems are inadequate for higher-level 
systems, because they do not measure critically the primary use for 
which the technology is being considered.
They suggest that financial techniques cannot reasonably be used to 
justify a strategic investment, which a fully integrated system 
represents.
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Figure 2.1 shows Meredith and Hill’s justification "model".
Level of Integration of 
Manufacturing Systems
Techniques Examples
Economic
Portfolio
Analytic
Strategic
Payback
ROI
NPV
Cashflow
Programming
Models
Scoring
Models
Growth
Options
Value
Analysis
Risk
Analysis
Technical
Importance
Business
Objectives
Competitive
Advantage
R & D
Level 1 
Stand-
Level 2 
Cells
Level 3 
Linked
Level 4 
Full
Islands Integrationalone
USEFUL
MOST APPROPRIATE
LARGELY \  
UNNECESSARY
Figure 2.1
According to the literature, then, we have three types or systems of 
justification. The first is the technological justification, based upon 
technological need regardless of the financial implications, or at least 
with finance as a secondary feature.
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It concentrates on benefits related to productivity, efficiency and 
quality, and whilst it is largely ignored by accountants it can have 
implications for revenue measures, e.g. cash flow.
The second type of justification is a short-term financial viewpoint, 
perhaps based on Discounted Cash Flow or Internal Rate of Return 
methods, and occasionally on payback.
The third type is the long-term viewpoint, and while several writers 
suggest that this is the "correct" means of justification, therb seems to 
be little evidence that it is commonly used.
Meredith’s consolidation of the three justification methods has some 
attraction in that it relates the three methods to their most 
appropriate application. What is clear, however, is the importance 
of the initial justification method, since this will provide the yardstick 
against which the implementation is eventually measured. It will 
also determine - in a somewhat arbitrary manner, according to the 
literature - whether or not the system will be implemented.
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2.2 Systems Integration
A Computer Aided Design system must be considered as part of, 
and not necessarily a major part of, the manufacturing information 
system, which itself is part of the company’s overall management 
information system. It is clear, therefore, that systems integration 
will be an important factor in the implementation of CAD.
Carrie and Bannerjee (1984 p252) identify trends towards both 
horizontal and vertical integration of systems, with horizontal 
integration crossing the horizontal boundaries between functions and 
vertical integration linking different managerial levels. They see 
these trends as fundamental in leading away from a corporate 
mainframe concept to distributed turnkey systems. This is a  bold 
concept for 1984, when data transfer protocols and standards were in 
their infancy. It is particularly bold when faced with the evidence of 
Arnold and Senker (1982 p5) that:
"Most CAD Systems we saw are primarily used as draughting 
systems and were cost-justified on the basis of saving draughting 
labour".
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At around the same time Carnall and Medland (1984 p56) touch on 
the need for integration, but concentrate on the discrete 
design/draughting system. It is clear that in the early 1980s systems 
integration was something of a pipe-dream, certainly on the level 
that we would consider today.
Winch (1983b p62) describes CAD/CAM as an
"integrating technology which requires stronger organisational 
linkages for its effective use".
However, whilst he sees true integration of CAD and CAM through 
a common data base he regards this as a technological island, which 
requires organisational changes to enable it to be integrated into the 
other systems.
By 1987 integration was taking on a much broader meaning. An 
integrated CAD/CAM  system incorporated design, draughting, 
engineering machine tools and manufacturing documentation 
systems, referred to as Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM). 
(Adler and Helleloid, 1987 plOl). They note:
"The competitive significance of a CIM environment derives less 
from the power of the component technologies and more from 
their progressive integration".
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This emphasis on synergy still remains with us in the 1990s.
One interesting proposition raised by Adler and Helleloid (1987 
pl04) is that computerised information systems must be well 
developed in the various functional areas before integration can take 
place. The argument for this is that integration is m ore problematic 
in terms of acceptance than in technological terms. Technological 
Integration is the easy bit. The hypothesis supports the 
top-down/bottom-up approach to advanced technology. The two - 
stage implementation starts with the top-down param eter setting to 
ensure systems have compatibility followed by bottom-up system 
choice and implementation.
The case studies will show that several of the companies investigated 
took a modified version of this approach.
A  number of the writers including Adler (1988 pp44ff) have 
commented on the "people" differences between implementing 
discrete systems and implementing integrated systems.
The former may be approached by skills development whereas the 
latter requires significant organisational and procedure changes.
This is taken further in the following section.
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Waterlow and Monniot (1986) in their State of the A rt study of 
Computer Aided Production Management (CAPM) identified four 
levels of CAPM integration, which they qualified as follows:
LEVEL
0 No CAPM
1 No integration
2 Partial integration
3 Full integration
4 Integration of 
manufacturing systems
DEFINITION ,
No CAPM or installing now 
Several functions 
computerised but without 
regard to integration 
Several functions linked via 
common files and 
co-ordinated controls 
All CAPM functions using 
common databases 
CAPM systems designed in 
conjunction with m aterial 
conversion, handling and 
quality systems against 
manufacturing strategy 
objectives.
This classification is of limited value for CAD/CAPM  integration, 
and will be expanded in later sections.
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2.3 Organisation and Management Changes
One of the best documented facets of the introduction of 
Information Technology and Advanced Manufacturing Technology is 
that relating to people issues. In particular, the changes in 
organisation and management structure has attracted much attention. 
Whilst, as in other areas, the literature specific to Computer Aided 
Design is sparse, there would appear to be a number of parallels 
worthy of investigation.
Collins and King (1988 p i82) in their investigations at R  & M 
Corporation look at - amongst other factors - the management of the 
CAD implementation. They conclude that draughters whose work 
involves more routine technology may derive m ore motivational 
benefits from CAD than those whose work is inherently complex. 
Managers should therefore anticipate changes in job design among 
those users employing highly routine technology, and should resist 
the temptation to manage CAD users in the same manner as 
non-users. They should develop implementation plans calling for 
more training, longer payback periods and the implementation of 
CAD in those areas where greatest improvements in performance 
can be produced - by implication the routine tasks.
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Winch (1983a), as described earlier, notes that CAD/CAM  is an 
integrating technology, which requires stronger organisational 
linkages for its effective use. Whilst the change is only a shift of 
emphasis, it is of such a magnitude as to generate considerable 
organisation stress. This occurs when the "mutually incompatible" 
organisation structures for CAD and CAM come into the conflict. 
Mintzberg (1979a) and Galbraith (1977) suggest the use of matrix 
organisation to resolve the problem. However, Winch argues that 
this is only one solution.
"If the environment is such that engineering can be functionally
organised then there is no need for organisational change. If,
on the other hand, the technology is such that the economies of 
scale in manufacturing allow the abandonment of functional 
organisation, there is again no need for matrix organisation."
Haywood and Bessant (1987) studied eight small to medium sized 
firms which had adopted flexible manufacturing systems. They claim 
that it is clear that organisation change is important for the 
successful implementation of new technology, but that there is no 
clear "best" pattern. Each organisation needs to seek the most 
appropriate arrangement for its circumstances.
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Five of the eight companies had experienced organisational problems 
during the implementation. They were convinced that companies of 
their size could not operate without the collapsing of boundaries 
between previously traditional operations. However, resistance to 
such change was common amongst managers, particularly middle 
managers.
Also, Marchrzak et.al. (1987 pl60ff) acknowledge the need to 
develop new organisational structures for enhancing communication 
among parties within the CAD design function and external to it. A 
management system is required which reduces the barriers to the 
engineering/manufacturing interface. However, they offer no ways 
of achieving such a structure.
Arnold (1983 p37) makes the interesting point that re-organisation is 
often forced on a company to enable it to cope with a computer.
This in turn leads the company to think about its systems, procedures 
and standards for the first time in years. As a consequence, 
improvements are brought about in the management and efficiency 
of the design process which could have been obtained without the 
implementation of CAD. The suggestion in this is that most 
companies change their organisation as a reaction to implementation 
rather than in a proactive manner.
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Adler (1988 pp34ff) takes a different approach to the common 
reorganisation philosophy. He accepts that the more sophisticated 
technical changes require changes of procedure and of structure. He 
goes further, to suggest that the more major changes require changes 
in strategy and culture. However, at that stage he appears to back 
away from organisational change, suggesting that:
"A key challenge .... is, therefore, to adapt (sic) organisational 
cultures to maximise spontaneous cooperation".
This is a "softly-softly" approach compared with the structural 
changes preferred by Mintzberg, Galbraith et.al.
Tranfield and Smith (1987/1990) suggest that successful 
implementation of technological change:
"... requires a revolution in management thinking in many 
companies".
Major technological change will have an influence on and will be 
influenced by the business strategy of the Company, and may impact 
on business performance.
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This is evidenced by the number of companies in which the 
management has failed to take a strategic view of the whole 
design/production system, and which have "islands" of automation.
Where CAD/CAM  is used as an integrative technology, 
implementation problems are often due to:
" the failure to recognise that new organisational realignments
are needed".
In their study of 13 Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
applications, Tranfield and Smith note that the most significant issue 
raised was that:
"exploitation required a radical change in how management think 
and organise manufacturing".
Those companies which had regarded AMT implementation as a 
step function change, and changed the organisation accordingly were 
more likely to succeed. This requires, in their terms, a morphogenic 
change, based upon a clear vision of the planning horizon, rather 
than the conventional morphostatic change associated with 
organisational growth.
27
It is clear, from the implications of morphogenic change, why 
managers are reluctant to take this approach, and that the impetus 
must come from the top of the organisation tree.
The research identifies nine elements of a methodology for f 
successful AMT implementation, seven of which have direct or 
indirect implications for the organisation structure or managerial 
style.
It is interesting to look at the wider issues of organisational change 
suggested by Delbeke (1983), Perez (1983) and Perez and Freeman 
(1988). Tranfield and Smith (1990 p51), following Perez and 
Freeman (1988) argue that the present trends in technology 
represent part of a paradigm shift in manufacturing. The paradigm 
being discussed is the set of rules which govern the workings of 
society and set the pattern of best practice. It is argued that the 
paradigm persists for an extended period of time, becoming 
increasingly inappropriate, until eventually it shifts and a new one 
emerges. Tranfield and Smith, building on the work of Bessant 
represent this as a series of ’S’ curves and suggest that the current 
position is as jumping from the fourth to the fifth curve. This is 
shown graphically in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2
The consequence, or corollaiy of such a shift is that organisational 
form is changing in many companies, and whilst the "old" form is 
clear, the shape of the "new" form is not, and companies are 
experimenting in an attempt to define "best practice".
The implication of this thinking for organisations undergoing major 
change, particularly where it involves information technology and 
communications, as CAD/CAM  does, is very significant.
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Whilst it may be clear that implementation of CAD/CAM  involves 
increased organisational integration, the "best" form for that 
integration may not be identified for some years.
In addition to the organisational change brought about by the 
implementation of an integrating technology, there are several other 
interesting ’human’ changes which may take place. Multi-skilling has 
already been hinted at earlier in the section, but Bessant et al.
(1992) suggest that the skill life itself may be shortened, and may 
indeed be shorter than the employee (working) life.
Accountability was another feature noted by Bessant et al. (op. cit.), 
whereby individuals would be formed into "cells" with devolved 
authority, and be responsible to those cells. In terms of management, 
these cells tend to be supervisor supported rather than supervisor 
controlled. Management has effectively been devolved to the "shop 
floor" units which then have more autonomy.
These changes are not, of course, limited to drawing/design offices, 
but are now commonplace throughout the manufacturing units of 
forward - looking companies.
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2.4 The System Champion
The need for top management to be involved at the early stages of 
systems strategy formulation has been documented for many years. 
As far back as 1973, Ettlie (1973 p36) found that management’s 
commitment to:
"...the philosophy of the new approach to manufacturing..."
to be second only to degree of workflow integration in correlation 
with utilisation rate (tape time) on NC tools.
Carrie and Bannerjee (1984 pp251ff) and others working in the same 
era note that the "top-down., bottom up" approach as described 
earlier is necessary in implementing a manufacturing information 
system. This implies that senior management will be involved at the 
specification stage.
The role of the "Project Champion" comes into the literature in the 
early 1980s (see for example Altschuler et al. (1984), Twiss (1984) 
p. 16). The prerequisite of such a "champion" is that he or she shall 
be influential in the management structure and shall work closely 
with the specification/implementation team.
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Such a person will have the authority to cross boundaries between 
departments, reducing inter-departmental conflict. H e will also have 
the ability to make the necessary changes to the organisation. ,
Haywood and Bessant (1987), looking at Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems (FMS) in small to medium sized companies found that 
seven of the eight companies they studied deemed the project 
champion to be very important or even vital to maintaining process 
efficiency. The role was often fulfilled by the Managing Director, as 
may be expected in small enterprises, or by the Production or 
Technical Director.
The research of Tranfield and Smith (1988) supports the top-down 
philosophy and in particular the senior management "champion". 
They take the concept further by involving all levels of management 
in a "cascade" of ideas generated by the top team.
If these are handled correctly, perhaps in a series of workshops, 
useful feedback can be obtained on the effectiveness or otherwise of 
the strategic decisions. There is nothing particularly innovative 
about this process, which underlies the communications philosophy 
of many successful firms. However, its express use in Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation is not well 
documented. Its main strength is, of course, in developing 
commitment, in this case to the new technology.
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Gerwin (1988 p93) picks up on the same sorts of concepts, giving the 
technical task force, including the new technology champion, the 
responsibility of recommending hardware, software and vendors.
The task force is not, however, a decision making body, and the final 
decisions on the recommendations are taken by the Company’s 
strategic management. Gerwin notes that this has a number of 
inherent problems. The greater the technical complexity of the 
recommendation, the less likely is the strategic management to 
question it. Unable to judge the future effectiveness and benefits, or 
even compatibility with its needs, strategic management is faced with 
a great deal of uncertainty and may make uninformed decisions.
The models described by Tranfield and Smith and Gerwin would not 
appear to be uncommon nor need they be mutually exclusive, 
particularly in the small firm where the technical task force and the 
strategic management team have at least some common members, 
including the "champion".
2.5 M easuring Implementation Effectiveness
The measurement of the effectiveness or success of an 
implementation has been discussed by many writers against an 
abstract background, and few have defined the param eters clearly. 
The first question to be answered is quite basic - what do we m ean 
by success?
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It is logical to look back at the initial justification for purchase, but 
where this is related to survival or some element of "me too", this is 
not particularly helpful.
In any case, it is reasonable to suppose that, particularly in 
companies which are implementing AMT for the first time, 
expectations will change as the implementation proceeds. In other 
words, the definition of success, even where it is quite specific in the 
case for justification, may be inappropriate as a true measure.
Several writers have addressed the thorny problem of defining 
success in implementation, and these fall into three categories. The 
first is the proposition that success is measured by the extent that the 
organisation uses the technology. This was first propounded by 
Bikson et. al. (1981 p226) and referred to as "’degree’ of 
implementation". Note that the focus is on the organisational use, 
and not on the use by the individual.
The comfortable factor in this definition is the ease of measurement, 
since total machine usage time can be used as a broad-brush 
indicator. What is not so easily defined is the yardstick against 
which this usage can be measured.
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The second category, as supported by Johnson et. al. (1985) is the 
definition of success as depending on the sophisticated use of 
technology. This has a number of attractive features, not least of 
which is its appropriateness for CAD implementation.
Whilst the success of a word processor can possibly be measured by 
the amount of use it gets, the same cannot be said for CAD. A 
simple measure of usage time is hardly a satisfactory measure of its 
use to the Company. By identifying several levels of sophistication, a 
more precise measure is achieved.
They define the lowest level as "low integration" - use of the word 
processor (their target system) as a typewriter. This may correspond 
to using a CAD system as an electronic pencil. Their second 
"clockwork system" level relies on the development of procedures to 
speed up the process and reduce keystrokes. The analogy here may 
be the use of symbols, macros or parametric programs.
The third level of sophistication they called "expander systems". At 
this level, centres of expertise are developed to handle all word 
processing. The analogy is wearing a little thin, but the use of a 
common symbol library may be the equivalent level.
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The fourth and highest level was known as "system-wide 
adaptation", with decentralised systems and operators responsible 
for their creative use. At this stage the analogy falls down 
totally, since such a move in CAD terms would be retrograde. A 
more meaningful fourth step for CAD would be a fully 
integrated system of CAD workstations. Unlike the word 
processor situation, this would leave several more levels of 
sophistication available for CAD/CAM  systems.
This is a more meaningful definition of success than the first, but it 
leaves open the question of the aspiration level of the 
implementation team at the start of the project.
Different companies will certainly seek differing levels of 
sophistication, and the success must be measured against this 
sub-optimal (in most cases) satisficing level.
The third category of definitions contains what Bikson et. al. (1981 
p227) refer to as the "fidelity of implementation". This relates to the 
extent to which the technology is exploited rather than the extent to 
which it is utilised. There may be situations where CAD is the only 
way of carrying out a particular design exercise. This would satisfy 
this implementation criterion even if the usage were low. This 
definition is, then, more to do with design innovation than with 
drawing office throughput.
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These three categories of measurement can be classed broadly as 
"business success" categories. Voss (1988b) highlights another series 
of categories involved with technical success. He, of course, is 
looking at the problem from an AMT viewpoint, where success can 
in principle be measured in technical terms. He quotes several 
measures of success and failure, including:
Success = % uptime
= use in actual production 
= has been in use for a year ^
Failure = Limited number of parts actually 
made on the system
He also refers (Voss (1988b p58) to the work of Ettlie (1984), who 
found that manufacturing organisations....
" would seem to believe that they have successfully implemented 
new operating technology when two conditions are met. Firstly, 
when all the bugs have been ironed out and it is working 
technically. Second, when the operation is working reliably and 
there is little downtime, and /or the new technology has a high 
utilisation rate".
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This is very similar to the definition of success which Bikson evolved 
for IT.
Finally Voss develops his own definition of implementation as:
"the user process that leads to the successful adoption of an 
innovation of new technology".
Whilst it is difficult to fault this as a definition of the implementation 
process, it does not further the search for a measure of success.
Wainwright and Bowker (1988 p396) take up Voss’s definition of 
implementation and expand it to incorporate problem definition and 
performance evaluation of what constitutes success. Their definition 
is:
"The user process that spans problem awareness through 
contextual criteria, which directs the adoption and subsequent 
development of the requisite process technology".
All we have to do, then, is to define the relevant contextual criteria.
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Smith and Tranfield, in discussions with Wainwright and Bowker 
(Wainwright & Bowker 1988 p396) suggest the following four 
dimensions for the interpretation of the implementation process:
1) Business validity which represents essentially an examination of 
the exploitation problem eg Was it worth it?
2) Technical validity an examination of the installation problem eg 
Did it work?
3) Organisational validity an examination of the change problem or 
in other words eg Can we cope with it?
4) User validity asks the question did the operators use it?, in 
essence an examination of the introduction problem.
This analytical tool has a great deal to recommend it, and comments 
on three of the four dimensions will generally be elicited from 
different people within the organisation. As Clegg (1988) points out 
in his tongue-in-cheek review of CAD personalities, the influential 
Luddite may take a totally different view of implementation success 
from that of his colleagues, demonstrating that truth may not be 
absolute.
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One aspect of what Wainwright & Bowker refer to as the "business 
dimension" which merits a good deal of discussion in the texts is the 
potential for financial benefits.
As was argued earlier, it would appear that many strategic 
investment decisions are taken on a short or medium term  financial 
basis. Where this is the case the measurement of success or failure 
is relatively simple, provided that the financial controls are 
sufficiently good to isolate the effects of the investment.
Hayes and Abernathy (1980 pl64) point out the disadvantages of 
reliance on this method of justification, which produces an 
environment where no-one can afford failure or a reduction in 
profitability. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the m ethod seems to be 
attractive. Senker (1984a p226) suggests one reason for this in CAD 
implementations is that most CAD suppliers in the past have 
attempted to sell their systems based upon savings in draughtsmen’s 
labour time. This would seem to be flawed, in that labour costs are 
normally a very small percentage of a company’s total costs. 
Haywood and Bessant (1987 p8) found that in the eight companies 
they studied the wage costs were only 20 percent of total costs. In 
the USA, Senker (1984b) suggested that this figure was greater than 
10 percent in only a few industries.
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If this is the case, then a company turning over £10 million at 10 
percent net profit will have labour costs of £900,000, and design costs 
(at 10 percent) of no more than £90,000. A cost saving of 20 percent 
will therefore yield only £18,000 - a very small sum for a drawing 
office with say, eight draughtsmen.
Success on this criterion is therefore going to be hard to 
demonstrate.
2.6 Significant Problem Areas ^
The problems associated with implementing high technology systems 
are covered widely in the texts. They centre around the two basic 
issues of people and systems. The people issue revolves around such 
factors as organisation, skills, resistance to change and commitment, 
whilst the systems issue includes the "hard" factors of system quality, 
development, implementation and integration.
2.6.1 Organisation and People Issues
By far the greatest incidence of problems noted in the texts is 
associated with people, either in terms of management, in resistance 
to change or in organisational issues.
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Keen (1981 p361) looks towards a strategy for the implementation of 
Management Information Systems (MIS), of which CAD/CAM  can 
be regarded as a subset, based upon the premise that the 
organisation is the major issue.
He looks closely at the problem of "social inertia", and the human 
aspects which cause it, supporting this with a tactical approach to 
dealing with it.
Keen also looks at the issue of "counter-implementation" - a' political 
approach to causing implementation failure, which includes diversion 
of resources, deflection of goals and dissipation of energies.
Again, he looks at some tactical methods of coping with 
counter-implementation. Compare this with Clegg’s (1988) 
"Influential Luddite", who has the power and motivation to take this 
sort of action.
Eason (1982 p58ff) also looks at the organisational end of 
implementation, taking as a starting point the "traditional" 
consequences of implementing computer systems which pervaded the 
texts at that time; job losses, changes in job content, health 
problems, retraining, increase in formality, changes in power and 
influence and industrial relations changes, all of which are social 
system factors.
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He expresses strongly the desirability of user involvement during the 
whole of the selection and implementation period, but argues that 
there is, in practice, a rather narrow window of time in which 
effective contribution can be made. This is bounded by the level of 
understanding or learning at the bottom  end and the need for system 
finalisation at the upper end.
His methodology for systems development seeks to keep 
organisational learning about technology ahead of system 
development so that the former can inform the latter.
Eason’s approach is "bottom-up" and "user-led", which has certain 
merit. For instance, it is particularly good for gaining the 
commitment of users and others at low levels in the organisation to 
the change about to take place.
It does not guarantee commitment, but it increases the probability. 
However, it leads to morphostatic change rather than morphogenic 
change, and it is particularly poor where a system needs to be 
reconfigured strategically. It takes little account of the need, if any, 
for major, system-wide change. It could, indeed, lead to a situation 
where functions are automated which may have no place in the 
planned system.
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The author has observed this frequently in organisations which have 
computerised discrete functions to provide "islands of automation" 
rather than looking at the overall need for integrated systems. The 
result has been on occasions that the "islands" have been subsumed 
at a later date, rendering the equipment redundant.
In a study of eight FM S/FM C implementations, Haywood and 
Bessant (1987) found that five of them stressed that it was 
organisational problems which presented the major interfacing 
problems and contributed to excessive timescales. Managers were 
more likely to resist change than the shopfloor workforce, and being 
in a more influential position they could have a greater effect on the 
implementation. In particular, they could influence the attitudes to 
training, which was considered as an essential adjunct to FMS 
introduction.
Haywood and Bessant also noted that the change in skills needs led 
to a problem of recruitment of a satisfactory level of people. It is 
usually assumed that existing personnel can be retrained to cope with 
the new technologies. This may be so in the majority of cases, but 
the training in itself makes the staff marketable, and a more rapid 
staff turnover may be the result. Hence the need for continuing 
training and for skills recruitment.
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Adler (1988 p43) quotes a McKinsey & Co survey of CAD/CAM  
implementation ("Forging CAD/CAM  into a strategic weapon". 
January 1984) which claims that the benefits of CAD/CAM  could be 
tripled in terms of reduced cycle time were it not for the lack of 
managerial commitment.
Adler further suggests that labour requirements are amongst the 
least well managed of all the implementation issues. He claims that 
the skills impact of new technology is low priority compared to the 
technical capabilities and cost savings. Similarly, when the*'" 
equipment arrives, training comes second to debugging the system 
and getting production rolling again. The result is that the attention 
to optional skills mix tends to be a firefighting exercise brought on 
by a need to absorb displaced people or to deal with job 
classification grievances.
Haywood-Farmer and Hill (1989 pp71ff) in their survey of CAD 
implementation in the Canadian consulting engineering industry 
found a general acceptance amongst users that CAD demands more 
management skills. However, they also found that half the 
respondents who accepted this felt that their senior staff were not 
prepared for CAD systems to be a success. Unfortunately the 
measure of success is not reported.
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This work is interesting, in that it is the only recent work which looks 
at the managerial skills level in actual implementations despite the 
wealth of theoretical writing on the topic. All other implementation 
studies involving skills reporting concentrate on the skills of the users 
- designers, engineers or draughtsmen - rather than the management.
We have to go back almost a decade to Arnold and Senker (1982) to 
find further empirical evidence of the shortfall in managerial skills.
A number of examples of the failings of management serves to 
highlight the need for training prior to implementation. THe authors 
go as far as to suggest government promotion of the raising of skill 
standards in management in the short term and in influencing the 
long term education and training of managers. It could be claimed 
that this need is still present ten years on.
In summary, there is a consensus that organisation and people issues 
feature strongly in system implementation, whether the 
implementation involves morphostatic or morphogenic change.
It is interesting to note the apparent general shift in emphasis from 
user resistance in the early 1980s to management resistance in the 
late 1980s.
The one exception cited is Arnold and Senker (1982) who were 
preaching the need for management training a decade ago.
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The reason for the apparent shift has not been investigated or 
assessed, but it could have something to do with the decline in 
organised labour over the period since about 1979. It is probable 
that the texts of the early 1980s reflect the needs of the day to take 
operators into account, particularly in the larger businesses such as 
the automotive industries where advanced manufacturing technology 
was being implemented and trades union were very strong.
Later in the decade, as managers were given the authority to 
manage, and as the technologies became more complex, the need for 
skilled implementers at managerial level appears to have become 
more acute.
2.6.2 Technical Issues
Not all writers consider the technical issues to be a vital area of 
study. Indeed Wainwright and Bowker (1988 pp395ff) attack the 
traditional approach to implementation of advanced manufacturing 
technology in general for its concentration on mechanistic issues 
without regard for the organisation and management dimensions of 
the process. This is quite a switch from the situation only six years 
or so earlier when the reverse appeared to be the case.
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They build on the work of Tranfield and Smith (1987) to create a 
multi-dimensional implementation model. This model suggests merit 
in looking to four important factors - technical, organisational, 
business/strategic and user issues.
Adler and Helleloid (1987 pl04) expand upon the technical issues of 
implementation and integration, which would appear to be 
particularly relevant in terms of CAD/CAM.
They suggest that:
"Computerised information systems must be well developed 
individually in both engineering and production functions before 
integration can occur. In other words, system effectiveness will be 
greater when all potential users of the system have already 
developed their own computer capabilities before the integrated 
system is developed".
However, they go on to suggest that the most difficult task is not the 
integration of software but the acceptance of the tools, which will be 
more acceptable if they are well designed. This supports the 
hypothesis propounded by Lucas (1985) discussed earlier. They 
further suggest that this can be better achieved if the users are able 
to take an active part in the development, again supporting work of 
Eason (1982).
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Peccei and Guest (1984 pp84ff) take a totally different perspective 
on the problems of implementation effectiveness. They suggest, 
quite reasonably, that the measurement of effectiveness depends 
upon the definition of success. What may be regarded as successful 
in one company may be inappropriate in another. Goals may be 
vague, ambiguous or simply unrealistic, and therefore may not 
provide a sound basis for assessment.
Goals may also be different across the various interest groups, and 
Voss (1988) notes that the goals may well change during the 
implementation.
These factors are clearly going to be important when attempting to 
define the problems associated with implementation. Peccei and 
Guest (1984 p95) have therefore developed a new framework for 
evaluation which focuses on three areas; the outcome/effectiveness 
of change, the nature and quality of the change process and the ratio 
of inputs to outputs in the change process. They use the framework 
in an analysis of a word processor implementation at British Rail.
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Lucas (1985 p75) takes a more balanced view of implementation 
than those already discussed. He accepts the im portance of the 
human aspects:
"Favourable attitudes on the part of users should be extremely 
important in implementation: attitudes have an action component, 
and favourable attitudes are consistent with high levels of use and 
satisfaction with a system".
However, he also takes into account the possibility that "other 
factors may be equally important.
"The technical quality of systems is important; it directly affects 
our attitudes as users and also makes it easier to use the system 
physically. For example, a system with difficult input 
requirements or a difficult language for user input will be used 
less than one with a good technical design".
He acknowledges that lack of these two factors may lead to lack of 
system usage, ie implementation failure. This m ore balanced 
approach to the problems of implementation would appear to 
provide more scope for further work than the unilateral approaches 
described previously.
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2.7 System vs Implementation Success
An impiementation can clearly be a failure for one of two reasons. 
Firstly the system itself may not be a success. In Quality Assurance 
terms it may not be "Fit for Purpose". Indeed it may even, in, 
consumerism terms, be "Not of Merchantable Quality". M ore likely, 
though, it may simply not be user-friendly, to the extent that it 
cannot be implemented successfully.
Secondly, the system may be perfectly satisfactory, and mayL>e a 
good match to the Company’s needs, but may be implemented badly.
In these terms, a successful implementation can only be achieved if a 
technically satisfactory system is implemented well. The best 
possible implementation of a poor system, or the mediocre 
implementation of a satisfactory system can at best be moderately 
successful, whilst a mediocre implementation of a mediocre system 
will almost certainly be regarded as a failure.
Looking back at the section on Justification (Section 2.1) it is clear 
that justification of a system is based entirely on the assumption of a 
successful implementation. Consideration is given only to the 
benefits to be obtained, in financial or other terms once the system 
is up and running.
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As examples of this, Arnold (1983 p36) lists as the potential benefits 
of a system, which include increased productivity, accuracy, 
presentation and perception of the Company. Primrose et. al. (1985 
pp92,93) concentrate more on the company-wide costs and benefits 
of a system, whilst Gerwin (1988 p91) sees advantages in flexibility, 
which he regards as a long-run intangible consideration.
Justification, then, appears to be a comparison of the benefits of a 
system with the costs of a system. It is normal to ignore the cost of 
"getting it right", which may be significant, or in some cases^even 
prohibitive.
As a criticism of the justification process, this is perhaps unfair, 
since the aim of the company in installing CAD is not to fail but to 
be successful. To justify a system on the assumption that it would 
not be successful would clearly be folly. Whilst justification 
concentrates on the "systems" factors, Section 2.6, which deals with 
implementation problems, focuses predominantly on the 
implementation process and its level of success. The reasons for this 
are not enumerated in the texts, but there are at least three 
possibilities:
a) A  system manager is going to be reluctant to admit that the 
system which he and his team have chosen is not satisfactory for 
the job in hand.
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b) Success of the system as a whole, in financial and time-saving 
terms is difficult to evaluate, since it may be affected by changes 
in the type of work being done, the volume of work being done, 
technological advances etc, which in turn may be affected by the 
value of the pound, market changes and company strategy. f
c) Implementation problems are easy to spot, and in management 
terms are less painful to acknowledge than inherent system 
problems. How odd this is when effective implementation is 
surely a management function
We find, therefore, a great deal in the texts about organisational 
change (Keen (1981), Eason (1982), Haywood and Bessant (1987)) 
and managerial commitment, or lack of it (Adler (1988), 
Haywood-Farmer and Hill (1989)). We also find a considerable 
amount written about the systems themselves, but on looking deeper 
we can see that they concentrate on the ’implementation’ end of 
systems rather than on systems failings. This can be seen in Adler 
and Helleloid (1987) and Lucas (1985).
The other factor missing from the texts is any criticism, constructive 
or otherwise, of what we may call the ’mechanistic end’ of the 
implementation process. In this we include the use of a Project 
Champion and the Implementation Team.
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It seems strange that the features which are considered as essential 
by a high proportion of writers should have so little written about 
their effectiveness.
2.8 Summary
As was noted earlier, the literature on the implementation of CAD 
systems is a little thin, and it has been necessary to look for 
similarities in the field of Information Technology. Even there, the 
coverage of small businesses is sparse, whilst the field of CAD in 
small businesses is virtually untouched.
The literature which has been surveyed has been broken down, 
somewhat artificially, one may argue, into categories which can be 
studied independently. The categories were, to some extent, 
self-selecting, in that they were the major issues perceived by the 
majority of writers, even though the section titles may not 
correspond to the terminology used by those writers.
The section on Justification highlights the perceived benefits of a 
CAD (or I.T.) system. Many of the writers list the benefits which 
would form the basis of the justification argument, and the writer has 
seen such lists in small and medium sized firms used for just that 
purpose. One important factor in this is that justification in these 
terms is regularly found for a first investment in CAD.
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It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this work, to look at 
the justification for expansion of a system or its replacement by a 
more sophisticated system. It is felt that the factors for justification 
may be quite different.
Financial justification is regarded with some scepticism by a number 
of writers, particularly where techniques such as Payback, Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF), Return on Investment (ROI), Net Present Value 
(NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) are concerned. Primrose 
et. al. (1985), Senker (1984), Hayes and Abernathy (19B0)Tand 
Gerwin (1988) are particularly scathing about such short-term 
quantification methods. It is interesting to compare these traditional 
accounting methods with modern Japanese investment decision 
making, which takes a much longer view of the investment. It would 
be interesting, but again beyond the scope of this work, to compare 
the justification methods of small Japanese companies with those in 
the UK.
Whatever justification method is used, the outcome of it will be a 
decision on whether to proceed, and if it should do so we may expect 
the justification to form the basis of the measurement of success.
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The section on Systems Integration starts off with the premise that 
the CAD system is not an end in itself, even for the very small firm, 
but a step towards an overall Manufacturing and M anagement 
Information and Control system. Integration of systems implies 
linking across "traditional" functional boundaries, both horizontally 
and vertically, and several writers, including Adler and Helleloid
(1987) point to the "people" issues of these cross-functional systems.
This is taken further in the section on Organisation and 
Management Changes, where the management of a CAD drawing 
office is contrasted with a traditional drawing office. The need for, 
and the form of organisational change is discussed by Mintzberg 
(1979a) and Winch (1983a) who argue for and against matrix 
management respectively.
The need to break down the traditional barriers between 
departments is identified by several writers. Adler (1983) goes so far 
as the suggest that these organisational changes can in themselves 
bring about efficiency improvements over and above those provided 
by the CAD system.
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There is scope here to compare and contrast the changes which take 
place in UK based companies with those in German or Italian 
companies, which tend to have much more clearly defined structural 
boundaries and with Japanese companies which generally have 
flatter structures.
The need for organisational change is accepted by most writers, and 
several suggest, quite reasonably, that this needs to be driven from 
the top. The concept of System Champion is therefore propounded 
by several writers from Altschuler (1984) onwards. Those who 
mention such a champion agree that it is an essential for successful 
implementation.
Tranfield and Smith (1988) take this further, building it into a 
"cascade" of information dissemination not dissimilar to the concept 
of team briefing now used by many large and medium sized 
companies and increasingly by small companies as a communications 
tool.
The correlation between effective communication within a company 
and the ease of implementing integrating technologies would make 
interesting research.
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It would be reasonable to expect success of a system implementation 
to be measured against the same factors as were used for the 
justification, but the section on Measuring Implementation 
Effectiveness shows that this is not so simple as it seems. Back in 
1981 Bikson et. al. (1981) suggested that a good measure would be 
the extent to which the organisation uses the system. Johnson et. al. 
(1985) recognise that the level of sophistication of use of the system 
is important, but do not recognise that some companies, particularly 
small companies, may not seek sophistication. Bikson et. al. (1981) 
look at the "fidelity of implementation", i.e. the exploitalion-rather 
than the usage of the technology.
The potential for financial benefits is discussed widely in the texts. 
Whilst in the past CAD salesmen have sold systems on this basis, 
there is general agreement that success on the basis of financial 
savings is likely to be hard to demonstrate.
Not all systems can be regarded as a success, regardless of the 
measures used, and the section on Significant Problem Areas 
highlights what can go wrong. In general, it subdivides into 
Organisation and People problems and Technical problems.
Not surprisingly, this section covers much of the ground of earlier 
sections in which writers described "how to" implement, based upon 
what they observed to be the problem areas.
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The final section deals with the twin factors for eventual success - 
system success and implementation success. It suggests reasons for 
the justification of systems concentrating on systems features whilst 
the problems tend to home in on implementation issues. There is 
potential to expand this section by researching the implementation 
problems in more detail, looking beyond the "claimed” problem areas 
to the real problem areas, to see whether systems feature strongly.
2.9 Research Focus
The literature search raises many more questions than it answers and 
it is clear that a number of significant areas for research are opened 
up. It is difficult, however, to overlook the overwhelming mass of 
literature which suggests that in advanced technology 
implementation, the people and organisational issues are as 
important if not more important than the technological issues.
Some writers go so far as to to suggest that the success of an 
implementation hinges around the way in which an organisation can 
change or adapt to the requirements of the new technology.
In looking at the success and failure of CAD implementation in 
small firms, there are several areas which could be explored in the 
light of the findings, and some of these are described below.
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a) Concentrate on the people aspects of the six chosen
implementations to the exclusion of the technological aspects, 
following the work of earlier writers. One problem with this 
approach is that with such a small sample size, it is quite 
conceivable that one or more may have experienced the sorts of 
technical problems encountered in the texts. This could lead to 
conclusions based on invalid or erroneous information.
Consider, for instance, the unlikely scenario that CAD 
implementations always fail in small firms because inexpensive 
CAD systems are technologically inferior. An examination of the 
people and organisational issues in this instance may yield a 
perfectly reasonable thesis that had little to do with the actual 
causation.
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b) Ignore the overwhelming body of literature on the basis that for 
all the research which has been carried out, no "solution" has 
been found, and seek a "solution" based upon technological issues. 
This is the other extreme to that described above, and is equally 
unlikely to be fruitful.
c) Compare and contrast the implementation of systems in large and 
small firms, and seek out the common factors which run through 
the successes and failures. This gives rise to two fundamental 
problems. Firstly, the writer has no access to large firms, and the 
literature on CAD implementation in large firms is insufficient to 
support a comparative study. Secondly, we cannot be sure that 
the reasons for failure or success would be the same in small and 
large firms, so drawing parallels may be counter-productive. 
Indeed, research in this area could be most interesting.
d) Take an open-ended look at the case material available, using 
people issues as a focus in deference to the writers who have 
highlighted people and organisational issues. Look, at the same 
time, for other, non-people issues, which may be relevant in the 
context of the small firms studied. In other words, keep the 
research focus deliberately blurred so that no doors are closed 
too early.
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This approach gives the impression of being woolly, but it has a 
certain attraction that open-mindedness and lateral thinking can, on 
occasions, give rise to revolutionary ideas and concepts.
To avoid the focus being too blurred, and giving rise to masses of 
extraneous information, a small number of minor foci should be 
identified, and it would be logical to use those most commonly 
encountered in the texts.
In summary, the research should have the following foci or 
parameters:
1 People and Organisations - this may be sub-divided
2 Level of Integration
3 Prior Computer Knowledge
4 Expectation of the System
5 Justification of the systems
6 Level of Satisfaction.
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3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter sets out to define the methodology used in the work, and 
to compare and contrast it with alternative methodologies. It also 
seeks to place the work into the spectra of research methodologies 
developed by other writers.
Section 3.1 looks at the inductive/deductive spectrum, and the way in 
which it can be perceived as a cycle into which one may break at any 
point.
Section 3.2 examines the definitions and descriptions of case studies 
developed by various authors. Whilst there are very few of them, they 
are telling about the approach of the author to the case study. The 
section develops a working and purposeful definition of a case study.
Section 3.3 recognises the dangers of collecting free-form data, and 
highlights the need to have a well-defined focus prior to the data 
collection.
Section 3.4 describes the approach taken to the research. It explains 
the reasoning behind the use of a questionnaire for data collection 
and how it was used.
It places the approach into the context of current research thinking by 
such writers as Schein (1987), Fredricks and Ludtke (1975) and 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975).
Section 3.5 describes the actual process of the methodology, from the 
selection of cases through to final exit discussions. It includes details 
of the questionnaire and the process used in data collection. It 
explains how cases were "deselected" to give a shortlist for detailed 
investigation.
The arguments for and against the use of case studies in research are 
presented in Section 3.6 which also argues the case for the use of a 
small number of such studies.
Section 3.7 looks briefly at a method of analysis of case study 
material, taking a three-stage approach of within-case investigation, 
cross-case pattern searching and within-case pattern investigation.
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3.1 Induction vs Deduction
It has long been established (Brewer & Hunter (1989); Eisenhardt 
(1989); Evered & Lewis (1981); Gill & Johnson (1991); Mitchell 
(1983)) that research falls into two categories: Deductive - a process 
which leads from theory to observation, testing the theory, and 
Inductive - a process which builds theory from observation. Kolb, 
Rubin and McIntyre (1979) tie the two methodologies together in a 
model which they refer to as an Experiential Learning Cycle (Fig 3.1)
The two methodologies can be seen to be represented and described 
by the two sides of the cycle. The left hand side corresponds to 
deductive research whilst the right hand is akin to inductive research.
—  CONCRETE EXPERIENCES
TESTING IMPLICATIONS OF 
CONCEPTS IN NEW SITUATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
AND
REFLECTIONS
FORMATION OF ABSTRACT 
CONCEPTS AND GENERALISATION
Fig 3.1
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As a model of learning this seems to be sound, but it misses a 
fundamental point that in practice research often encompasses 
elements of both methodologies. Indeed Gill and Johnson (1991) 
suggest that Induction and Deduction are at opposite ends of a 
spectrum of methodologies, and research will take its place on .'this 
continuum between an emphasis on nomothetic methods and an 
emphasis on ideographic methods. At the nomothetic end of the 
continuum the methods might include laboratory experimentation, 
whilst the ideographic end encompasses ethnography.
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Note that the work of Kolb et al. (1979) is based on Wallace (1971 
p l8), who developed it as a model of the scientific process.
Concept Formation 
Proposition Formation 
and
Proposition Arrangement
Measurement 
Sample Summarization 
and
Parameter Estimation
Theories
Losical
I Inference
Observations
Logical \  
Deduction )
Decisions
Empirical to accept Hypotheses
Generalisations or reject
Hypotheses
Tests of 
Hypotheses
Interpretation 
Instrumentation 
Scaling & Sampling
Figure 3.2
The Principal Information Components, Methodological Controls 
and Information Transformations of the Scientific Process
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One of the problems with theory orientated research, whether it be 
inductive (theory building) or deductive (theory testing) is that:
"... most empirical generalisations are logically consistent with a 
good many theories, and, as this implies, different theories lead 
to many of the same predictions". (Brewer and Hunter (1989) 
p35).
They point out that the generalisation that homicide rates increase 
after wars is consistent with a variety of theories, which inHurn can 
lead to a variety of expected outcomes.
Often the only or at least the most logical way out of this impasse is 
to establish a second or a third empirical generalisation which will 
narrow the range of possible theories. A second possibility is to test 
the validity of the inducted theory.
In effect this means we have taken Kolb’s cycle (fig 3.1) a full circuit, 
and the second time round the theory should be more plausible.
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Testing theory in this manner may not be so straightforward as it
seems. If we take Denzin’s (1970) approach to qualitative research
as a pattern, he suggests a six stage process:
1 A rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is 
formulated.
2 A hypothetical explanation of the phenomenon is formulated.
3 One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis, with the object 
of determining whether or not the hypothesis fits the facts in that 
case.
4 If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is 
reformulated or the phenomenon to be explained is redefined so 
that the case is excluded.
5 Practical certainty may be obtained after a small number of 
cases have been examined, but the discovery of negative cases 
disproves the explanation and requires a reformulation.
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6 The procedure of examining cases, redefining the phenomenon 
and reformulating the hypothesis is continued until a universal 
relationship is established, each negative case calling for a 
redefinition or reformulation.
The problem is clear. The researcher needs to set out on a search 
for negative cases in order to disprove the hypothesis, since he is 
unable to prove the hypothesis. Whether six cases would be 
sufficient to establish any type of hypothesis is open to debate, and 
the alternative approaches are discussed further in Sectioif'3.6 where 
Mitchell’s (1983) single case deductive approach is investigated.
3.2 Definition and Description of Case Studies
Over the years there has been much written about the case study and 
the use of case study material, but the number of writers who have 
committed themselves to a definition of a case study is very small.
Goode and Hatt (1952) define the case study as:
"a way of organising social data so as to preserve the unitary 
character of the social object being studied".
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Yin (1981 p59) extends this somewhat:
"... the distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it 
attempts to examine (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its 
real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."
Mitchell (1983 p i92) takes this even further, identifying the reason 
why case studies should be of interest, and building this into his 
definition:
"A case study (is) a detailed examination of an event (or series 
of related events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) 
the operation of some identified general theoretical principle."
A case study, then, is not a case study unless it falls in with a  set of 
predefined criteria. This would appear to damn in one sentence the 
whole ethos of inductive methodology, although the assumption is 
clearly inaccurate, since later in his paper he writes (pl97):
"...most social anthropological and a good deal of sociological 
theorising has been founded upon case studies".
Indeed it has, and the literature is the richer for it.
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More recently, Eisenhardt (1989 p534) has produced not a definition, 
but more of a series of statements which encapsulates the meaning 
of the term Case Study. She writes:
"The case study is a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings."
"Case studies can involve either single or multiple cases.."
"Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as 
archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations. The 
evidence may be qualitative (eg words), quantitative (eg, 
numbers), or both."
"Finally, case studies can be used to accomplish various aims: to 
provide description ..., test theory ... or generate theory."
Whilst not being a definition in the true sense, this encapsulates the 
essence of the case study without presupposing the intent of the 
researcher.
These diverse writings between them lead to a working definition 
which will suffice for the present. Case Study research is a  research 
strategy which examines an event or a series of events for the 
purposes of providing description or testing or generating theory.
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This definition takes the case study away for the realm  of general 
ramblings and makes it purposeful. Unlike Mitchell’s (1983 pl92) 
definition, this does not preclude the narrative account of an event 
or a series of events, since it does not presuppose that those events 
portray:
"... features which may be constructed as a manifestation of some 
general abstract theoretical principle".
The rationale behind the case study approach is discussedTn Section 
3.4.
3.3 Theory Building
Free-form data collection in even a small number of companies 
without some form of research focus is a recipe for the generation of 
vast volumes of data which cannot reasonably be analysed or even 
assimilated.
Mintzberg (1979a) recognised that some initial narrowing of the field 
of research was necessary.
"No matter how small our sample ... we have always tried to go 
into organisations with a well defined focus".
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This appears, on the face of it, to be contradictory to the 
theoiy-building ideal that there should be no hypothesis to test, but 
this is not the case.
We may identify the research question in order to constrain the field 
of research, but it has to be accepted that this constraint, and indeed 
the research question, may shift in the light of the research itself. In 
other words, whilst we start with a research focus, the developing 
theory may cause this focus to be moved. This brings us back to the 
Experiential Learning Cycle of Fig 3.1. * ^
3.4 Methodological Approach
In order to understand fully the approach to the current research it 
is important to place it in the context of the environment whence it 
arose.
As described in the Introduction, the author was in an excellent 
position to observe the implementation of Computer Aided Design 
systems in small companies right from the conceptual stage. He was 
instrumental in the selection of systems for all the companies 
described in Section 4. Being aware that of the 20 or so systems 
implemented, not all could be described as unqualified successes, he 
sought to identify the reasons for this by closer investigation.
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Several research methodologies were open to the author. Whilst 
experimentation in its various forms was not an option in the later 
stage of the implementation, some degree of participation was 
almost inevitable. Having considered the two broad-based 
techniques of Ethnography and Survey, and acknowledged ther 
advantages of each methodology, it was decided to use elements of 
both.
It was clearly not going to be feasible, as a consultant, to revisit the 
sites and discuss the CAD implementations passively. Having been 
involved in selection of the system, the author would inevitably 
become involved beyond the pure observational role. Nevertheless, 
the objective of the exercise would be to collect information, not to 
continue the consultancy role, and this would need to be agreed 
explicitly with the company representative.
Prior to the post-implementation visit to the companies some 
information was already available. The initial reports gave a general 
background to the companies, and the reasons for implementing 
CAD. This did not necessarily go as far as listing the expectations. 
The "stories" were, in fact, far from complete, yet the wealth of data 
and their variety was substantial and relatively unstructured. If an 
inductive approach were to be taken, then the collection of further 
data would need to be much more structured.
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The two-pronged approach would consist of observation - participant 
or non-participant, structured using a questionnaire or research 
instrument. It was never intended that the questionnaire should be 
followed slavishly to the exclusion of other information, but that 
copious field notes should be taken during the visits.
In this way, the best elements of observation and open-ended 
questionnaire survey would be utilised.
W hether the observational style at this stage would be participant or 
non-participant was open to conjecture, and arguably not too 
relevant. On first impression it would be what Freidrichs and 
Ludtke (1975) would describe as "non-participant, controlled, 
standardised", where the observer is not directly involved in the 
action, but where there is an observation schedule. Participant 
observation, interventionist or non-interventionist, was not to be 
sought specifically, since the event being studied - the 
implementation act - was less relevant than the effects of the event.
However, the author would be conscious at all times of his former 
participative role. No problems were expected regarding the 
language of implementation or in acceptance as an observer, since 
the implementation itself and not the implementers was to be the 
focus of the observation.
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In practice this may not be totally acceptable to the participants, and 
some elements of the situation may be excluded as a result.
If we take Schein’s (1987) breakdown of qualitative research into 
the Clinical and Ethnographic methods, accepting that these are 
points on a continuum and not discrete perspectives, the aim of the 
exercise would be to take up a position towards the ethnographic 
’end’ of the spectrum. Previously, of course, the author had been 
working towards the clinical end in selecting the CAD system for the 
company - intervening in order to change the status quo within the 
system.
The phrase "...towards the ethnographic end..." used above was 
chosen with care. It is difficult to visualise a situation whereby 
observation of this type could be anything but interventionist. The 
very fact that the system is of interest to an external observer causes 
those involved to take more notice of it and probably change it or 
their perceptions of it. In Schein’s words (Schein 1969 p 97):
"If I interview someone about his organization, the very 
questions I ask give the respondent ideas he never had before. 
The very process of formulating his own answers gives him 
points of view which he may never have thought of before."
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This is most relevant in the current research, where the author 
sought to elicit the thoughts, feelings and opinions of those close to 
the CAD systems. This would inevitably cause some of them to 
analyse their own thoughts. In open discussion, they may even 
change their opinions in the light of the opinions of others.
It was hoped that having worked at both extremes of the spectrum 
would bring its own benefits. A breadth of information would be 
obtained from the ethnography, as predicted by Schein (1987), whilst 
the elements of the clinical perspective - the probing in particular 
areas - would give a quality of data not available to the ethnographer 
in those specific areas. However the collection of qualitative data by 
these means means that the researcher may affect the validity of the 
results of the observation, acting as a "sieve" to collect 
non-representative data.
The same can, or course be said about the survey researcher, who 
may unwittingly (or wittingly) choose:
".... questions which correspond to the notion of what is 
important and consequently force reality into a preconceived 
structure" (Bogdan and Taylor (1975)).
On the the hand, it can be claimed (see Mintzberg (1979a) in 
Section 3.3) that a research focus is essential.
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It was in recognition of these inherent dangers that a multi-pronged 
approach was formulated. This would combine participant 
observation (system selection) with non-participant observation 
(system re-visit) and survey (structured open-ended questionnaire). 
Whilst it is accepted that the same bias may run through all three 
techniques, the fourth element of ethnography (free-form field notes) 
may eliminate some of the risk.
The whole of the information collected by whatever means and from 
whatever source would be collated and case studies developed.
These would not be large scale in-depth single-case stories, but 
would be short summaries with sufficient depth to enable patterns to 
be observed and conclusions to be drawn both within and between 
the cases.
3.5 Methodological Process
This section describes the actual process used for data collection, 
against the background of the approach already described.
All the initial selection work for the companies was well 
documented, and this included a description of the Company, its 
approach to design and a detailed breakdown of its needs in 
CAD/CAM terms.
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Where the Company was already computer literate, this was also 
recorded. As the outcome of the original study had been a 
CAD/CAM  system selection, a short-list of systems was described 
and the merits discussed.
In all cases, whether or not a higher level of integration was 
intended, the potential for expansion was explored and the potential 
benefits listed and costed where applicable.
The potential cost savings were usually included in the reasoning for 
eventual implementation, although in most cases a purely financial 
justification based on the normal financial measures of payback, 
return on capital employed, discounted cash flow etc. was not 
possible.
However, the reports were not limited to financial measures, and in 
all cases other benefits such as reduction in design turnaround time 
were stated and argued.
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The selection reports had been carried out over a period of several 
years, and the style had changed in that time, as had the overall 
competence of the consultant. The result of this was that the later 
cases homed in much more quickly on the selection process itself, 
and were higher in technical content. The information peripheral to 
the selection process had been reduced to the bare minimum, and 
was not sufficiently detailed for useful comparisons to be made.
In order to bring all the information up to the same base level, it 
was decided to prepare the questionnaire shown in Appendix 1. A  
"Standardised Research Instrument" had been prepared by Winch
(1988) for interviewing senior manufacturing and engineering 
managers and key departmental heads as part of a study into 
CAD/CAM  implementation. Whilst much of the instrument was 
inappropriate to the current research, parts were directly relevant, 
and the whole acted as a prompt for some of the m ore im portant 
issues in CAD/CAM implementation.
The resultant questionnaire covered a great deal of ground. Indeed it 
covered all the topics included in one or more of the original 20 case 
studies, plus others which had been raised by Winch’s work.
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It was considered important at that stage not to narrow the field of 
data collection by being selective with the questioning, but to collect 
as much data on as wide a front as was practicable. One of the 
reasons for this was essentially practical.
Whilst the relationship with the target companies was good, it would 
not be possible or desirable to return to the companies time after 
time for further information. A second reason was that at that 
stage the "important" issues had not been identified, and a deductive 
approach was not feasible.
O f the 20 or so original studies, six were selected for further 
investigation. Deselection of the companies was carried out firstly 
on the basis of geography. Those over two hours’ drive from 
Sheffield were discarded. Next, those companies where the 
implementation had been influenced to a high degree by external 
factors were discarded.
One such Company had substantially changed its product mix, and 
hence its design/draughting style since the initial study. One other 
had had major problems with the system supplier and had 
abandoned the system in favour of an alternative vendor. Finally, 
those companies where the consultant or his associates were carrying 
out further work were discarded.
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Primarily this was to avoid any compromising of the further work 
being done by other consultants, but there was a secondary reason.
Two of the companies were undergoing management training, which 
involved some restructuring of teams. Since in both cases this work 
involved the design section, the implementation may have been 
affected in a way which could not be identified. This was considered 
too high a risk.
The result of the deselection process provided a shortlist* oTeight. 
This was further reduced to six by discussion with the chief 
executives of all eight companies. Two considered that the 
information which they may be asked to provide would be too 
sensitive commercially, and they would prefer not to be involved.
The six remaining companies formed a good cross-section of the 
studies in all respects. One, for instance, was a well documented and 
spectacular failure in terms of implementation.
A  second was equally spectacular and even better documented, but 
had progressed exceedingly well against ambitious targets.
All six had extremely cooperative management teams.
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Without being too particular about definitions or units of measure at 
this stage, the cross-sectional nature of the cases can be shown 
diagramatically, as in Figure 3.3. Each point on the continua 
represents a case.
Implementation Failure
Company Size 0
D.O. Size % 0%
Product Range Small
Training Level Low
Integration Target Low
Prior CAD Knowledge None
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Figure 3.3
Taking the admittedly narrow spectrum of criteria, it can be seen 
that the "scatter" across the figure is good, and there is little 
bunching.
It is not claimed that these cases are typical in any way of British 
industry, or even of small businesses, and as will be argued 
elsewhere, this is not important in the present context. The 
important factor is that the cases appear not to be unrepresentative, 
in other words, apart from all being small firms, there does not 
appear to be any significant bias, at least on the factors chosen.
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Interviews with the respondents took place over a period of about 
eight weeks, some six to eighteen months after the initial CAD study 
had been completed, with approximately two half days being spent 
with each company. The interviews were structured by using the 
questionnaire as a prompt.
The relationship with all six companies was sufficiently good to allow 
for unrestricted access to the systems, the management and 
operators of the systems and to those involved peripherally in their 
implementation. The diversity of the questions being asked made it 
essential to interview at least two people at each company. One of 
these was always the individual responsible for managing the 
implementation.
The second was generally the chief executive, and where necessary a 
third member of the management team  was involved. The schedule 
was used to ensure a baseload of essential data. No time limit was 
put on the interviews, and the respondents were encouraged to talk 
in general about the CAD/CAM  system. The whole of the 
conversation was documented by hand.
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3.6 Case Selection and Validity
There are two distinct and conflicting stances on the validity of using 
case studies in research. The first is that a single or very small 
number of case studies cannot give rise to valid theory, whilst the 
second suggests that a single case is adequate. The argument for the 
former stance is that it is impossible to ensure that a case is ’typical’
- that it is representative of a large number of other cases which 
could have been used had the necessity arisen.
If we take a numerical analogy we can see that there may be some 
validity in the argument. Consider for instance the sequence of 
numbers:
2 : 4 : 8 : 16
We can draw relationships from these numbers which would lead us 
to believe that a similar sequence starting with 3 should be:
3 : 6 : 12 : 24
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This is based upon the hypothesis that the numbers are doubled as 
they progress. Equally, we could conclude that the sequence should 
be:
3 : 9 : 27 : 81
This uses an equally plausible hypothesis that each number is the 
multiple of the previous number and the first number. This is a veiy 
convincing argument against using a single ’case’ for theory building. 
If we take this further, and look at the field of statistical analysis, we 
see an emphasis on taking ’representative’ samples which are free 
from bias, so that the outcome of the sampling procedure can be 
assumed to be typical or representative.
The counter argument is overwhelmingly stronger under certain 
conditions. Any competent detective will tell you that a crime can 
be solved - ie a hypothesis developed - from a single ’case’. This 
analogy has been used by many other writers, including Cook and 
Campbell (1979) and Yin (1981).
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The "case" in this instance consists of a quantity of information on 
motives, methods and opportunities which allows a hypothesis to be 
developed which fits the information. Not only that, but where 
alternative hypotheses exist, the best one can be selected. If 
insufficient data are available then a case cannot be made, ie the 
case material is inadequate.
Eisenhardt (1985) favours the multi-case approach which, although 
theory generating in principle, includes many of the attributes of 
hypothesis testing research such as sampling. She is a proponent of 
early identification of the research question and possible constructs.
Eisenhardt’s approach is not without its critics. Whilst her approach 
argues for the use of a number of cases, there are many instances of 
"classic" case studies involving a single case. Dyer and Wilkins (1991 
pp613 ff) cite a number of such cases where the researchers have 
tended to focus on the comparisons within the same organisational 
context rather than across organisational contexts. They argue that 
this approach, which in no way invalidates Eisenhardt’s approach, 
can provide a rich description of the social scene.
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They quote:
"Theory that is born of such deep insights will be both more 
accurate and more appropriately tentative because the 
researcher must take into account the intricacies and 
qualifications of a particular context" (Van Maanen 1979).
They continue:
"Those who would attempt to use Eisenhardt’s method" are 
necessarily constrained by the number of cases that will be 
studied, and descriptions will be rather ’thin’, focusing on surface 
data rather then deeper social dynamics".
It is clear that there is some danger in Eisenhardt’s approach that 
the research will focus on existing theories. That is not to say that 
the single case researcher may not do he same, but it is suggested by 
Dyer and Wilkins that the depth of insight in the "storytelling" will 
avoid this.
Coming back, then, to the single case study or the small number of 
case studies. Hypotheses may be developed from a single case, and 
the case does not have to be typical or representative.
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It is not the typicality of the case which is important, but the analysis 
of that case. In the words of Mitchell (1983 p200).
"... the features present in the case study will be related to a 
wider population not because the case is representative, but 
because our analysis is unassailable."
It is therefore not only unnecessary but also pointless to attem pt to 
find a "typical" case.
Where the number of cases exceeds one but is still small, the 
principles above still apply. However, several advantages are opened 
up by the second and subsequent cases. As the number of cases 
which can be studied is necessarily limited, selecting the cases can be 
done to effect. Pettigrew (1988) noted that it makes good sense to 
choose cases in which the process of interest is "transparently 
observable" - possibly by selecting extreme situations. So far as was 
possible, the cases used in this work were selected in such a manner, 
as described in Section 3.5.
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3.7 Case Analysis and Evaluation
In order to generate form from the volume of data generated by a 
number of case studies, it is necessary to tackle the analysis 
systematically. Eisenhardt (1989) describes a multi-stage process 
from case to hypothesis construct. The first step is within-case 
analysis, which involves a detailed case-study write-up, with a view to 
becoming intimately familiar with each case as an entity.
This is followed by cross-case search for patterns, looking at the data 
in several divergent ways. It is at this stage that a systematic 
approach is needed, such as comparing pairs of cases to highlight 
similarities and differences. By taking this approach, some of the 
arguments of Dyer and Wilkins (1991) are countered.
Having done the cross-case comparison, there is a further vital stage 
to the process. At this point there are likely to be patterns emerging 
which may not be present in all the cases. One reason for this could 
be that the relevant data may not be available, bearing in mind the 
relatively focused data collection method. This need not be a 
problem, since the intimate knowledge of the writer of some of the 
cases may enable deeper insights into the patterns to be made.
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The analysis and evaluation then takes place in three stages
Stage 1 : within-case investigation
Stage 2 : cross-case pattern searching
Stage 3 : within-case pattern investigation
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4.0 CASE STUDIES
This section has been developed to provide a background to each of 
the cases involved. It gives general information on the companies, 
sufficient for the reader to understand the context of the outcpmes 
developed in Section 5.0. It was not considered necessary to include 
in this section all the information collated outcome by outcome in 
the later section, since this would have resulted in a great deal of 
repetition. Section 5.0 can therefore be regarded as an extension of 
Section 4.0, in that the cases are only fully developed by reference to 
both.
4.1 Company 1 : Road Tanker M anufacturer
Company 1 is a wholly owned subsidiary of a large public limited 
company. Established in its present site in 1856, it employs about 
160 personnel and has a turnover of around £4 million.
The Company undertakes the design, manufacturing and sale of road 
tankers, bulk carriers and car transporters using free issue chassis 
and also a range of helicopter refuelling tanks. The main customers 
are the petroleum industry and the Ministry of Defence. Although 
the Company has a standard product range, almost every order 
demands modification to the standard to suit customers’ specific 
requirements.
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In 1984 the Company had a drawing office staff of nine people 
undertaking draughting work and the associated design calculations. 
At that time a decision was made to retain a management 
consultancy to develop a specification for a computer aided design 
system and to select a proprietary system.
The design of road tankers is very calculation intensive. The first 
stage is to draw the cab and chassis from the supplier’s data sheets, 
and to calculate the centre of gravity of the unit with all the ancillary 
items attached.
This is done by distributing the load of each ancillary between the 
two axles and subtracting the fixed weights from the gross vehicle 
weight at each axle to give the tank and payload weight and 
distribution.
The centre of gravity and vehicle wheelbase define the ideal length 
of the tank, and using the capacity of the tank the section of the tank 
can be calculated.
Several standard sections are available, and the nearest one is 
chosen, allowing an actual length to be determined. The tank can 
then be drawn onto the chassis, and the positions of its partitions, 
manholes and sumps marked. All other detail such as pumps, 
run-off pipes and drain tubes are then drawn.
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From the drawing, further calculations are necessary to determine 
the number and sizes of sheets required for fabrication, the walkway 
length and mass and the centre of gravity of the assembly.
Using the information collated from the drawing a full list of 
components is prepared, and piecepart drawings are done for any 
non-standard items and for the tank.
At the time of the Consultant’s report, the Company was installing a 
manufacturing control system. This was Kewill’s Micross running on 
Extel Hi-net hardware, and it was deemed necessary to provide links 
between the manufacturing system and any proposed CAD system.
By November 1984 the Consultant had finished his analysis of the 
Company’s requirements and had shortlisted the potential suppliers 
for final selection.
The specification called for a three workstation system with capacity 
for further expansion. In addition to the normal 2D draughting 
facilities, extensive parametric facilities were specified, to allow 
designs and calculations to be carried out simultaneously.
This would enable not only general assemblies to be designed, but 
also enquiry and tender documents to be produced quickly and 
accurately.
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At this stage, the analysis showed that implementation would 
produce savings of around 4500 hours per year in draughting time, 
and this was broken down into types of design. For example, a tank 
barrel taking 12 hours of design and draughting time was targeted at 
4.6 hours using CAD. General assemblies were expected to reduce 
from 24 hours to eight hours. Achieving or bettering these figures 
would constitute success in implementation terms.
The Consultant’s report was shelved at the end of 1984, and no 
further progress was made until September 1985, when the ^ 
Consultant was invited to update the report in the light of changes to 
CAD technology. By that time the Bill of Materials module of 
Micross had been installed, and the part file was complete. It was 
decided that since the BOM was present on the manufacturing 
system, it would be illogical to regenerate this on the CAD system. 
Instead, parts lists would be produced on the system and passed 
electronically to the manufacturing software.
No additional benefits were highlighted by the updated report, and 
the indicators of success were unchanged.
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Following the second report, a decision was made to purchase a 
three workstation system. Installation was planned for mid January 
1985. The Chief Draughtsman was relieved of his normal duties to 
enable him to manage the implementation with assistance and advice 
from the Consultant. Up to the time of the decision to proceed with 
the purchase, the impetus for the project had been from the 
Company Secretary, acting on the delegated authority of the 
Managing Director.
Whilst the initial investigation had been approved by the Board of 
Directors, the instigator had been the Managing Director, who 
maintained an active interest in the project throughout.
Towards the end of 1985, detailed discussions took place between 
the Company and the suppliers of the CAD and Computer Aided 
production Management CAPM software, to ascertain the precise 
form of the link between the two systems. In parallel with this, work 
was started on writing the parametric program for designing tanker 
general assemblies. This was done by the CAD supplier against a 
verbal specification.
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The first implementation plan was developed by the Consultant in 
December 1985, updated by the Chief Draughtsman in January 1986 
and consolidated into a CAD/CAPM  implementation plan by the 
Consultant later in January 1986. At about the same time, the CAD 
supplier was in the middle of updating from 16-bit to 32-bit f 
hardware, and this looked likely to cause software problems in file 
transfer. It was therefore decided that a well tried and tested 32-bit 
machine should be installed, so that the software could be ported 
onto the supplier’s own 32-bit hardware when it became available.
The CAD system was installed in January 1986, with an agreement 
that the supplier’s 32-bit machine would be installed in May 1986.
By June 1986 it was clear that all was not well, and the Consultant 
was called in to resolve some of the problem areas.
It was at this point that the lack of formal specification for the 
parametrics became an issue. The aspirations of the customer 
clearly did not match the comprehension of the supplier, and this 
had caused slow progress, bad feeling and excessive costs.
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The Consultant was able to bring the two sides together and 
formalise the specification. Further training was also arranged for 
the Chief Draughtsman and one other. The 32-bit machine delivery 
had at that stage slipped to August 1986.
The Company entered a period of intense design activity during the 
summer of 1986, and the pressure to produce drawings led to a 
reduction in CAD output. Only one draughtsman was using the 
system on a regular basis, and overall usage was only about 
70 percent. However, work with the parts listing software was 
proceeding well, and the parametrics were being used extensively 
and expanded. A revised implementation bar chart was issued.
Changes to the CAD supplier’s customer support structure late in 
1986 led to short-term problems of response which caused problems 
to the Company. This was compounded by the lack of movement on 
the 32-bit hardware which had still not been delivered. Changes in 
the top management structure of the CAD supplier led to a review 
of the hardware policy, and a decision was made to offer a 
commercially available system rather than continuing development of 
the 32-bit machine. This was accepted by the Company late in 
January 1987.
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At about that time the Consultant reported that certain important 
elements of system management and housekeeping were not being 
carried out effectively, and it was decided that the System Manager 
(formerly the Chief Draughtsman) was to be replaced. The 
Consultant was retained to oversee the system in the short term until 
a replacement could be found.
A deadline of 23 February was set for replacement of the hardware. 
By 3 March 1987, the hardware had been installed and was running 
well. It had been expanded to six screens. “
The relationship between supplier and customer had improved 
dramatically, the parametric development programme was back on 
course, and procedures for operation had been developed. The 
Consultants therefore handed back command to the System 
Manager, who had not at that stage been replaced.
In May 1987 the Consultant was again invited to intervene, this time 
by the system supplier. The problems again related to the 
management of the system, and criticism was made of the 
System Manager. With the agreement of the Company, the new 
Chief Draughtsman was brought into the picture, and trained in 
system operation.
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A minor restructuring of the Technical Departm ent led to the 
replacement of the System Manager by the Chief Draughtsman, and 
this eliminated the personnel and inter-personnel problems.
4.2 Company 2 : Filter Press M anufacturer
Company 2 is a manufacturer of filter presses and associated
equipment. In 1985 it had a turnover of about £3.5 million and
employed 70 personnel. The filter presses range in size from
-  ^
1 metre square up to 2.5 metres square, and are typically used in 
collieries for filtering coal slurry.
All orders are placed on the Company against a formal quotation, 
prepared in response to an Invitation to Tender (ITT). Where 
insufficient detail is available on the ITT, a site visit will be arranged 
to measure up the building or site area and to note any height or 
access constraints. Following this visit a Press General Assembly will 
be prepared. This is drawn to scale, but contains less detail than is 
required for manufacture. In addition, one or more plant layouts 
will be produced for discussion.
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A site plan may also be drawn, showing the relationship of the press 
or presses to the remainder of the plant. Piping diagrams and civil 
engineering drawings may be required, particularly for export 
tenders.
On receipt of an order, the necessary calculations and drawings will
be done to enable the side-bars to be ordered. The side-bars are the
structures which carry the filter plates and are the main load-bearing
beams. They run longitudinally down each side of the press, and are
*  ^
usually ordered before the remainder of the design is started since 
they are very long delivery items.
A general assembly drawing is often required by the customer, and 
this is usually prepared within the first week and sent to the 
customer for approval. Whilst approval is awaited, the design work 
proceeds, starting with the two end castings and the nut end 
fabrication. This is the structure which translates the rotary motion 
of the press screw into linear motion for opening and closing the 
press plates. No drawings are released for manufacture until the 
general assembly drawing has been approved.
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After approval the remainder of the design can be done. Whilst a 
press may be significantly similar to a previous design, allowing for 
the use of standard parts, there are invariably substantial differences 
requiring modifications to existing drawings.
The way these have been done in the past is by taking interprints - 
copies on film - which may be modified, leaving the original intact. 
This reduces draughting time significantly, and whilst the drawing 
quality is not high, it is acceptable for manufacturing purposes. 
However, whilst first and second generation films are usable, third 
and fourth generation are sometimes produced, and these are rarely 
acceptable. At that stage a new drawing is therefore required. 
Where no similar drawing exists, or where the degree of similarity to 
previous drawings is low, a new drawing will also be created. In 1984 
over half the drawings created were films of previous drawings.
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At the time of the feasibility study in 1985, eight draughtsmen were 
involved in the design of filter presses and ancillary items under the 
control of the Chief Draughtsman. In addition, one designer was 
responsible for all contract design and estimating work.
Apart from the filter press drawing office, a separate drawing office
was responsible for the design and draughting of pumps. Unlike
filter presses, standard pumps were generally offered. Approximately
30 standard pumps were available in the range, and each of these
*  ^
could be produced with alternative flanges, flange locations and 
electrical controls. About one third of all enquiries required a 
special general assembly drawing. Over half of the drawings created 
for manufacture were modified films of an earlier design.
A fourth design office was investigated during the feasibility study. 
This was at a site remote from the other three, and consisted of two 
draughtsmen. On this site, filter plates were designed for the filter 
presses.
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The plates, manufactured from either polypropylene or rubber, 
required quite different approaches to design. W hereas the rubber 
plates were built up from strips of rubber and vulcanised together, 
the polypropylene plates were milled from solid polypropylene, and 
tapes were required for the Numerically Controlled (NC) router.
The aforementioned feasibility study was carried out in June 1985,
prompted by a need to increase the throughput of the filter press
design office without increasing the number of draughtsmen, which
■* ^
by that time was giving cause for concern. Not only was the drawing 
office overcrowded, but the wide fluctuations in load necessitated the 
extensive use of contract draughtsmen who were a scarce commodity.
The Managing Director perceived the introduction of CAD as the 
solution to the throughput problem, but accepted that this would not 
alleviate the problems of peak demand. The pump and filter plate 
drawing offices were seen as a lower priority.
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The report, prepared by Consultants, highlighted significant savings 
of the order of 3000 hours in the filter press area following the 
implementation of a three-workstation system. Approximately 80 
percent of the savings could come from new drawing creation, 
making the savings achievable early in the life of the proposed 
equipment. No facilities were to be made available for the pump 
and contract drawing offices other than occasional use of the main 
system. This was seen as a future expansion path.
*  ^
The Company decided that a single workstation should be purchased 
rather than installing the full system from the start. Consequently 
the workstation was purchased in August 1976. This coincided with 
a period of intense activity in the drawing office, and other than 
basic training, no significant work was carried out for some weeks. 
However, the Consultant was retained on an ad-hoc basis to advise 
initially on the structuring of directories and the setting of standards.
The operation of the equipment was in the hands of the senior 
designer - an extremely capable draughtsman with vast experience in 
filter press design. Unfortunately, his position also necessitated a 
relatively high degree of supervisory effort, and responsibility for the 
more complex designs.
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Consequently the time available for the CAD system was somewhat 
restricted, and the equipment was used for only about 20 percent of 
the time.
In order to improve the utilisation of the equipment, it was agreed 
that it should be used for electrical schematic design. The 
Consultant was requested to prepare a number of electrical 
schematic symbols together with data sheets which would form part 
of the standards book. The completion of these symbols coincided 
with the resignation of the electrical draughtsman from the 
Company, and progress was suspended.
From early September 1986 to late February 1987 the single 
workstation was used increasingly for the creation of new drawings - 
predominantly of pieceparts rather than general assemblies or 
fabrications.
No parametrics had been created during that time, although the 
need had been highlighted in the original consultancy report. This 
had slowed progress, and the Managing Director was concerned that 
the equipment was not being used productively. Consequently the 
Consultant was asked to advise.
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Following discussions, it was agreed that the workload of the drawing 
office precluded the release of a designer for parametric creation. It 
would therefore be necessary to bring in a contract CAD 
draughtsman to do the work. As the system was in frequent use it 
was deemed necessary to provide a second workstation.
Whilst the Company was prepared to purchase a second workstation 
like the first, the supplier had ceased supply of the equipment, 
although it was continuing support. This created two problems. 
Firstly, the original hardware, whilst supported by the supplier in the 
short term, would not be supported in the long term. Secondly, the 
Company would have two dissimilar pieces of hardware, making 
communications between the two difficult. To compound the 
problem further, the replacement for the original hardware was still 
being developed, making it necessary to supply third party hardware.
The agreed solution to the apparent impasse was to rent the third 
party hardware as an interim measure until the replacement 
hardware become available. At that time the Company would be 
offered the new hardware at a discount to allow for the rental costs, 
with an option to sell back the old hardware.
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At the end of March 1987 the rental machine was delivered and 
communications with the older machine were established to enable 
drawings to be passed between the systems. A contract designer was 
set on with a programme of work covering seven sets of drawings 
over a three month period.
In April 1987 the problem of the hardware upgrade came to a head, 
and the Consultant was called back in to help resolve the situation. 
Discussions took place between the Consultant and the supplier. At 
the same time a review of the systems and procedures in the 
drawing office was undertaken. This review found a number of 
major changes since the previous study, and a number of areas of 
concern around the issues of CAD implementation.
In the six months since first implementation, the only standard 
symbols were those which had been created by the Consultant in the 
early stages of implementation. Usage of the first machine had been 
ad-hoc and infrequent, with a utilisation of only about 20 percent.
No pattern of usage could be identified in terms of the draughting of 
similar or families of parts. Only one draughtsman - the senior 
designer - was competent in using the system. Although two others 
had had basic training, they had not used the system sufficiently to 
become fully efficient.
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The other major change had been introduced gradually by the D.O. 
Manager, who had not been trained in the use of the system and had 
remained uncommitted to its success. This involved extension of the 
use of interprints - film copies of original drawings - which could be 
modified, albeit at a low copy quality. This had produced a low cost, 
if short-term alternative to the CAD system, and had negated many 
of the potential cost savings.
As a result of this investigation, a decision was made not to proceed 
with expansion of the system. The second, rented machine was 
taken out, and the contract draughtsman’s work was abandoned.
Virtually all progress was suspended by the end of May 1987. 
Eighteen months later, the equipment had been relegated to the 
production of charts and tables, and no drawings were produced.
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4.3 Company 3 ; Cast Fibrous Product M anufacturer
Company 3 casts fibrous plaster products, mostly for the building 
trade. Part of a small group of companies in a variety of different 
but related types of business, the Company is itself spread across 
several sites, all within a five mile radius, with each site being 
responsible for a part of the product range.
The products of the Company fall into two broad categories. 
Standard mouldings are made to stock and are sold from an 
extremely extensive catalogue of architectural mouldings.
Specials, on the other hand, are made to order. They may be 
variants on a standard moulding or may be quite different from 
anything tackled previously. For instance the Company may be 
asked to produce a length of cornice to match that existing in a 
building, or may be asked to tender for a complete ceiling scheme. 
Standards and specials can be supplied and fixed by the Company, 
but the majority of sales are supply only.
i l l
All design and draughting work is carried out by a single designer 
who is responsible for both the commercial and the domestic work. 
His experience and knowledge are fundamental in producing designs 
which are both aesthetically pleasing and easy to manufacture. 
Domestic design and draughting is relatively simplistic, often using 
one or more of a range of standard mouldings from the extensive 
catalogue. These mouldings include cornices, niches, columns and 
arches.
*  ^
Whilst the catalogue defines the shape and size of standard 
mouldings, it is not unusual for a customer to ask for a pictorial 
representation of his precise application. This activity is not 
complex, but is very time-consuming and may involve several 
iterations before an acceptable design is achieved.
Much of the domestic work is strictly two dimensional, even though 
the parts themselves are three dimensional. However, there is an 
occasional requirement for an isometric or perspective 
representation, particularly for new designs or "specials". This may 
involve freehand sketching of capital architecture or other sculptured 
surfaces.
1 1 2
Drawings are prepared at two levels - pictorial for customers and 
dimensioned detail drawings for the workshop. The manual system 
of design dictates that this involves the creation of two separate but 
substantially similar drawings.
The commercial contract work is quite different from the domestic 
work in both style and size. Typically, four or five projects are live 
at any time, varying in size between £40,000 and £300,000. Examples 
of commercial contracts are shopping malls and large suspended 
ceilings.
The first stage of design on receipt of an architectural drawing, is the 
production of a layout. If ceiling work is involved, as it usually is, 
the layout will be done in floor-line reflection, usually at a scale of 
1:50 or 1:20. The layout defines the shape of the various ceiling 
panels, all of which may be different by virtue of the lighting 
requirements, but many of which may be substantially similar and 
may be created eventually from same mould.
From the layout a fixing drawing is created for the fixing team.
These drawings are often at a different scale from the layout, and 
therefore cannot be traced. From two sets of drawings the panel 
construction drawings are created.
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Each panel requires a drawing, but there are usually many 
similarities between the drawings. From the panel drawings, detailed 
workshop drawings are created. These are fully dimensioned to 
allow the moulds to be built in the workshop.
Again, there is strong correlation between the drawings, and many 
features which may be picked up from the higher level drawings.
A number of serious pitfalls cause problems at the design stage. The
*
first is that the single designer working on five projects runs the risk 
of making mistakes particularly when dimensioning a drawing which 
may have been created some time before. A second is that the 
continual redrawing of panels may lead to errors of transcription 
which would then be perpetuated.
A third problem is that when a feature is changed on one drawing, it 
may need to be changed on several others. Failure to do this would 
cause problems later.
In addition to the shopping arcade type of work, two other types are 
worthy of note. The first is upgrading work, where mouldings are 
required to replace or match existing mouldings. In this case site 
drawings are usually created as a result of a site survey.
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Items such as replacement ballusters need to be drawn full size for 
the benefit of the moulding shop, whilst cappings are drawn to scale 
and fully dimensioned. Typically this requires at least two redraws 
of part of the site plan.
The second type of work, which is relatively infrequent, is the 
free-space drawing of ceiling panels, usually for domestic 
applications. This type of work is creative, involving many sketches 
and partial drawings before the final drawing is created. One 
example of this type of work involved drawing a quarter of the panel 
onto AO paper, then copying it three times for layout purposes in the 
workshop.
In August 1988 the Managing Director became particularly aware of 
a number of problems. Firstly, the designer was working excessive 
overtime, to the extent of working every Saturday and a minimum of 
eight additional hours during the week. It was thought that this was 
having an adverse effect on his health.
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The second problem was that the designer was working on anything 
up to ten projects at the same time, and this was causing inefficiency. 
The pressure of work was also leading to drawing errors, and 
although they were generally of a minor nature, the risk was growing 
that an error would occur on a major project.
As a great deal of the work consisted of redrawing all or part of 
each design, perhaps at a different scale, the Managing Director 
decided on two lines of action. He seconded a junior draughtsman 
to the designer to take on some of the workload, and he retained a 
consultant to investigate the feasibility of implementing Computer 
Aided Design.
The parameters of the system, as defined by the Managing Director 
were:
a) it should be a single workstation capable of being expanded and 
networked at a future date.
b) it should be capable of being used by a fully trained CAD 
draughtsman for the creation of drawings, but should be simple 
enough for the casual user to access and plot drawings.
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c) it should be capable of creating parts lists for complex designs 
and passing them to a future manufacturing computer as yet to 
be specified.
d) it should be available in a reduced cost version so that agents 
throughout the country could produce draft designs and pass 
them to the manufacturing unit for checking and costing using 
modem links.
e) it should provide links to other CAD systems using recognised 
protocols to enable site plans to be ported onto the system from 
architects’ systems.
The consultant’s analysis was concluded in September 1988, and a 
number of points were raised by the report.
The nature of the design task within the Company precluded the 
need for a link between the CAD system and a manufacturing 
system. The main reason for this was that the cost of a contract was 
closely related to the time taken to construct the necessary moulds 
and the time taken for fixing on site.
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Neither of these estimates was produced at the design stage or by 
the designer, who took no part in the job costing. In addition to this, 
the parts list was limited to fixing hardware only, since the cost of 
raw materials for the panels was insignificant. As the fixing 
hardware was rarely drawn, the automatic creation of parts lists was 
inappropriate.
The Company had not considered the use of parametric 
programming, although this was seen to be essential by the 
consultant. The repetitive nature of the domestic work and the 
amount of "same as-except ..." work offered excellent savings for 
simple parametrics.
A survey of the CAD facilities used by major customers and other 
architects and specifiers showed a need for DXF, IGES and SIF 
(Intergraph) exchange protocols.
A database facility was deemed to be essential for several purposes. 
The time lapse between initial drawing creation and final 
manufacture could be considerable - often several months, and it was 
seen as essential to find the drawings quickly and easily. Changes to 
a feature on one drawing often led to changes on several others, and 
the database would give the ability to provide cross-references to 
reduce the risk of errors.
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A system specification was created for the CAD software, and four 
suppliers were invited to submit tenders for turnkey systems. A  
cost/benefit analysis on the preferred system showed that it could 
not be justified purely on the savings likely to be achieved, and that 
other factors such as fewer errors and more rapid throughput, would 
need to be considered.
Following several demonstrations of the software and informal 
benchmarking, a system was chosen, and the Company went ahead 
with the purchase of a single screen system. * ^
The first few months of operation were extremely difficult for the 
Designer, who still had to cope with his manual systems whilst 
transferring some work to the CAD system. Had it not been for a 
fall-off in orders at that stage it is likely that the pressure would have 
suspended work on the CAD implementation.
The Designer took advantage of the three days of training offered, 
and this enabled him to become productive very quickly.
Within six months, approximately half of the new contract work was 
being done on the system, and savings in time were being observed, 
but not evaluated.
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The Designer and his draughtsman were both able to use the system 
proficiently, and often shared projects. At that stage no attempt had 
been made to download from other systems, and only very simple 
parametrics were being used, predominantly for domestic work. The 
database had not been implemented fully, although full drawing 
records had been maintained. Overall, the drawing office was less 
pressurised and a much more comfortable environment.
Two years on from the implementation, the picture was quite 
different. Two systems were being used, sharing the co'm riton 
database and peripherals. Several drawings had been downloaded 
from customers’ systems, with few problems, although it had been 
necessary to borrow additional hardware in one case to overcome 
apparent problems with disc formats. The ability to download had 
provided an additional and unexpected benefit that the Company 
was able to return the layout drawings to the customer electronically, 
speeding up the acceptance process.
Several more parametric drawings had been created, some of them 
quite sophisticated, but virtually all were for domestic work.
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No agents had been persuaded to buy the necessary systems to 
create designs locally, and no attempt had been made to link the 
systems to the manufacturing systems.
It was clear that the systems were being used in preference to.'the 
drawing board wherever possible. An occasional 3D drawing was 
created on the system, but generally these were still done on the 
board or freehand. The system was nevertheless a success in the 
eyes of the Directors and the Drawing office.
4.4 Company 4 : Refrigeration Engineer
Company 4 was founded in 1976 to provide a refrigeration service to 
the fishing industry. This involved the provision, installation, 
commissioning and servicing of fish freezing and ice-making 
equipment on trawlers. Some years after its launch the Company 
took over an ailing manufacturer of ice-bank equipment. Unlike the 
ice-makers and fish-freezers, ice banks could be used in a  variety of 
non-fish applications such as vegetable chilling.
At the same time as the takeover, the Company invested much 
money and effort in the development of a range of modular 
equipment for water chilling, moist air production and ice making.
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These machines all had refrigeration technology in common, and 
were conceived and designed by the Managing Director. The design 
work and prototype testing of the machines was completed, with 
external help from a Value Engineering Consultant in late 1986, and 
the Company embarked on a period of non-developmental 
consolidation.
Having taken the time and trouble to design the products in modular
form, it was clear to the Managing Director that the design effort in
*
the immediate future would be limited to modification of the existing 
design to provide variants.
For instance in the case of shipboard fish freezers, the freezing 
capacity would be satisfied by installing a number of standard 
freezers, all of which would have a known capacity and would stand 
alone. No central freezing plant was necessary, and a breakdown 
would affect only a fraction of the freezing capacity. However, the 
freezing requirements of a trawler would depend on a variety of 
factors, including the type of fish to be frozen, the expected 
maximum catch rate, the seawater temperature range (seawater is 
using for condensing the refrigerant) and, not least, the space 
allocated or available for freezers.
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All these factors would have an effect on the design of the freezer - 
the number and size of plates, the size of the compressor and 
condenser etc.
A similar situation appertained for the ice-making machines. These 
were capable of producing a continuous supply of dry, thin ice, an 
ice/water mix or iced water, depending upon the requirement.
Again there would be a variation in demand for different 
applications, necessitating design changes. These changes would, 
because of the modular nature of the units normally be minor.
It was the expectation of repeated modification work that caused the 
Managing Director to consider the use of Computer Aided Design, 
and in July 1987 a consultant was retained to select a suitable 
system. Links with other computer based systems were not seen to 
be necessary at that stage.
At the start of the project in late July 1987, the Company had some 
250 drawings varying in size from A4 to AO, and no fewer than three 
drawing number systems. In addition, many drawings had no 
reference number and some were without title or date.
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The drawings were held in mixed sizes in a horizontal storage unit, 
and some were being damaged. In short, the drawing office 
housekeeping was poor. On the other hand, however, a very 
effective seven-digit part numbering system was in use, and this 
system had been followed to the letter.
Most of the drawings were A4 or AO size, and the vast majority were 
orthographic. However, about 12 percent of the drawings were 
isometric drawings of structural frames. These were fully 
dimensioned and in most cases equivalent orthographical drawings 
did not exist for the units. Many of the drawings were at a second 
or third issue, and almost ten percent had been redrawn at some 
stage.
At the time of the study there was no full-time draughtsman 
employed, and the Managing Director was acting as designer and 
draughtsman, creating the bulk of the design concepts and many of 
the drawings. Other drawings were done by an engineering 
postgraduate on temporary placement at Company.
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With each project taking around 150 hours of drawing time, this was 
causing problems for the Managing Director, and a major benefit of 
a CAD system would be to relieve him of the draughting task. His 
intention at that stage was that he should develop the designs on the 
system, and employ a draughtsman to take the designs through to 
full working drawings, again on the system. The draughtsman would 
also be able to create variants of the design.
It is important to note the design philosophy of the Company, which 
is based upon the principle of offering a range of standard products 
within each product group. For instance only one plate freezer was 
designed, but a range of variants on this one design gave a family of 
seven different sizes of plate freezer. At the start of development, 
the decision was taken on which sizes to produce, and these were 
offered as standards.
All the design and development work for the whole family was 
completed prior to offering the unit on the market.
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This principle relies upon an extremely good knowledge of the 
available market, since there is a risk of losing orders for units not in 
the standard range. The benefit, however, is that the market is 
manipulated to a certain extent into accepting one of the wide range 
of standards offered. Since the designs and working drawings .'are 
available, the lead time is very much shorter for a standard than for 
a special, and requirements for units outside the range are rare.
Some minor layout changes may occasionally be required, and 
ducting and pipework is generally specific to a particular trawler.
A specification to the CAD system was developed during August and 
September 1987. The prime software requirement was to speed up 
the generation of families of parts, by using symbols and parametric 
programs. In view of the relatively small number of designs created 
in the average year, a single workstation was considered to be 
adequate, with the capability of networking systems were not 
computerised at that stage no links could be developed in that 
direction. However, it was agreed that this would be desirable in the 
future, and that the target would be a linked system creating parts 
lists.
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It would have been impracticable to load all the existing drawings 
onto the system, and it was decided that only the latest design - the 
fish freezer - would be loaded, allowing for modifications as 
necessary.
A cost/benefit analysis was carried out by the consultant, which 
showed a payback of around six or seven years. In purely financial 
terms this would not normally have been acceptable, but there were 
additional factors which influenced the decision to purchase.
The main factor was that much of the time to be saved was that of 
the Managing Director, and as this was a high priority, the payback 
argument was overridden.
A second factor was that a variant for a particular trawler or type of 
fish could be generated very quickly and accurately, reducing overall 
lead times and making costings much more accurate.
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The estimated reduction in drawing time was very significant, 
amounting to some 120 hours of actual drawing time. Adding the 
traditional checking of the drawings gave a further saving of 40 
hours. The total represents some four weeks of concentrated effort, 
or six weeks of elapsed time for a draughtsman.
This was seen as a major advantage in gaining orders for trawlers 
undergoing a refit, since a significant part of the refit cost is 
associated with lost revenue from time out of the water. A  supplier 
who can design, build and install shipboard equipment on or ahead 
of schedule can therefore make significant cost savings for the 
operator.
A database package was specified as part of the software for two 
purposes. Firstly it would allow drawings to be accessed, modified 
and grouped easily and quickly. Secondly, and more importantly, it 
would allow records to be held for each installation by trawler name. 
Any subsequent work or repairs could therefore be planned in 
advance in full knowledge of the installed equipment.
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Following the development of a detailed system specification, five 
systems were considered in detail; three selected by the Consultant 
and two for comparison purposes with which the Managing Director 
was familiar. An informal benchmark was set up to enable each 
supplier to demonstrate his offering to the full, including parametric 
design and database facilities.
Four demonstrations were arranged, and a clear leader was 
identified and examined in further detail. It proved to offer a 
remarkably close fit to the needs of the Company in the short and 
long term. A whole - life costing of the system also showed it to be 
the cheapest of the five.
Following the demonstration and final selection, nothing further 
happened for about a year until August 1988.
At that time the systems were again reviewed, and a single screen 
system was purchased. A young graduate was employed by the 
Company to implement the system and to load the latest design. He 
and the Managing Director were both trained to the basic level by 
the vendor.
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Progress on the system was slow, partly because of pressure of work 
in other directions, which left the draughtsman with insufficient 
screen time to do justice to the task. This situation continued until 
the end of 1988, when the draughtsman left and an experienced 
designer was taken on who had previously worked for the Company.
Whilst he was an extremely competent refrigeration designer, he had 
no CAD experience, and even with the basic training he was very 
slow to get into the system.
In February 1989 the Consultant was invited to review the system 
and make recommendations. At that stage the dexterity of the 
designer on the CAD system fell well short of that of the previous 
draughtsman. Whilst the whole of the freezer had been transcribed 
onto the system it was not being used to its full potential, and as an 
electronic drawing board it was taking longer to create designs than 
the manual method.
The first action taken was to provide the designer with a refresher 
course. This had two effects.
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Firstly it increased his speed by reinforcing technique. Secondly, it 
gave him more commitment to the system, and he was prepared to 
make it work rather than fighting it. The second action was to have 
a number of parametric designs generated by the vendor. Whilst 
these could have been done by the designer, it was considered- by 
everyone concerned, including the designer, that he had insufficient 
time to do justice to them.
Within three months things had changed dramatically so far as the 
CAD system was concerned. It was now creating drawings at the full 
target speed, and most of the planned benefits had been achieved. 
The database was the one weak link, and had not been used to the 
full.
Records of installations were still maintained manually, and since the 
number was very small it was not considered to be a problem.
By August 1989 all the targets for productivity had been met. The 
Managing Director had virtually stopped working on the drawing 
board and spent little time on the system. In all respects the 
implementation was regarded as a success.
This continued to be the case for about twelve months, when the 
Company was liquidated because of a shortage of orders.
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4.5 Company 5: Municipal Furniture M anufacturer
Company 5 is a long established manufacturer of municipal furniture 
including lighting columns, bus shelters and fencing, plus a range of 
street furniture. It employs about 160 people and turns over 
approximately £7 million, of which columns, shelters and fencing 
represent a very large proportion.
In September 1987 the Works Director decided to obtain the 
assistance of a consultant in the selection of a computer aided design 
system. The reasons for the decision were twofold.
Firstly, the designs were recognised as being, to a great extent, 
variations on a theme. The columns, for instance, not only looked 
alike but also fell naturally into about six families, within which the 
main variation was size rather than structure. Secondly, the 
Company had recently installed MAAPICS - a manufacturing control 
software - on an IBM System/36, and was eager to simplify the 
procedures for creating bills of materials for new products.
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At that stage the Company had had no exposure to Computer Aided 
Design, although some departments were computer literate, having 
worked with Computer Aided Production Management (CAPM) 
software. A consultant had been retained to implement the CAPM 
system, and it was decided that he would manage the integration of 
CAD and CAPM. It was therefore necessary that he should work 
closely with the consultant selecting the CAD system.
Orders for lighting columns can be as simple as a single standard 
catalogue item or as complex as a complete lighting scheme'for a 
goods yard or football pitch. For the latter, the lighting engineer 
uses a purpose written lighting design system running on a Hewlett 
Packard (HP) 9000 Personal Computer (PC).
This is used to calculate the lighting requirements, positions and 
types of lanterns. A plotter is used to produce a hard copy of the 
footprint of each lantern. The structural engineer uses this 
information together with details of terrain, type of column (raise 
and lower, fixed, etc) and bracket style. Using a similar HP PC he 
will check the suitability of standard products.
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If a non-standard is required, he will set the design parameters using 
pre-calculated stress limits, and specifying one or more of the 18 
stock materials.
All the above work is necessary in order to prepare a quotation, and 
a drawing of the scheme is generally required by the Client.
When an order is received, a works order is issued, and the drawing 
office is required to produce detail drawings and parts lists. If the 
product is simple, the parts list may be put on the drawing, otherwise 
a separate list is produced. The draughtsman is responsible for 
selecting the parts and materials to be used from a list of around 
14000 materials, components, sub assemblies and finished items.
In most cases, a draughtsman will be fully responsible for an order, 
including drawing production, parts listing, customer liaison and 
preparation of the erection specification.
Shelters, fences and other similar items usually only reach the 
drawing office when an order has been placed, and are processed in 
the same manner as columns. Once the drawings and parts lists are 
complete they are passed to the planning department.
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Here, the drawings are "exploded" to component level, and material 
lists and route cards are prepared. Production control are then 
involved in scheduling the jobs, issuing manufacturing instructions to 
the works and progressing the jobs.
Even on non-standard jobs there are many standard or near-standard 
items. On columns these would include raise and lower gear, door 
and door openings, base sections, electrical instructions, spigots and 
brackets. Shelters, which are built up of modular sections are much 
more standardised, but need variations for the terrain or for 
non-standard lengths. Even on the non-standard section, many 
standard components will be used, such as roof sections, ground 
fixings, seating, frames and municipal logos. Fencing is also 
modular, and any variations in length are normally taken up in the 
end panel, which is often a scaled-down standard panel. O ther 
products such as bollards, litter bins, "olde worlde" lighting and toilet 
blocks are generally standard and require no drawing office 
involvement.
A detailed system specification was developed by the consultant to a 
level at which vendors could be invited to tender.
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The first stage was to be very modest, with two workstations sharing 
a plotter and with common files. This would allow the creation of 
drawings up to A1 size and the generation of parts lists from those 
drawings.
Very quickly, a second stage was to be targetted whereby the files 
generated by the structural design system could be imported for 
incorporation in parametric drawings. A third stage would allow the 
parts lists to be delivered electronically to the IBM System/36 
where they would be converted into BOM structures. This was to be 
done using an intermediate IBM /PC for data validation and transfer 
purposes.
In addition to preparing a specification for the CAD system, the 
consultant made recommendations on the elimination of a number 
of barriers to effective systems integration.
The structural calculations for columns were written in BASIC, and 
were incomplete in that they did not cover the full range of columns 
designed. A decision had been taken to update and expand these 
programmes, and they were being rewritten in PASCAL. This was 
seen as a misguided decision, since the programs were very simple, 
making BASIC adequate, and there was no in-house expertise in 
PASCAL.
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A more useful approach would be to create the structural programs 
as parametrics on the CAD system. This would, of course, cut across 
one of the Company’s traditional barriers, moving much of the 
structural work into the drawing office.
Creation of parts lists had always been the responsibility of the 
drawing office, although material lists and routings were produced by 
the planners. If the CAD and CAPM systems were to operate 
together, there would be a need to redefine the roles of the 
designers and planners, and to make inventory data available to the 
designer to facilitate part standardisation.
The consultant presented his report in early December 1987, and a 
number of further questions were raised by the Company regarding 
the communications between the proposed systems.
Following clarification of the issues, demonstrations of the selected 
systems were set up. These initial demonstrations were somewhat 
informal, and no benchmarking was carried out.
The Company was, however, happy to select one of the suppliers, 
who was invited to proceed with further developments to prove the 
feasibility of linking to the CAPM system.
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This was to be done jointly between the Company’s CAPM 
consultant and the CAD vendor, although no formal specification 
had been written for the link.
By July 1988 there were clearly problems in proving the 
communication link to the satisfaction of the Company, and the 
CAD consultant was invited to intervene on behalf of the Company 
to resolve the situation.
The problems were found to be of a technical nature, although not 
sufficiently complex to have warranted a six month delay. The 
vendor promised an early solution, and this was accepted by the . 
Company. By mid August, however, the situation had still not been 
resolved, and the CAD consultant again intervened and 
independently developed a formal communication link. This was 
presented to the vendor and the Company in late August and the 
link was demonstrated to the satisfaction of all parties in mid 
September. This removed all the obstacles to the system purchase.
Demonstrations were controlled at each stage by the Works 
Director, although he was not always present. It was he who had the 
final decision on acceptance or rejection, and he insisted on all 
aspects of the justification being demonstrated.
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Implementation of the system was the responsibility of the Drawing 
Office Manager, although he delegated much of this to the Chief 
Draughtsman. When the DO Manager left the Company part way 
through the project, the new DO Manager picked up the project and 
much faster progress was made.
Within nine months all aspects of the initial criteria for success had 
been achieved, although the use of parametrics was still limited.
The DO M anager claimed to have achieved the major targets in 3-4 
months, and apart from the parametrics saw the project as a total 
success at that point. No action had been needed other than that 
originally planned to achieve the success.
The structuring of BOMs had been brought into the DO at an early 
stage by importing a planner. He passed on his skills to the 
designers so that they could develop structures, and in the process 
became a designer himself.
Plans are now well advanced for producing an open system, which 
will also incorporate the facilities for plasma cutter generation and 
the necessary CAM links.
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4.6 Company 6 : Aluminium Window Manufacturer
Company 6 is a private limited Company formed in 1966 as a 
designer and installer of shop fronts.
Over the years, the scope has widened, and now includes curtain 
walling, security screens, commercial windows and ground floor 
treatments. The Company is on two sites about 180 miles apart, 
with about 110 employees in total and a combined turnover of 
£4 million per annum. Approximately three quarters of the' 
employees are on the larger of the two sites.
The Company’s customers are predominantly specifiers, local 
authorities or architects, who place contracts varying in size between 
£5,000 and £150,000, with the bulk being up to about £50,000. 
Typically 10 to 20 such jobs are concurrent in the factory.
The products are manufactured from extruded aluminium alloy 
together with castings and fittings as required. Most of the 
extrusions are designed in-house, as are many of the castings.
Fittings such as handles and locks are usually proprietary items, and 
are often specified by the customer.
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The majority of contracts require full drawings, with only about five 
percent needing an elevation drawing only. The number of standard 
parts and the repetitive nature of much of the work led the Company 
to consider the use of Computer Aided Design in the creation of 
designs and parts lists.
Each contract is usually completed by one designer. The format of 
the drawings changes only in scale and complexity, but there is 
inevitably an elevation, one or more plan views and a number of 
sectional details. The elevation is generally pictorial, but is used at a 
later stage to produce a cutting list for the extrusions.
The sectional details are built up from standard sections and are 
extremely repetitive and tedious to produce. An earlier experiment 
to build up sections from pre-printed self-adhesive section drawings 
was abandoned because of the cost of producing the self-adhesive 
film.
Copies of drawings are submitted to the contractor for checking and 
amendment as necessary. On their return the originals are amended 
and copies are resubmitted if necessary. Once they have been 
agreed, a surveyor is sent out to measure up the actual dimensions of 
the site, and the drawings are again amended to take into account 
the precise dimensions.
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It may be necessary to reissue the drawings to the contractor at this 
stage, before they can be released for production.
From the drawings, four cutting lists are prepared for the materials. 
These are:
* perimeter materials and windows
* doors
* components for assembly : shop
**
* components for assembly : site
The final task is the preparation of shop drawings. These include 
pressed metal, brackets and section drilling details.
If any stress analysis is required, for instance for wind loading on 
curtain walling, this is done by the local University.
The Company has developed its range of products based on standard 
items. There are 12 standard shop-front drawings, each of which 
may have single or double doors, side and top lights. The range of 
sections shown on these drawings is very small, and the elevations 
within a standard are substantially similar although variable in 
overall size. In addition to the standard shop fronts, non standards 
may be constructed, using the 30 extrusions.
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Windows are built up in bays, with up to five sections per bay. Each 
section may have fixed glass or all or part of it may have a side or 
top hung opening. The drawing of windows is therefore extremely 
repetitive. Window drawings contain significant amounts of text 
detailing the closures and furniture. The elevations call up standard 
sections by sequential number, and these are drawn on 
supplementary sheets.
Curtain walling consists of large areas of glass or infill panels, 
several storeys high. The drawings show a matrix of rectangular 
bays, which contain windows or panels, some of which may be 
openers. Each transom and mullion is numbered and referred to a 
section on a separate sheet.
The wall matrices are full chain-dimensioned, involving a high 
degree of over-dimensioning. Each transom and mullion is drawn on 
a separate drawing, showing the cutting and machining details and 
the stud fixing positions.
1 4 3
The Managing Director in conjunction with the Chief Draughtsman 
and Project Manager had identified the potential for CAD in the 
drawing office. Therefore he retained the services of a consultant to 
cariy out a survey and select a suitable system for use at the larger 
of the two sites, with expansion to the other site at a future date.
The survey was carried out in September and October 1988, and the 
consultant presented his report in November.
The report identified the main requirements of the software and 
hardware. In software terms the requirem ent was complex?
Whilst to produce pictorial elevations and sections by symbol 
building and step-and-repeat was straight forward, translating these 
images into cutting lists was more complex. The problem was 
exacerbated by the need to overlap adjacent lengths of aluminium 
extrusion used to make up a section, so that a joint did not go right 
through the section. It was clear that a significant amount of editing 
would be required prior to creating a cutting list. This editing would 
need to be done on the graphics rather than on the parts list.
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The report identified the principles behind this method of drawing 
construction, but in order to produce a meaningful benchmark a 
small committee was set up to develop the methodology further.
This committee brought together the designers, draughtsmen, 
planners and buyer, and turned out to be the first phase of a f 
company-wide consultative and implementation process.
The benchmark developed by the team was explained fully to two 
vendors, together with the reasoning behind the techniques, and each 
was given time to prepare a demonstration. From this 
demonstration a clear front-runner was identified, and asked to 
quote for a two workstation system. The system was to have the 
capability of sharing files between the two screens.
In order to cut down on the amount of lost time in the drawing 
office, the vendor was also asked to quote for the loading of 
extrusions and sections and the construction of three simple 
parametric designs.
The system was installed as specified, and three draughtsman were 
trained by the vendor. Over the next three months the other three 
were trained initially in-house but with some input from the vendor.
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The symbols for sections had been created prior to installation, but 
significant changes were needed to these over the first two months of 
operation, taking up the time of one of the draughtsmen and one 
screen full time. The parametric designs were more successful and 
needed only minor changes taking just a few days. As a result- one 
of the screens was operational and doing constructive work within 
about a week of installation. This was clearly insufficient for the 
throughput required, and manual systems were retained for the more 
complex schemes.
A review of the system was carried out in August 1989, six months 
after the decision to purchase had been made and five months after 
installation. At that stage some of the shop fronts were being 
designed using parametrics, and further parametrics were being 
constructed to extend the range.
Windows were nearly all done by a combination of parametrics and 
symbols. Curtain walling schematics were being generated by the 
use of grids, which reduced the draughting time by almost two thirds.
The database had been set up to allow schematics created at the 
tender stage to be archived and recalled for manufacture. This was 
working well. No progress had been made on the specialist software 
required to create cutting lists from the elevation drawings, and it 
was decided to bring the vendor back in to review this.
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A further six months passed before the software was sufficiently 
robust to produce cutting lists for windows and the simpler curtain 
walling. At this stage the Company considered that it had exceeded 
its reasonable expectations as declared at the concept stage, although 
it now saw ways of moving to further levels of integration.
One of the major features of this implementation was the rapid
turnover of CAD draughtsmen over the first two years, which
remains unexplained. The working conditions were good, and
*
qualified people were easily acquired to replace those lost.
One of those who left returned within two months for the same 
salary.
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5.0 OUTCOMES AND PROPOSITIONS
5.1 Case Study Outcomes
5.1.1 Level of Integration
It was established in Chapter 2 that integration is a continuum with a 
well-defined bottom end of no integration and an ill-defined or even 
moving target upper end which we can call "full integration". This is 
not particularly helpful when defining the point on the continuum 
which a Company has reached, and it is necessary to make some 
(arbitrary) sub-divisions, on similar lines to Waterlow and M onniot 
(1986 p7). Meredith and Hill’s (1987 p52) four-level model is not 
sufficiently precise for a detailed study.
For the purpose of this investigation, six levels of integration have 
been identified, each of which has a fairly clean-cut break to the next 
level. These are described as follows:
Level 1 - Electronic Drawing Board
This is a single stand-alone design, draughting or numerical control 
system which may be linked to non-active peripherals such as printers 
and plotters.
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It is also used to describe multiple systems where they are not linked 
electronically, even when files may be shared by the exchange of 
magnetic media.
Level 2 - Linked Systems with Common Database
This is the first step on the integration ladder. Two or more systems 
are linked electronically such that each may read from the common 
domain files of the other and, given the necessary access, write to 
those files. The systems are still, at this level, used only for 3esign 
and draughting work, whether in two or three dimensions.
Level 3 - Linked Systems Creating Parts Lists
A second category of software is invoked, which can interrogate a 
design to produce a simple part listing. This listing may require to be 
edited prior to use, depending upon the CAD software used and the 
creation method for the listing.
At this level, one system can be used to create parts lists for 
accessible files on the other system(s).
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Level 3a - Linked Systems Creating Numerical Control (N O  Files
At this level, a design is created which may then be passed to NC 
software for profile generation. To reach this level, design software 
must be linked to NC software, ie it is insufficient to have two linked 
NC systems, which would be classed only as Level 2.
One system must be capable of accessing CAD files on the other for 
NC generation, but it would be acceptable for only one of the systems 
to have NC capability. The systems may be linked to other non-active 
peripherals such as tape punches or magnetic tape drives.
Level 4 - Linked Systems Creating Bills of Materials
This is an extension of Level 3 in that the parts list, generated from 
the drawing, can be extended to produce a full Bill of Materials. This 
requires access to a third category of software - a database - in which 
full stock information may be maintained, including supplier 
information. The Bill of Material (BOM) software requires the 
ability to produce part structures which show the inter-relationships 
between parts.
At this level of integration we have broken through a traditional 
barrier between Design and Production Planning.
150
Level 4a - Linked Systems Linked to NC Equipment
This level is an extension of Level 3a in that once a profile has been 
designed, tools have been chosen and toolpaths have been defined 
and proven, the cutting data can be passed electronically to the-'NC 
equipment without producing hard media such as cards or tapes. An 
extension to this which is not to be considered further in this work is 
the addition of automatic gauging which can be used to adjust tool 
offsets to compensate for wear.
Level 5 - Linked System to Computer Aided Production Management 
(CAPM1 System - One Wav
Having produced a structured Bill of Materials the next step is to use 
this in a CAPM system for the creation of costings, production 
planning and materials requirements planning (MRP).
Data are transferred electronically from the BOM files held on the 
CAD equipment, usually into transit files on the CAPM system for 
validation prior to use.
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Level 6 - Two-wav CAD/CAPM Link
The problem with a Level 5 implementation is that it requires parts 
information to be held on both the CAD and the CAPM systems, 
which is problematic when changes have to be made.
Level 6 avoids the need for this by allowing the CAD system BOM 
software to access part files on the CAPM system, create structures 
and send the structures back to the CAPM system. Flags can be used 
on the parts file to identify those items which are not available in 
graphic form on the CAD system.
This level is the highest one would expect to find in a Small to 
Medium Enterprise (SME) in the UK in 1991, although Open 
Systems are becoming more acceptable to other than the very large 
firms. One would expect a Level 6 implementation to be keyed in to 
external access points such as purchasing and supply and sales order 
entry.
Table 5.1 puts the six case studies into the context of the six levels of 
integration described above.
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Case Initial Interim Target 
Level Level Level
1 2 3 5
2 1 - 2
3 1 1 3 (note 1)
4 1 1 2
5 2 4 6
6 2 3 (note 2) 3 (note 2)
Table 5.1
Notes 1) The target was to have parts listing on one system and 
draughting on each of two with floppy disc transfer.
2) Cutting lists were also created.
The Initial Level corresponds to the first hardware configuration 
purchased by the Company together with the software implemented 
within the first two months.The interim level is that reached in the 
first phase of operation, and usually corresponds to an elapsed time of 
12 to 18 months.The Target Level is that declared as a long-term 
objective prior to implementation.
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Implementation, like integration, is a continuum, along which 
companies move. Three of the six companies have reached or are 
approaching their target level of integration within three years of the 
initial purchase, as described in Section 4.
5.1.2 Computer Knowledge Base
It is possible that the degree of success in implementing CAD systems 
relates in some way to the prior computer knowledge base of the 
Company. In other words, where computer systems are In full and 
free use within the Company we may expect a different level of 
understanding and hence a different level of acceptability of CAD, be 
it higher or lower.
The cases present a wide spectrum of prior knowledge from virtually 
no experience to wide experience with sophisticated CAPM and 
design software. A ranking of experience has therefore been 
developed as follows:
Level 1 : No systems in use within the Company 
Level 2 : Computers used by some sections of the 
Company eg Accounts, remote from the 
Designers
Level 3 : Discrete packages used freely throughout 
the Company but not for Design work
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Level 4 : Integrated CAPM systems used throughout 
the Company but not by Designers 
Level 5 : Integrated CAPM systems available to the 
Designers for reference 
Level 6 : Computer systems used by the Designers, 
eg for non-graphic design, databases or part 
structures.
The initial levels of the six companies were:
Case Level Note
1 4
2 6 Limited to one designer
3 2
4 3
5 6
6 6
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Whilst the lower levels of prior computer knowledge may be of some 
interest, Levels 5 and 6 are of particular interest, since they relate to 
the exposure of the designers to computer systems.
5.1.3 Expectation of the System
Expectation of the system is extraordinarily difficult to define after 
the event, and the best guide can be obtained by looking at the case 
notes for each project made during the early discussions with the 
Companies. The expectation is a combination of the initial 
aspirations of the individuals within the Company as amended by the 
experience of the Consultant during discussion. It is made up largely 
of two components; targets and timescales.
If expressed verbally, an expectation would be "...to achieve level A by 
time B". It may indeed be more complex than this, with several 
targets and timescales embedded in it.
We can deal with expectations in one of three ways. Firstly we could 
look to see what level was reached in the given time. This is difficult, 
since it requires a subjective view of the level reached.
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Rather easier is to look at the time taken to reach the target. In 
theory this is objective, but it takes no account of the probability that 
a satisfactory or sufficing level may be achieved well within the time.
The third method is to combine the two targets in some type of
mathematical formula. Since a higher level and lower time are
"better" in relative terms, one simple formula would be to express the
expectation as A/B. Satisfaction is guaranteed when A /B  exceeds a
predetermined value. Whilst this is fine on paper and mathematically
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tidy, it requires a continuous subjective assessment of A. It also has 
the problem of having no limits on A, so that a satisfactory position 
could be considered to be reached if a low target were achieved in a 
very short time. This is clearly unacceptable.
For the purpose of this study, since we are dealing with a small 
number of cases which can be compared easily, a more pragmatic 
approach has been taken. Mathematical satisfaction is calculated at a 
stated point on the implementation programme where development 
has reached a plateau. At that stage the satisfaction level is taken as 
the combination of the estimated percentage of target reached with 
the inverse of the ratio of actual time and target time. This is 
covered further in section 5.1.8.
So far as the expectations of the six systems are concerned, the 
following six statements apply.
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Case 1
To produce tank barrel designs in five hours and general assembly 
drawings in eight hours within two years of starting the 
implementation. To link the CAD system with Micross CAPM 
software within three years.
Case 2
To reduce the average time required to produce a filter*prdss design 
from 200 hours to 145 hours within 18 months. The actual target was 
a saving of 3000 hours per year, but it was not feasible to assess the 
savings in this form.
Case 3
To allow the designer to increase the throughput of work by 40 
percent whilst working 20 percent fewer hours.
To enable a second draughtsman to take a significant part of the 
workload, as a backup to the designer.
These changes were to take place immediately, with the full time 
savings being achieved within six to nine months.
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Case 4
To enable families of designs to be created quickly and easily by 
people other than the Managing Director. The target was to produce 
a tailored version of an existing design in 30 hours, compared with the 
usual 150 hours. This was to be achieved within the first 12 months.
Case 5
To develop an integrated CAD/CAPM system to allow Bills of 
Materials to be generated on the CAPM system from CAD drawings. 
This was to be achieved within 18 months of implementation.
Case 6
To increase the throughput of the design department by 50 percent 
within 12 months without any additional manpower. To produce 
cutting lists from the CAD drawings within 18 months.
Summary
The expectations, whilst all expressed in simple terms, vary in the 
objectivity of their measurement and the length of time required to 
carry out the measurement.
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Two of the Case Studies - 4 and 5 - opted for very easy measures.
The expectation was tangible in each case.
* to produce a tailored design in 30 hours
* to provide an integrated CAD/CAPM system.
The very first tailored design could be timed, and an accurate 
measure of success produced in Case 4. In Case 5, the level of 
integration was pre-defined, and the time taken to reach that level 
could be measured. Even if the targets were not reached within the 
expected time, an estimate of the extent to which success had been 
achieved could be made.
Two of the Case Studies - 1 and 2 - opted for more difficult measures. 
Both relied on an improvement in the time to complete a project. 
Whilst this does not, on the face of it, seem too difficult it must be 
noted that the project times varied significantly in both cases, and the 
average project time was targeted for improvement. Whilst this is 
measurable in the long term, its assessment over one or two projects 
is somewhat objective.
The final two Case Studies - 3 and 6 - had very difficult measures of 
achievement. Both sought an increase in throughput of the 
department by 40 percent and 50 percent respectively.
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For a drawing office which develops many similar products in the 
course of a month or year, this can be a useful measure of success, 
but both these companies were project based, with a 10:1 spread of 
project size. In both cases, therefore, the m easure was extremely 
subjective.
Fortunately both these companies had secondary, more objective 
measures. The first sought to employ a second draughtsman to take 
the load off the designer. The effectiveness of this could be measured 
easily, tangibly and quickly. The second required the system to 
produce cutting lists. This is very easy to assess, and a  measure of 
achievement is objective.
Table 5.2 summarises the objectivity of the cases.
Case Measure Objectivity
1 Time to complete a project M
2 Time to complete a project M
3 ' Increase throughput/
Second draughtsman L /H
4 Increase speed of operation H
5 Integrated CAD/CAPM H
6 Increase throughput/ L /H
produce cutting lists
TABLE 5.2
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The degree of difficulty in achieving the expectations was very 
difficult to assess objectively, but was likely to have some relevance 
when assessing the value of the project. It was, arguably, easier for 
the Consultant to assess than for the Company, since he had been 
involved in several implementations and had observed many of the 
problems likely to be encountered by the companies.
In an attempt to scale the degree of difficulty an ordinal scale has 
been developed as follows:
*■* ^
1 2 3 4 5
Target easy Target very
to achieve difficult to
achieve
Using the scale the following assessment has been made.
Case Difficulty
1 4
2 2
3 3
4 3
5 5
6 4
Table 5.3
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5.1.4 Prior Justification
Justification is to some extent linked with expectation, although as we 
saw in Section 2, justification may have little to do with the 
operational milestones. In addition to that, we also saw that in'many 
instances justification is a static activity carried out at the concept 
stage and may not be reviewed - indeed may be forgotten - during the 
system implementation. As a result, a successful system may well not 
achieve its justification targets, or conversely a system which has 
reached those targets may be regarded as unsuccessful. As a simple 
example, justification may be based on a four-year payback, whereas 
success may be based upon time savings and hence throughput.
There is no guarantee that these two benchmarks will be reached at 
the same time.
In small companies, where the same ’team ’ is likely to be responsible 
for justification and exceptions, we would not anticipate wild 
differences in the two, but for completeness the measures of 
justification have been extracted from the questionnaire analysis.
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Case 1
The main problem faced by Company 1 was the bottleneck in the 
Drawing Office. Justification was therefore based upon increasing the 
throughput of the D.O. A three workstation system would be justified 
if it allowed enquiry and tender documents to be produced in half the 
manual time whilst at the same time increasing the number of 
projects per year through the departm ent by 45 percent. These 
measures line up fairly well with the expectations of the system.
This is an interesting concept, since it regards the cost of the system 
as secondary to its benefits. This approach continued through the 
implementation, resources being made available almost without 
regard to cost.
Case 2
Company 2 had the same pressing need to get more work out of the 
Drawing Office (D.O.) using the same number of people, but their 
timescale was much shorter.
The D.O. was at full capacity, and new projects were being secured 
more quickly than they could clear them. It was therefore essential 
that the CAD system produced its benefits very quickly without taking 
up valuable design time in the process.
164
The justification in this case was related to short-term time savings 
which were offered by the potential for parametric programming. 
Unlike Case 1, however, cost of the system was not insignificant in the 
eyes of the Company, and the ongoing benefits were expected to 
outweigh the ongoing costs.
As the method of justification was not expressed in this manner at the 
outset, the reasonable expectations of the system did not match the 
justification.
Case 3
Company 3 had a major problem of designer overload. It was not 
that the D.O. had insufficient space, but that the Company only had 
one designer, and he was working long and hard to keep pace with 
the workload. He had insufficient time available to train a second 
designer, and as a result of pressure was extremely inefficient.
The justification as expressed by the Managing Director was that the 
system should make the designer more cost-effective and reduce his 
workload. At the same time the design operation had to be deskilled.
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This lines up fairly well with the expectations of the system. In 
addition to this non-financial justification, a maximum budget for 
hardware and software was set at £20,000, exclusive of maintenance 
costs. Note that the degree of workload reduction and 
cost-effectiveness increase formed no part of the justification.
Case 4
Company 4 was under similar constraints to Company 3, except that 
the designer in this case was the Managing Director. H e was* aware 
that he could not continue to run his Company and do all the design 
and draughting work. The justification in this case was fairly clear, 
but stated in vague terms. "The cost of the equipment has to be 
justifiable in terms of releasing me (the Managing Director) from 
draughting work to do design and management work".
The Managing Director’s reasoning was that the system should be 
cheaper than the annual cost of employing a Managing Director to 
take over the management of the Company, thereby releasing him to 
do the technical work. The justification was therefore loosely 
financial.
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Whilst the justification and expectations are different, they both point 
to the same end, and it can be argued that were either to be achieved 
the importance of the other would wane. It is difficult to envisage a 
situation whereby the expectations could be met without fulfilling the 
justification criterion.
Case 5
Company 5 developed its justification on the back of the Consultant’s 
report. This report showed a payback for the system which was 
acceptable to the Company. It was decided that the system would be 
justified if the savings in terms of speed of operation and quality of 
output could be achieved. The justification could therefore be said to 
be purely financial, although the non-financial benefits of integration 
soon became paramount, to the extent that they were targeted without 
further financial justification.
Case 6
Company 6 was more traditional in its approach to justification. It 
took the expected savings less the annual maintenance costs as being 
the benefits. It then compared this with the finance costs of the 
system over four year. The system purchase was justified on the basis 
that the benefits outweighed the costs.
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There was some suggestion that had the balance been more equal, or 
even tipped in the other direction, some account would have been 
taken of the additional benefits to be obtained by having m ore 
draughting time available. In the event, however, this was not tested.
Summary
The actual justification for implementing systems tends to be very 
complex, involving many different criteria. All we can do is pick out 
the major points made during discussion, and assume that there are 
no hidden factors.
In one case, as we saw, there were such hidden factors which did not 
come to light until well into the implementation.
It is fair to say that the match between justification and expectation is 
not particularly good in most of the cases. This is partly because we 
are comparing prior justification with expectations formulated in the 
early stages of implementation, when the power of the systems had 
been appreciated at least in some measure.
The findings of this section are summarised in Table 5.4.
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Case Non-financial Financial Match To
Justification Justification Expectation
1 Throughput None Good
2 Throughput Not Declared Poor
3 Reduced Workload Budget only Fair
4 Reduced Workload Tenuous Fair
5 Speed and Quality Payback Poor
6 None Payback Poor
TABLE 5.4
5.1.5 Management and Organisation
As a company grows, its structure changes, and this change is often 
accompanied by delegation of authority and responsibility. The 
designer in a very small company may well report to the Managing 
Director, whilst someone with equivalent skills in a large company 
may find himself three or four steps removed from the Managing 
Director.
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If that designer is responsible for implementing CAD in his drawing 
office, we may expect to find differences not only in the approach to 
implementation in areas such as justification, but also in the actual 
methodology of implementation. For instance the project team  is 
likely to have a different emphasis, and the scale of the 
implementation may be different. Not only does the structure of a 
company change as it grows, but the management style may also 
change. It is not uncommon to find an autocratic manager at the 
helm of a very small company, but participative management tends to 
be more common with the larger companies. This can have a 
dramatic effect on the justification and implementation of capital 
equipment. For this reason, the organisation structure of the six 
companies has been recorded, noting the management style of the 
Chief Executive.
It was not deemed necessary to show the whole of the structure, but 
all the departments who may have influence on selection and 
implementation have been included. The structures are shown in 
Appendix 3.
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Case 1
This Company is "directed" by the Managing Director in the true 
sense. Whilst he does on occasions become involved with day-to-day 
operation, this is rare, and the Company is managed effectively :by the 
other executive members of the Board.
The teamwork at that level is good, with the Financial Director being 
the unofficial but unchallenged team leader. His personal, technical 
and strategic skills fit him well for this role.
The structure is quite traditional, with the pre-sales and post-sales 
design being handled by the Technical Director, production planning, 
including Bill of M aterial structuring, by the Production Director, and 
the management information, including CAPM systems, by the 
Financial Director. All the MIS and CAPM and systems have been 
computerised to some degree.
The D.O. is in the charge of a D.O. Manager, who spends some time 
estimating but the bulk of his time managing the D.O., issuing work 
to a priority list and ensuring that schedules are met. He is also 
responsible for new product development and the legal requirements 
of the new products.
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At the start of the project, all the computer expertise and literacy was 
vested in the departments controlled by the Financial Director and 
Production Manager. The Technical Manager had no prior computer 
knowledge, and none of the D.O. staff had been involved with 
computers. Coincidentally, within a few weeks of the CAD study 
being started, a draughtsman was taken on who had CAD experience 
obtained outside the Company, although this experience was fairly 
limited.
Relationships between the "technical" and "production" departments 
had always been good, with free interchange of information. The 
drawing office personnel spent considerable amounts of their time on 
the shop floor, particularly when a new product was being developed, 
and this was seen by both parties to be quite normal.
The boundaries between the technical and production jobs were well 
defined. The D.O. prepared detailed drawings and parts lists, but the 
planners produced the structured Bills of Materials. This was seen as 
necessary because of the planners’ intimate knowledge of production 
methods.
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It was considered that this division was essential for efficient and 
accurate operation of the system. Whilst current thinking may regard 
this as unenlightened, it has to be said in its defence that the close 
working relationship of the two departments allowed it to work 
remarkably well.
Case 2
As with Case 1, Company 2 is "directed" by the Managing Director 
and managed by the senior executives. This direction is rather more 
hands-on, and is controlled by daily production meetings. The 
Managing Director is effectively running two separate companies on 
the same site, which share very few resources, but carry out work for 
each other on occasions.
The pump section is managed by the Works Director, whilst the Press 
section is managed by a Technical Director and a Production 
Director. Each division has its sales personnel, and the Financial 
, Director is responsible for the accounts of both division.
The Pumps division has a single design draughtsman, and since an 
early decision was made not to provide CAD facilities for this 
division, it is not considered further.
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Design work on the Press section falls into two categories both in 
style and organisationally. Major contacts are handled by a contracts 
designer and his small staff, working directly for the Technical 
Director. Again, an early decision was made that this section could 
not be computerised effectively in the short term.
The bulk of the design within the Company is in press work, and this 
is handled by the Drawing Office. The D.O. M anager works directly 
for the Technical Director and controls two Chief Designers. One is 
responsible for all the electrical design, with a single perm anent 
designer. The other one is responsible for all mechanical design; he 
controls a variable sized team, depending upon the workload. At the 
minimum this would be four designers, but this could be 
supplemented by up to seven contract draughtsmen. The normal 
complement is four plus two contractors.
A t the start of the project computer literacy was limited. A  computer 
based accounting system had been in operation for some time, but 
there was no CAPM system.
The Chief Designer (Mechanical) and the Production Controller had 
both been to night school on basic computer courses, and were able 
to programme in BASIC and PASCAL. They were, of their own 
volition, developing unofficial systems between them to help the 
production planning process.
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In doing this they had developed a very close working relationship, 
and their departments worked closely together as a consequence.
Within the D.O. environment the jobs were not particularly well 
defined, with the exception of the electrical section. New products 
were handled initially by the D.O. Manager, who decided, in 
conjunction with the Chief Designer whether the product would be 
designed by the Chief Designer himself, or whether it could be 
designed by one of the other team members.
If a decision was taken on the former course of action, a team would 
be set up to handle the design, headed by the Chief Designer. In the 
case of the latter course of action, the management of the projects 
was much less well defined. Some would be handled directly by the 
D.O. Manager, some by the Chief Designer, some by both and some 
apparently not at all. In short, D.O. Management was far from 
perfect. The uneven, and often very heavy, workload of the 
department was cited as a reason for this.
The boundaries between design and production were very clearly 
defined, with the designers preparing parts lists and cutting lists but 
having no part in production planning. On occasions the designers 
would be called onto the shop floor to resolve production problems, 
but this was informal and ad-hoc, and generally related to drawing 
errors or insufficient information.
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The working relationships were far from close and at times 
antagonistic.
Case 3
Compared with the two previous cases, the organisation structure of 
Company 3 is veiy simple. The Company is small, and the structure 
reflects this.
At the start of the project, all design work was carried out by the 
Chief Designer, who worked directly for the Managing Director. He 
was also responsible for all post-sales customer liaison.
The Company was run on a day-to-day basis by the Managing 
Director and the Financial Director, with the Managing Director 
being responsible for all functions other than accounting. The 
Chairman was a non-executive accountant.
For a small Company, the amount of attention paid to the design 
process by the Managing Director was very small, and arguably 
reflected his confidence in the Designer. The Managing Director’s 
main function was in sales and liaison with the agents throughout the 
country. His knowledge of the design and manufacturing process was 
good, although not to the level whereby he could take over either of 
the functions.
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The Managing Director’s "hand-off approach was also evident in his 
dealings with the production unit. His Works Manager was in full 
control, reporting to the Managing Director infrequently.
Liaison between the Designer and production was good, and he-spent
a considerable amount of time with the mouldmakers. One of the
reasons for this was that in many cases it was seen as simpler to
communicate concepts verbally than pictorially. There was certainly
benefit in this approach, since the. Designer maintained an intimate
* ^
knowledge of the limitations and potential of the production process.
At the start of the project all the computer literacy resided in the 
. F.D. and one other member of his accounting staff. This was limited 
to sales, purchase and nominal ledgers, stock records and sales order 
entry, all on a single Apricot microcomputer on which the payroll was 
also done. The routines were simplistic, and needed to be reviewed. 
The designer was familiar with the concept of CAD, but had not been 
involved directly.
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Case 4
Company 4 had grown fairly quickly on the expertise and knowledge
of the Managing Director, an entrepreneur who had exceptional flair
but little managerial expertise by his own admission. A part from the
Managing Director there was no other manager in the Company with
any authority apart from the Accounts Manager’s statutory authority.
The Managing Director was capable of doing all the jobs in the
Company without exception, and tended to hold on to the parts he
*
enjoyed - design and development.
Partly because of his awareness that the could not do everything, and 
partly because of time constraints, he employed a designer who 
worked under his close supervision. He also employed a Works 
Supervisor who worked under equally close supervision. As a  result, 
all decision making involved the Managing Director to some extent, 
and there was no perceived need for the designer and supervisor to 
talk to each other, let alone work closely together.
At the start of the project there were no computer literate people in 
the Company. All the systems were manual even to the extent of 
having no word processor. The Managing Director was aware of the 
existence of sophisticated systems and had been to demonstrations of 
several.
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Apart from accounting systems, for which he saw little need at that 
stage, he had looked at two CAD systems in some detail, and had 
been convinced that this was the way forward.
Job descriptions in the Company were nonexistent, and there was a 
great deal of overlap between the Managing Director and virtually all 
the staff who worked directly from him, to the extent of confusion in 
some cases. There was almost no overlap between departments, 
because of the Managing Director’s "divide and rule" method of 
management.
The foregoing gives the impression of a hard-nosed autocrat, but this 
was far from reality. The Managing Director led by virtue of his 
technical ability - which was second to none in the UK - and his 
gentle, persuasive manner. He had also collected around him a team 
of relatively passive people who had neither the expertise nor the 
desire to challenge or push him.
Case 5
This Company is directed by a Managing Director, with a very strong 
executive team behind him. By far the strongest member of this team 
is the Works Director, who has responsibility for all technical and 
manufacturing functions, ie everything except accounts, sales and 
administration.
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At the next level down from the Works Director there is a layer of 
first-line management.
The Drawing Office Manager controls a design/drawing office with
six people including a supervisor. This D.O. is responsible for all
design work and estimating for nonstandard products, excluding
structures. A separate department is responsible for structural design
and lighting planning, reporting to the Sales Director and feeding the
structures and lighting plans to the D.O. for the detailing if necessary.
■* ^
The split between design and lighting seems somewhat arbitrary, but 
whilst the reasons are historic, the principles work in practice, and 
there is little or no overlap between the departments. Installations 
are also controlled by the Sales Director via an Installations Manager. 
This is regarded as essential because of the high degree of customer 
contract by this department.
At the start of the project, both these departments would create 
designs up to the parts list stage, and then pass them to the 
production planning department for Bill of Materials structuring.
In this and other respects, jobs were very clearly defined. All 
employees had job descriptions which detailed their reporting lines 
and levels of authority and responsibility.
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To some extent this had led to "hard" demarcation between 
departments, and there was a high degree of insularity throughout. 
That is not to say there was any animosity between departments, and 
they were working well together. One of the reasons for this was the 
participative style of the Works Director. He held regular 
planning/progress meetings for his first-line managers and others such 
as the Industrial Engineer who worked with his managers.
The Company was very computer literate. A large mainframe 
computer carried out all accounting functions, and an extensive suite 
of software was in use for production planning and control and 
management information.
In addition to this, there were several numerically controlled pieces of 
equipment on the shop floor. The lighting designers used Hewlett 
Packard microcomputers for their design work, linked to printers and 
a plotter. The CAD system was therefore one of the last links in the 
computerisation jigsaw.
Every department, including the D.O. was computer literate, if only to 
the extent of using the system to interrogate parts files.
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The role of the D.O. Manager was key to the efficient functioning of 
the Company. Priorities on projects were set at the Works Director’s 
meetings, but within these guidelines the D.O. Manager would 
coordinate the design and planning functions to ensure that the 
project could be completed to schedule. This may involve liaison with 
the buyer to pre-order long leadtime materials, and liaison with the 
planning department to optimise material usage. Once in production, 
he would also liaise with the manufacturing unit to resolve production 
problems related to design. This would often result in improved 
design practices for the future. * '
Case 6
Company 6, whilst not being a particularly new Company, could 
hardly be regarded as well-established in people terms, having had 
significant personnel changes prior to the start of the project.
The Managing Director is a salesman and leads a small team  of sales 
personnel as well as controlling two manufacturing units. It is clear 
that his scope for hands-on management is limited, and he places a 
great deal of reliance on his management team.
The team is conventional in most respects, but has an ’extra’ manager, 
who in the event turned out to be crucial to the CAD system success.
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Some 12 months prior to the start of the project, the D.O. M anager 
had resigned to take up a post elsewhere after many years of service. 
He was duly replaced by an equally competent but less experienced 
Manager. Within nine months he had left his new post, and the 
Company took him back, because of his experience, as Special f 
Projects Manager. In this role he was allocated major projects or new 
developments, and worked alongside the D.O. Manager and /o r sales 
staff. In his short time away from the Company he had gained some 
limited experience of CAD, which was seen by the Managing Director 
to be beneficial so far as his future plans were concerned.
Roles within the Company were clear but flexible, with staff crossing 
the traditional demarcation lines whenever the need arose. For 
instance the designers would, if necessary, carry out some of the 
planner’s work if he were busy. The special Projects M anager would 
also get involved with design, draughting and planning at times of 
extreme pressure.
Relationships with the production unit were excellent. This was partly 
because of the tendency of the designers to under-specify work to an 
extent where verbal instruction was required as a supplement. The 
Directors and Managers were aware that this state of affairs could not 
be allowed to continue, particularly if they were to seek certification 
under the BS 5750 Quality Assurance Standard.
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Nevertheless, this constant contact between the department fostered 
close working relationships.
Unusually, the planners, who were responsible for creating cutting 
lists from the drawings, worked for the Production Manager, and not 
for the D.O. Manager. For the reasons expressed earlier, this caused 
no problems.
The Company was computer literature to an extent. The accounts 
were computer based, and the planners used a suite of bespoke 
software for cutting lists, part of which had been developed by the 
Special Projects Manager in his former role as D.O. Manager. This 
had not been implemented because of a shortage of hardware. There 
was no computer based CAPM system.
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Summary
To summarise the foregoing as an aid to focusing on the similarities and 
differences between the companies, ten categories have been selected. 
These are summarised further in Table 5.5.
1. Management Style of Chief Executive
This can have a significant effect on the way in which decisions are taken 
within a company, particularly where costs and benefits are being traded 
and specifically where they are expressed in financial terms. The 
approachability of the Chief Executive may also be important in the way 
the company manages significant change.
2. Size of the Management Team
The number of people involved in strategic decision making may have an 
influence not only on the speed of decision making but also on its 
effectiveness.
3. Position of the "Driver1
The Chief Executive may not be directly involved in implementing the 
CAD system, and this category defines who in the organisation was 
responsible.
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4. Management Style of the “Driver"
As in 1. above, this may have a significant effect on the implementation.
5. Management Style of the Drawing Office fD.O.IManager
Whilst the D.O. Manager may not be driving the implementation, his 
method of management may have a profound effect on the speed and 
effectiveness of the implementation.
6. Effectiveness of the D.O. Manager
It was clear during the studies that the D.O. Management varied 
between good and poor, and this may well have had an effect on the 
success or otherwise of the implementation.
7. D.O. Internal Relationship
Linked with 5. and 6. above is the internal working relationships between 
members and sections of the D.O.
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8. Inter-Departmental Boundaries
As CAD has the capacity to be a cross-functional technology, the 
relationships between departments are important. This category 
describes the strength of boundary definition.
9. D.O. External Relationships
Following on from 8., this category describes the effectiveness of the 
D.O. in working across those boundaries.
10. Challenge to Authority
This follows on from 1. and 4. above, and describes the openness of the 
CAD implementation management to criticism, advice or questioning. It 
may provide pointers towards true team-work.
5.1.6 Management "Ownership”
Management commitment to a project has been recognised as being 
essential to its success for many years (see Section 2.4). In recent years, 
a new level of commitment has been identified and propounded, 
particularly where high technology implementation is concerned. This is 
the Project Champion.
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It is suggested that this individual, to be successful, should be influential 
in the management structure, and should work closely with the 
specification/implementation team (Altschuler et. al. (1984)).
This section looks at the position and authority of the person most- 
influential in implementing the CAD system at the six companies. It 
considers his relationship with the implementation team where this is 
relevant, and his contribution to the success or otherwise of the project. 
It also looks at the contribution of others further up and down the 
structure who were fundamental in supporting or counteracting his plans.
Case 1
At Company 1, the CAD project was managed by the Financial Director 
(F.D.). It was he who commissioned the Consultant to select a suitable 
CAD system, and he was involved in developing the brief for the 
Consultant.
Throughout the consultancy phase, all reports were made back to the 
F.D., and the final report was presented to him. Only after he had been 
through the report in detail did he involve others.
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So far as the hierarchy of responsibility was concerned, he had been 
given the task of implementing CAD by the Managing Director, who 
required little involvement. The F.D. therefore saw it as his role to 
manage the whole of the project to eventual implementation, using 
whatever resources he required. He had full authority to select and 
direct an implementation team.
The team he selected was small. The Drawing Office Manager was a
key member, and the Technical Manager was involved on the periphery.
* ^
The Production Control Manager was involved as required, as was the 
computer specialist. The "full time" team therefore consisted only of the 
F.D. and the D.O. Manager.
So far as the Consultant was concerned, two sources of information were 
essential. Technical requirements for the system were obtained by 
detailed discussions with the D.O. Manager and his senior staff.
The Consultant was fully conversant with the CAPM system in use and 
the hardware platform, but required the expertise of the computer 
specialist when developing the interface to the CAPM system, 
particularly in terms of file structures.
190
Final selection of the CAD system was in the hands of the F.D. This 
may seem a dangerous path, but the shortlisting had at that stage been 
done by the D.O. Manager and Consultant, and the three systems 
shortlisted were all technically capable of the task in hand. At that stage 
the F.D. became involved in detailed discussions with the vendors,-' not 
only on system costs, but on the more technical aspects of links with the 
CAPM system.
It would have been very easy to alienate the Technical M anager (T.M.) 
who was ultimately responsible for the Drawing Office, and hence the 
CAD system. However, the F.D. used his considerable inter-personal 
skills to avoid any conflict, keeping the Technical Manager informed on 
progress and involving him in the more important stages of the 
negotiations. It must be said that the T.M. had little to contribute to the 
system selection or implementation, and saw himself as too busy to be 
involved in the detail.
The implementation of the system was managed by the D.O. Manager, 
but very closely monitored in terms of cost and progress by the F.D. It 
was during this stage that the M.D. began to take a more active role, 
once the implementation was running behind schedule.
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Whilst supporting the F.D. fully, he insisted that the T.M. took a more 
active role, and took the necessary decisions to allow the D.O. Manager 
to be released to manage the implementation full-time. At no stage was 
the F.D. seen to be over-ruled, the M.D. acting purely in a supporting 
role.
All negotiations with the supplier before, during, and after the 
installation were conducted by the F.D., supported where necessary by 
the D.O. Manager, Consultant or M.D.
As a project manager or "champion", the F.D. was extremely successful 
and effective. He involved himself in the technical aspects of selection 
to a high level, as well as the more familiar (to him) financial aspects.
By so doing, he was able to challenge statements and recommendations 
made by both the vendor and his own implementation team. This ability, 
coupled with his apparent impartiality and fairness gave him credibility 
and enhanced his authority.
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Case 2
It is not unfair to state that at Company 2 the project was not managed 
by any single person. The Consultant was commissioned by the 
Managing Director, who laid down very few guidelines for either the 
project or the system. It was to the M.D. that the Consultant presented 
the final selection report, although he (the M.D.) took no active part in 
its preparation.
* ^
The logical source of technical information would have been the D.O. 
Manager, but he expressed his misgivings about the feasibility of CAD 
and passed the responsibility to his Chief Designer (C.D.), who was 
considerably more enthusiastic. Information not available from the C.D. 
was available from the Contracts Designer or the Electrical Designer, all 
of whom worked physically closely together.
Whilst the C.D. was the main contact, he had no authority or 
responsibility for the project, and was not involved at the final 
presentation. Nor, incidentally, was the D.O. Manager or Technical 
Director.
Having accepted the findings of the selection study, the M.D. involved 
the T.D. in the final selection and meetings with prospective vendors. 
The T.D., whilst not being so sceptical as the D.O. Manager, needed to 
be convinced of the benefits of CAD.
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The vendors did this to a level at which he was at least prepared to 
support the project, although to suggest that he was totally committed to 
its success would be to overstate the case.
Negotiations with the vendor were carried out by the M.D. and the T.D.,
with some input from the Consultant, and a little from the C.D. These
were far from straightforward, as the vendor was in the process of
changing his hardware platform, which involved a software change.
Nevertheless, a deal was arranged between the companies which involved
* ^
a combination of purchase and lease.
At the point of delivery of the system the M.D. took a back seat, and the 
project became the responsibility of the D.O. Manager, who delegated it 
to the C.D. as a part-time activity.
Software and hardware problems with the supplier caused the M.D. to 
become involved, and the T.D. was also brought back into the picture. 
Again, there was no "ownership" of the system at any level, and this 
caused severe problems for the vendor, who was receiving contradictory 
information from different levels in the organisation.
The Consultant was invited to intervene, and the immediate problems 
were resolved fairly amicably for the time being.
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The eventual breakdown of the project came suddenly. In the absence 
of any evidence that cost savings had been achieved by the Company 
through use of the system, the M.D. requested an investigation by the 
Consultant. This found that the system was not being used effectively, 
and that by altering working practices the D.O. Manager had effectively 
sidelined the system.
The C.D. had attempted manfully to use it, but pressure of work and the 
introduction of the new practices made this almost impossible. Whilst he 
was still convinced that it could be cost effective, he was powerless to do 
anything about it. The Consultant’s report stated that in the absence of 
records it was not possible to evaluate the actual or potential 
contribution that the system had been making or could make, but the 
short-termism of the new working practices was criticised.
The T.D. received the Consultant’s report, and on his recommendation 
the M.D. decided that the project should be suspended.
Somewhat acrimoniously, the vendor was asked to remove the rented 
equipment, and the equipment which had been purchased was virtually 
mothballed.
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Case 3
At Company 3 the decision to investigate the use of CAD was taken by 
the Managing Director (M.D.), although it was clear that the Financial 
Director (F.D.) and the Chief Designer (C.D.) had been involved in 
discussions on the subject prior to this. As a result there was general 
consensus amongst the senior management team that the project as a 
whole was desirable.
The case was unique amongst the six cases, in that a decision had 
already been taken to purchase a CAD system, and the Consultant’s brief 
was to select a suitable system. That this had not been a fully informed 
decision became evident as the project progressed, although the decision 
turned out to have been correct in terms of potential benefits.
The M.D. retained full control and ownership of the project throughout 
the evaluation and selection stages, and was intimately involved at all the 
demonstrations, together with the C.D. He thus became something of an 
authority on 2D/3D draughting and was able to take an active part in 
the discussions. In this respect also the case was unique. At no stage 
was the Consultant required to make decisions. All his assumptions were 
tested fully and any recommendations were questioned in detail.
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This not only enabled the M.D. to learn about systems very quickly, but 
also gave him confidence in his decision to purchase.
The C.D.’s role was to some extent a parallel to that of the Consultant. 
He sought out the technical areas which may give rise to problems'and 
assured himself that the chosen system was able to meet his 
requirements.
The role of the F.D. was rather different. He was not so well informed
*  ^
on the technical aspects of CAD as the M.D. or C.D., but he had taken 
some trouble to look in detail at the various methods of financing the 
purchase. Having been kept up-to-date on the general progress of the 
project, he was able to step in and negotiate the purchase from a 
position of strength.
There can be no doubt that in this case the M.D. was the System 
Champion, although the other members of the team worked so closely 
with him that there was no conflict whatever. The final decision, when it 
was made, was unanimous.
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Case 4
The Managing Director (M.D.) of Company 4 was an autocrat, and not 
surprisingly he took on the role of the System Champion. As owner of 
the Company his authority was unchallenged, and this remained so 
throughout the project.
The evaluation and selection stages of the project involved the M.D., but 
also the draughtsman. However, the draughtsman’s input was limited for 
two reasons. Firstly, since he had been with the Company a very short 
time, his knowledge of systems, procedures and working practices was 
limited. Secondly, he was on a short-term contract, and had little 
interest in evolving systems for the future.
The M.D.’s position during these two stages was that he was prepared to 
impart as much information as was needed, but he did not want to take 
an active part in system selection.
He took the attitude that the Consultant would select a suitable system 
and was better left alone to do so. Whilst this was far from satisfactory 
from the Consultant’s point of view, the M.D. had made his stance and 
would not be moved.
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At the final selection stage the M.D. agreed to be involved in 
benchmarking, and introduced two further vendors of his own to the 
shortlist of three. He and the Consultant prepared the benchmark test 
and used it to select the system to be purchased.
At that point the M.D. suspended the project for about a year because of
the trading situation. At the end of the period the M.D. reviewed the
systems again and purchased the selected system. At that stage he had
no design staff, and he employed a young graduate to load the system.
** ^
Both were trained by the vendor.
It had always been the intention of the M.D. to re-employ a designer 
who had worked for him previously, and he did so at the first 
opportunity. This designer had no CAD experience, and had not, of 
course, been involved in the selection. He was therefore fairly 
unenthusiastic about the system, despite being trained by the vendor.
The M.D. was unable to raise his enthusiasm at that stage.
Only after working with the system for some months and undertaking a 
refresher course did the designer stop fighting the system and begin to 
use it effectively. From that point a successful outcome was within 
reach, and benefits were achieved very quickly.
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At no stage did "ownership" of the implementation move from the M.D., 
although his control of the situation was suspect at times. His inability 
to motivate the designer to use the system effectively was central to the 
protraction of the project, and in the event may have been contributory 
to the eventual demise of the Company.
Case 5
The investigation of the need for CAD in Company 5 was instigated by 
the Works Director (W.D.). It was clear from the outset that the W.D. 
had spent some considerable time considering how a CAD system could 
be linked to the existing CAPM system and making himself familiar with 
the types of system available. He recognised that he did not have the 
skill or knowledge to select a system form those available on the market.
The Consultant’s main contact during the study was the Drawing Officer 
(D.O.) Manager, who also had a little knowledge of CAD through his 
extensive reading. However, at all stages of the project the Works 
Director made himself available for providing and receiving information. 
H e made it clear that he wished to be involved throughout the selection 
procedure.
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Prior to the investigation the W.D. had negotiated a budget for the 
proposed system at Board level, although this was deliberately withheld 
from the Consultant during the selection stage. Only during the system 
evaluation was the presence of a budget admitted.
The W.D. took no active part in benchmarking the selected systems, 
leaving this to the D.O. Manager and CAPM Consultant. The CAPM 
Consultant had been brought into the selection team by the W.D. to 
highlight and evaluate the potential problems of linking CAD and 
CAPM.
Unlike most of the other Cases, an integrated system had been specified 
from the start, and the links were to be demonstrated by the vendor 
prior to purchase.
Following each benchmark, the W.D. received reports from the 
Consultant, the CAPM Consultant and D.O. Manager, who agreed the 
next action with the team. The benchmarking and selection thus 
proceeded in a steady, controlled manner, interrupted only by a period of 
inactivity by a shortlisted vendor. All aspects of justification of the 
system were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the team, and in 
particular the W.D.
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Once the technical specification had been finalised and agreed, the W.D. 
took over the financial negotiation and purchase of the system. Guided 
by the Consultant, he specified a phased approach to the 
implementation. Whilst the D.O. Manager was ostensibly in charge of 
the implementation, he delegated much of the responsibility to the Chief 
Draughtsman (C.D.), who reported progress directly to the W.D. This 
was fortuitous in that part way through the implementation the D.O. 
Manager left the Company and the C.D. was promoted to that position. 
From that point progress was faster.
*  ^
The implementation was monitored in detail by the W.D., who checked 
progress against targets agreed with the D.O. Manager. All the 
necessary organisational changes, such as combination of the D.O. and 
the Planning Department were instigated and monitored by the W.D., 
who received reports of progress weekly and resolved operational 
problems as they arose. The fact that he had control of these two 
departments was clearly advantageous, and his own motivational style 
appeared to play a significant part in the success of these fundamental 
changes.
There can be no doubt that the W.D. controlled the selection, 
implementation and monitoring of the CAD system from beginning to 
end.
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What is equally clear is that he had the authority to proceed as he 
thought fit at all stages, even to the extent of going slightly over the 
budget figure agreed with the Board. Whilst the writer was not privy to 
the Board discussions, the results of those discussions would suggest total 
support for the W.D. throughout. At no stage did the Managing Director 
or any of the other Directors become involved directly in the project, 
although a copy of the Consultant’s report was made available to Board 
members.
*
Similarly, the extent of authority ad responsibility of the team members 
was very clear to all from the start of the project, and there was little or 
no interference from above other than that required for monitoring 
purposes.
Case 6
The situation at Company 6 in terms of managerial involvement was not 
unusual. The Managing Director (M.D.) instigated the investigation into 
the use of CAD, but thereafter withdrew from the project until the 
system was selected. His involvement with the consultant was at the 
minimum level consistent with courtesy.
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The project "driver" was the Special Projects Manager. This individual 
had formerly been D.O. Manager, and had left the Company for a period 
to work for a competitor. When he left the competitor he was taken 
back by the Company with alacrity, partly because of his undoubted skills 
and partly to avoid his moving to another competitor. As the post'of
D.O. Manager had been filled, a new post was created for him. Whilst 
the post was ill-defined, the implementation of CAD was seen as an 
ideal "special project" for him to manage.
* ^
His knowledge of and experience with the Company made it unnecessary 
for anyone at a more senior level to be involved to any extent, a factor 
which was welcomed by the M.D.
The Special Projects (S.P.) Manager was given full authority to specify, 
identify and select a suitable system, with the help of the Consultant.
The initial specification and shortlisting was carried out jointly by the two 
individuals, but at that point a consultative process was started.
Several interested parties were invited to join a small team to prepare a 
benchmark test. This team included designers, draughtsmen, planners 
and the buyer. The involvement of all these people was seen as key to 
the eventual success of the system.
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Once the benchmarking had been conducted to the satisfaction of the 
S.P. Manager, the final selection was carried out and a quotation was 
prepared. At this point the M.D. again became involved, and conducted 
negotiations with the technical assistance of the S.P. Manager. From 
that point and for the next six months or so the M.D. remained in f 
contact with the project, receiving progress reports and monitoring 
draughting times against targets set during the selection phase.
The M.D. and S.P. Manager held monthly meetings to review the system 
performance, and any necessary actions were discussed and agreed for 
subsequent implementation by the S.P. Manager.
The identification of a "project champion" at Company 6 is not so clear 
as in some of the other cases. Whilst the S.P. Manager had control of 
the selection and implementation, it became clear that he had no 
financial authority. On the other hand, the M.D. who had that authority 
relied totally upon the technical expertise of the the S.P. Manager, and 
to some extent the Consultant, during the project. The fact that he had 
initiated the project and supported it by implication during its early 
stages probably points to his being the "project champion", although he 
was not the "driver" of the project.
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Summary
A "project champion" can be identified in five out of the six cases, 
although surprisingly in one of those five cases the "driver" of the project 
was a different individual. Table 5.6 shows the position of the project 
champion in the organisation.
Case Project Steps Remote Project
Champion From M.D. Driver
1 Financial Director 1 Financial Director
2 None None
3 Managing Director 0 Managing Director
4 Managing Director 0 Managing Director
5 Works Director 1 Works Director
6 Managing Director 0 Special Proj. Mgr
Table 5.6
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5.1.7 Commitment to the System
Before getting too involved in this Section it is important to determine 
what we mean by commitment to the system, since it would appear that 
commitment can be identified and evaluated at various levels and stages. 
These can be broken down as follows:
By level in the organisation:
Commitment by the : Chief Executive
: System Champion
: Project Team
: User Group
By implementation phase:
Commitment at the : Concept Stage
: Selection Stage
: Implementation Stage
: Integration Stage
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By Commitment Type:
Commitment to : Buying a System
: Getting it Right
: Making it Pay
Using it all the Time 
: Expanding the System
: "Full" Integration
: Implementing Quickly
*
There are also peripheral issues which may cloud the commitment, such 
as the "me too" syndrome, or the need to implement because there is no 
other way to do the job. Both these factors could be more compelling 
than the level of commitment.
Clearly, then, the issue of commitment to the system is going to be 
difficult to define and even more difficult to evaluate, since there can be 
no absolute scale of commitment. If this were not sufficient, there is also 
the likelihood that commitment may change during the implementation, 
and may increase or reduce.
To reduce the complexity of this analysis, it has been decided to look at 
the level of commitment of two people or groups of people at four stages 
in the implementation.
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Since the "system champion" was in all cases the most senior person 
directly involved, and at the same time the decision maker, his level of 
commitment is important. The other individual or group is the user or 
user group, whose commitment can make or break a system.
The four stages chosen are:
1. System selection stage.
2. Immediately before the worst setback.
3. Immediately after the worst setback.
4. When the setback had been resolved.
These stages have been chosen with some forethought. A t the system 
selection stage the likely costs and benefits have been evaluated and the
company has to decide whether to proceed. Any lack of commitment at
this stage could presage problems later. The period immediately before 
a major setback is likely to be a honeymoon period, when all appears to 
be well and confidence is high. Immediately after the setback all those 
involved are likely to be reeling and possibly confused. This is where 
confidence can drop. Once the situation has been resolved, and some 
confidence has returned we can again look at the commitment in a  stable 
situation.
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In order to reduce the subjectivity of measuring commitment, an ordinal 
scale has been developed. However, it must be understood that the 
placing of individuals or groups on this scale involves subjective 
judgement by the writer based on discussions and contemporaneous 
notes made by the Consultant.
The scale used is as follows:
A. The participant had no interest in the project or in its success or
■* ^
failure.
B. The participant would rather the project succeeded than failed, 
but was not prepared to take an active role.
C. The participant wanted the project to succeed and was prepared 
to help it to do so.
D. The participant was prepared to go out of his way to make the 
project succeed.
E. The participant was prepared to do everything in his power to 
ensure success, and would not consider failure.
It has to be emphasised again that some respondents would not express 
their commitment, and the evaluation in this case can only be gauged 
from their subsequent actions.
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Case 1
Company 1 had determined that CAD was an essential piece in its 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) jigsaw, and could see no 
other way forward. This had been discussed at length by the Board, who 
were all committed to a high level. In addition, some groundwork had 
been done in the Drawing Office, and many of the draughtsmen were 
keen to be involved. Those who were reluctant were informed that they 
need not be involved in the early stages
The worst setback for the Company occurred some six months after the 
first installation, when a period of intense design activity caused the 
CAD system usage to fall and the more familiar manual draughting to 
rise to cope with the work. This in itself showed a lack of confidence in 
the system. This period lasted for around six months, and was followed 
by a second period of poor vendor support and hardware changes lasting 
two months. Confidence returned very quickly after this.
The commitment "map" for Company 1 is as follows
Phase
1 2 3 4
Champion (F.D.) D D E D
Users C D B D
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Case 2
Company 2 saw CAD as a convenient way of reducing the number of 
contract draughtsmen in order to avoid the problems associated with 
training as throughput increased. Whilst some of the contractors were 
familiar with the products, many had to go through a lengthy 
familiarisation as they were taken on.
As suggested earlier, their was no "system champion", and no single 
person "owned" the system. The commitment of the Managing Director 
has therefore been tabulated.
The worst setback for the Company came six months after the first 
implementation, when it was discovered that the D.O. Manager had 
introduced systems to erode the benefits of the CAD system. This led to 
a formal system review and a decision to abandon the project.
The commitment "map" for Company 2 is as follows:
Phase
1 2 3 4
Champion (M.D.) C C B B
Users D D E C
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Case 3
Company 3 was concerned at the pressure of work on its designer, and 
saw CAD as being able to reduce this by eliminating repetitive drawing. 
There was therefore some level of compulsion at the start of the project 
which raised commitment to its success.
The Company suffered no major setbacks, but a few months after 
installation of the system the pressure of work became very high on the 
draughtsman, who at this stage was using both manual and CAD systems. 
Fortunately a fall-off in work allowed the draughtsman the time to 
concentrate on getting the CAD system fully operational. During this 
period the draughtsman was supported by the M.D., who retained his 
belief that the CAD system was the only way forward.
The commitment "map" for Company 3 is as follows:
1
Phase 
2 3 4
Champion (M.D.) D D E D
Users D D E D
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Case 4
Company 4 found itself in a similar position to Company 3, in that the 
CAD system was seen as the only way out of a manpower shortage. In 
his case, the designer/draughtsman was the M.D. at the start of the 
project. As the project progressed, a draughtsman was introduced to run 
the CAD system, and then a designer replaced him at a later stage.
The major setback for the Company was the replacement of the 
draughtsman by the designer. To some extent this was self-imposed, 
since the designer had no experience of and little interest in CAD. A 
period of intervention by the Consultant and a training course for the 
designer resolved the situation to an acceptable extent in a short time, 
and the designer’s attitude to the system increased dramatically.
The commitment map for Company 4 shows the designer and the 
draughtsman as users.
Phase
Champion (M.D.)
Draughtsman
Designer
1 2  3 4
D D D D
C C
A  D
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Case 5
Company 5, like Company 1, saw CAD as being an integral part of their 
AMT programme, and there could be no doubting that it would be 
successful. A great deal of pre-planning had gone into the project'and 
consultation had taken place withing the Drawing Office. By the time 
the project started there was an eager expectancy and a sense of urgency.
The approach of the Company was to resolve all the problems before 
purchasing the system, and a great deal of time and expense was 
involved in doing this. The consequence was that the most serious 
setback took place before the system was purchased. This was when the 
links between the CAD and CAPM systems could not be defined by 
either the Company or the vendor. This resulted in the Consultant’s 
being involved and a specification was drawn up. From that point the 
links were created and proved and the system was purchased. At no 
stage was a serious loss of commitment noted.
The commitment "map" for Company 5 is as follows:
Phase
1 2 3 4
Champion (W.D.) D D E D
Users D D D D
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Case 6
Company 6 saw the benefit of CAD to be in the reduction in complexity 
of creating a drawing. The high level of detail was extremely 
time-consuming, and the repetitive nature of some of the drawings was 
laborious. However, when compared with some of the other cases the 
compulsion for implementation was not so great. That is not to say that 
the Company was less committed to success.
* ^
No serious setbacks were encountered during the implementation stage, 
and the nearest point to a setback was when the vendor was called in to 
review the creation of cutting lists from elevation drawings. The writing 
and proving of this software took about four months and opened up 
areas of design which had hitherto been unavailable.
The commitment "map" for Company 6 is 2
Phase
1 2 3 4
Champion (M.D.) C C C C
Users D D D D
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Summary
The commitment "maps" show a number of interesting features.
a) In all except cases 2 and 6 the "system champion" showed an .equal 
or higher commitment than the users.
b) In four of the six cases the period of setback resulted in a higher 
level of commitment from the users or the "champion".
c) In Case 2, the only case where the "champion" lost commitment, the 
project eventually failed, even though the users’ commitment rose 
initially after the setback.
d) In Case 1, the "champion’s" commitment rose after the setback, and 
a short-term dip in that of the users was turned around.
In general, the commitment of the "champion" appears to override that
of the users. It would appear that the users will in the long term  follow
the lead from above, whether that commitment rises or falls.
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5.1.8 Level o f Satisfaction
Satisfaction is an extremely complex and subjective emotion, yet 
corporate satisfaction with a system is fundamental to its acceptance. It 
is therefore essential that we provide a yardstick against which * 
satisfaction may be gauged. If we can do this objectively, then we can 
compare the implementations one against another in a meaningful 
manner.
In order to produce the yardstick, phrases used by those responsible for 
implementing the systems were collected together and "ranked". These 
ranked phrases were then taken back to the original implementers and 
validated. The following list of phrases and statements represents the 
final consensus reached.
Level 1
Totally dissatisfied 
System was a failure 
We should not have bothered
Level 2
Highly dissatisfied
Virtually no benefits were achieved
Very unhappy
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Level 3
Dissatisfied
Few of the requirements were met 
Unhappy
Level 4
Not happy
The system has not paid its way
Level 5
Not unhappy
Some benefits were achieved 
Marginal success
Level 6
Satisfied
Many of the benefits were achieved 
Happy
Level 7
Highly satisfied
System met the majority of the requirements 
Very happy
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Level 8
Totally satisfied
System was unqualified success
Excellent
Using these statements, a "satisfaction curve" was plotted for each of the 
six cases, and these are shown in Appendix 2. The curves related the 
level of satisfaction and the project timescale. Note that the timescales 
on the X-axes are different.
* ^
It is important to note that the "satisfaction curves" combine two 
measures of success. Success in implementation can be measured by 
hitting targets and timescales, whilst success in application is perhaps 
measured by the degree of use of the system.
By seeking the views of several members of the implementation team 
and the Chief Executive, the two measures have been combined. Lack 
of "satisfaction" in the earlier stages of an implementation were 
invariably the result of lack of success in implementation, or in other 
words targets were not being met.
In order to clarify the position regarding the two measures of success, 
Table 5.7 has been constructed based upon the comments of the various 
respondents.
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Case Success in Success in Satisfaction Comments
Implementation Application Levelm (%) (1-8)
1 50 90 7 Supplier
Problems
2 30 20 2 Lack of 
Acceptance
3 40 80 7 Slow
Progress
4 60 90 7 Limited
Resources
5 90 100 7 Unqualified
Success
6 70 80 7 Good
Progress
Table 5.7
It must be re-emphasised that we are discussing corporate satisfaction 
with the system, and not the impressions of a single participant in the 
process. Under conditions of free discussion it soon became apparent 
that agreement on a level could be reached, using the phrases listed 
above, for each stage or milestone in the implementation process.
It was interesting to note how often the views of the "system manager" 
were more lucidly expressed and apparently more strongly held that 
those of the chief executive.
Perhaps task commitment could be one of the reasons for this. The 
summary of section 5.1.7 (p.217) would appear to support this.
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5.1.9 Implementation Planning
CAD represents, for many companies, a significant financial outlay, as 
does for instance the implementation of a Computer Aided Production 
Management (CAPM) system. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, 
to expect a similar degree of planning prior to the implementation stage. 
In the author’s view, this is rarely the case, and there may be several 
reasons for this:
* CAPM by its very nature is cross-functional, whereas CAD in small 
firms may not be so. The cross-functional nature could perhaps lead 
to more communication and hence better planning.
* CAPM usually involves a financial tie-up, and the statutory nature of 
this requires a higher level of pre-implementation planning and 
post-implementation monitoring.
* Accountants tend to have an eye for detail, and are prepared to take 
a view of the implementation which would not normally be taken by 
an engineer, who tends by the nature of the job to be more results 
orientated rather than task orientated.
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Whilst we may all agree that planning for a project is desirable, it 
appears that many small firms are reluctant to spend time doing it. Of 
the six cases, only three developed an implementation plan of any sort. 
The other three, by implication had no method by which they could 
measure progress other than by intuition.
Of the three which did produce plans, i.e. Companies 1, 5 and 6, only 
two, Companies 1 and 5, identified milestones and target dates in any 
detail. Company 5 went further by publishing its plan in the form of a 
wall-chart in the Drawing Office, and progress was marked on the chart 
for all to see. A t frequent but irregular intervals the project team  would 
review progress and redraw the chart.
There was a disadvantage to this method which would not have been 
obvious at the start. The identification of milestones tended to 
concentrate effort on achieving them, possibly in some cases to the 
detriment of other, more useful targets. Rather like cramming for 
examinations, the draughtsmen tended to have tunnel vision, and some 
opportunities were lost.
As an example of this, one of the targets was the development of 
parametrics for lighting columns, and this was achieved ahead of target. 
However, the talking point in the office was the potential for 
development of parametrics for fencing.
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This did not become obvious until the targets had been set, yet it had 
greater potential than the columns parametric. Despite this, the 
milestone of the column parametrics prevailed.
Company 1 used their plans rather differently. They reviewed the-' 
progress monthly against the plan and analysed the reasons for slippage. 
They then changed the manning level to bring the project back on target 
if this was feasible.
  *
The milestones in the case of Company 1 were much wider and rather
less precise. This gave some flexibility to the Design Manager, but made 
progress a little more difficult to assess. Misunderstandings over the 
targets led to heated exchanges at the review meetings on several 
occasions.
The plan defined by Company 6 listed the milestones and their sequence, 
but did not show timescales. There was a general understanding 
amongst the implementation team of the pace required, but the 
philosophy of implementation was somewhat different.
W hereas Company 1 and 5 sought to implement quickly in order to 
maximise benefit, Company 6 took a different view. They sought to 
extract every last bit of benefit from each planned stage before 
proceeding with the next. This is quite a sound philosophy, except that 
does tend to lead to periods of relative stagnation as the law of 
diminishing returns takes effect.
The review for Company 6 looked at the progress on a particular
milestone or topic and then sought to maximise the benefit. Only when
*
the benefits became inconsequential did the team move on to the next 
target.
Summary
Case Plan Effect
1 Broad Targets and Rapid Progress;
Timescales Misunderstanding
2 None No Monitoring
3 None No Monitoring
4 None No Monitoring
5 Detailed Targets and Rapid Progress;
Timescales Tunnel Vision
6 Broad Targets Slow Progress; well
Only Defined Benefits
5.1.10 Vendor Relationships and Training
Discussions with the six companies revealed little about the actual 
relationships between company and system vendor, partly because of the 
subjective nature of the evidence and partly because of the complexity of 
the relationship. When companies, or more particularly people within 
those companies, work closely together on a project, a kind of love-hate 
relationship tends to be built up. This is based on mutual respect for the 
other’s position whilst attempting to safeguard one’s own position. The 
result is a relationship which can fluctuate quickly and widely in terms of 
satisfaction and closeness.
Whilst we may expect companies to "manage" advisors as they do their 
own employees, there was no evidence of this in the six cases. Indeed, 
the vendors were often seen to be taking the lead in system 
development. However, the author was able to find no common threads 
in the treatm ent of companies by vendors or vice-versa.
One measure of the vendor relationship which could be assessed was the 
uptake of vendor training. Whilst this is admittedly not a good measure, 
it has some merit in that in all six cases it was an additional cost which 
had to be borne by the company. It could be argued that the higher the 
uptake of vendor training on a per-capita basis the better the 
relationship between vendor and customer.
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This is clearly an excessive claim which cannot be substantiated by the 
present work, but a study of the effectiveness of that training reveals 
some interesting points.
All six of the companies paid for some basic training on the system.
Basic training provides a skill level which allows drawings to be created 
in a competent manner and imparts housekeeping and elementary system 
skills.
Basic training is a term which is understood by system suppliers and 
CAD users, and in the author’s experience the level of skill imparted 
varies little between suppliers on a day-to-day basis. There is, however, 
some variation in the length of training, but in the six cases studies, basic 
training took two or three days.
The five vendors involved in the six cases also provide an intermediate 
level course, which enables the user to take advantage of all the 
draughting facilities. They also provide a system manager’s course under 
a variety of names. This covers elements such as operating system usage, 
directory structuring, archiving and other non-draughting activities.
Company 1 had a long-standing commitment to training, and provided all 
users and potential users with basic training. At the same time they 
provided the D.O. Manager with system training.
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Those draughtsmen who took to the CAD system were encouraged to 
stay on it, and the higher level training was offered to them when they 
were ready to take advantage of it.
There was a great deal of informal training within Company 1, whereby 
the more skilled would advise the less skilled on an ad-hoc basis. 
However, this was not allowed to be used as a substitute for formal 
vendor training.
The basic training plan was to have all the draughtsmen trained to use 
the system, half trained to the intermediate level and the D.O. Manager 
and his deputy trained to the systems level. The number of intermediate 
draughtsmen was, in fact, exceeded, whilst the turnover in draughtsmen 
often meant that there were untrained draughtsmen in the Drawing 
Office.
Company 2 had no training plan and no history of training within the 
Company. Four draughtsmen were trained to the basic level, i.e. two for 
each work station, and one was trained to the intermediate level. He 
was then charged with passing on his skills to the other three. Time 
constraints made this virtually impossible.
Company 3 had one workstation only, and the draughtsman/ designer 
was trained up in three stages to systems level. He set his own pace of 
training, taking on the next level as and when he felt able to do so.
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When the designer was joined by a second draughtsman, that 
draughtsman was provided with basic vendor training, and the designer 
undertook to increase his skill level by informal ad-hoc sessions.
Company 4 had one workstation and one draughtsman, who was given 
basic training only. When the draughtsman left, the designer who took 
his place was trained to the basic level by the vendor. His lack of 
aptitude made it necessary for the vendor to provide a slightly modified 
re-run of the basic training some months later. No formal intermediate 
or systems training was given, although the Company did benefit from 
systems advice from the vendor.
Company 5 had a training plan which had many similarities to that of 
Company 1. It provided basic vendor training to all the draughtsmen 
who may be involved in CAD or who showed an interest. As the 
draughtsman became more experienced, he was sent on the more 
advanced course to enable him to write parametric programs.
Unlike Company 1, the D.O. Manager did not undertake the 
intermediate training, since he foresaw no situation when he would need 
to write parametrics. As systems manager he needed to be able to 
manage the system and modify drawings where necessary. He was 
therefore trained to basic level and systems level.
229
This could only work well because the D.O. Manager was not expected 
to help designers with their work on a day-to-day basis. This was the 
role of the Chief Draughtsman, who was trained to the vendor’s 
intermediate level.
Company 6 had no formal plan, but nevertheless provided basic training 
for all their draughtsmen. The Special Projects Manager took all three 
levels of training, and managed the system. The D.O. Manager was 
trained to the intermediate level, and then undertook the training of the 
others as required.
Summary
Case % of Draughtsmen % of Draughtsmen No of People
at Level 1 at Level 2 at Level
1 100 60 2
2 50 12 0
3 100 50 1
4 100 0 0
5 100 30 1
6 100 30 1
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5.2 Propositions
These propositions have been developed from the case study 
outcomes. They are intended to form a focus for the research 
findings in an attempt to find a rationale for the outcomes of the six 
cases. Where a potential proposition cannot be verified by all six 
cases it has not been developed.
5.2.1 It is not unreasonable to suppose that where a potential CAD system 
is to cross functional boundaries, or where it involves a significant 
amount of capital expenditure, a reasonable amount of thought will 
be given to the system and its implications prior to implementation.
A significant consideration is likely to be the potential cost of failure 
both in monetary and human terms.
la  The higher the level of integration the higher the cost of the 
system and the higher the potential cost of failure in monetary 
and human terms.
This proposition in itself is not particularly exciting, but it leads on to 
a more interesting proposition.
lb  The higher the level of integration the higher the cost and the 
higher the level of consideration given to the system. 
Consequently the higher the likelihood of eventual success.
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This is based on the premise that the rational manager will seek to 
reduce risk by giving sufficient thought to the project before 
committing funds. Of course, with a new technology risk cannot be 
eliminated entirely, and projects tend to go forward on this basis.
Case 5 is an excellent example of pre-planning, where no finance was 
committed to the project until all the possible sources of problems 
had been highlighted and discussed fully. Case 1 was similar in its 
approach, but reduced risk even further by a carefully staged 
implementation. ' '
When problems do arise, they have to be dealt with by the project 
team, whether it consists of ten people or just one. It is likely that 
problems which do arise can be resolved more effectively by the 
combined efforts of a group than by one man.
lc  The higher the level of integration the greater the number of 
people involved in the implementation and the higher the 
likelihood of speedy resolution of problems.
"Whilst there is a danger in attempting to solve problems by 
committee, we rather envisage task groups characterised by an 
effective group process." (Schein 1969)
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5.2.2 CAD is predominantly about design and draughting, but it has a
significant computer-related bias, particularly when handling files and 
directories. People with computer experience tend to be comfortable 
with other, more complex computers. They are keyboard literate, 
they understand that they can do little damage, and they know : 
something of the jargon used by computers and their users. This is 
the case whether they have worked on a small personal computer or a 
large mainframe. If, as we may expect, fear of a system inhibits its 
acceptability, then the converse is likely to be true.
*
2a The more people in design related roles with prior computer 
knowledge and experience the higher the chance of acceptability 
and hence success.
There is some evidence of this during CAD training, which inevitably 
involves learning to use the computer for non-draughting work.
Those with prior knowledge, even of just a games computer, tend to 
pick this up more quickly and end up with a greater depth of 
understanding.
One may expect that exposure to computer systems but not as a user 
may have a similar effect. For instance we may expect the 
non-computer-literate accounts clerk who sees the equipment being 
used daily to have a high empathy with it. This does not seem to be 
borne out in practice.
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2b The level of computer literacy elsewhere in the organisation has 
little effect on the success or otherwise of the CAD 
implementation.
Case 3 bears out this proposition. The Company had used computers 
for financial purposes for some considerable time, but the designer 
and MD were computer illiterate and had difficulty with some aspects 
of the training. Both were familiar with the concepts of 
computerisation and understood the benefits likely to accrue, but this 
did not appear to help them in their transition from information user 
to system user.
5.2.3 The wide variation in the targets set for the system implementations 
was most interesting. Whilst some cases set a low "satisfactory" level, 
others seemed to set their targets at a particularly high, almost 
unattainable level.
As with the level of integration discussed earlier, those companies 
which set different targets tended to spend a great deal of time 
discussing the targets and planning for success. Two companies in 
particular built milestones into their plans (Cases 1 and 5) against 
which they could measure their performance and adjust the activity 
level. The propositions for targets therefore bear a close relationship 
to those for level of integration.
234
3a The higher the degree of difficulty in achieving the target the 
more consideration has been given to the measure of success 
and therefore the better planned the project.
The corollary to this proposition became self-evident.
3b The higher the degree of difficulty in achieving the target the 
higher the likelihood of success.
This does not conflict, as it may appear at first, with the*work on goal 
setting which suggests that attainable but moderately difficult goals 
are most motivating (Lawler (1983) p.230). Indeed a very difficult 
primary target may be achieved by setting very modest goals.
It is important to note that the "degree of difficulty" to which we refer 
here is that as perceived by the implementation team  at the start of 
the project, and may bear little relationship to the actual difficulty 
encountered.
The concept has direct parallels elsewhere in industry. It forms the 
basis of the majority of incentive schemes, where pay is directly linked 
to the effort put into the job. An incentive scheme has the chain:
T A R G E T -> EFFORT -> ACHIEVEM ENT - > PAYM ENT
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The CAD implementation has a different reward at the end of the 
chain:
T A R G E T -> EFFORT -> ACHIEVEMENT ->  
SATISFACTION/KUDOS
5.2.4 As was suggested earlier, the expectation of a system is difficult to 
quantify and can be inordinately difficult to identify. One of the 
problems is that, not knowing what a CAD system can do, potential 
users are unable to get any feel for the benefits, and have to*resort to 
advice and/or what they have read.
In the absence of well-founded expectations, it is difficult for a 
company to prepare a meaningful justification on which to base the 
capital expenditure. This is the case whether or not the company 
spends time looking at systems, particularly if their only exposure to 
systems is via system suppliers.
It would seem to follow that a company which has prior CAD 
knowledge should be better placed to prepare a com petent 
justification.
4a Prior CAD knowledge causes justification and expectations of a 
system to be broadly similar in scope and achieved within the 
same time frame.
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Putting this another way, and with a slightly different emphasis.
4b A clear justification may be the result of prior CAD knowledge 
and is likely to lead to reasonable expectations.
W here there is no prior CAD experience expectations tend to be
poorly expressed. However, by the nature of justification it has to be
expressed regardless of the lack of knowledge. Only when the
implementation has commenced and the participants begin to
* ^
understand the potential for CAD are expectations formed that are 
meaningful.
4c Expectations are more important yardsticks of success than 
justification since they are formulated in the early stages of a 
project implementation against a background of better 
information.
The word "important" may cause some raised eyebrows for any 
readers with a financial background, since they would claim that what 
is really important is a return on the investment. However, the word 
stays, in the belief that there may be wider issues than payback at 
stake in a CAD implementation.
Whilst justification is by its nature a static measure, expectation is 
ever-changing and at the start of a project it may change very rapidly.
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As a result, justification tends to be forgotten during the 
implementation. Indeed it is quite possible that the implementation 
team know nothing of the justification. The time when justification 
comes back into the spotlight is when something untoward happens, 
and the system does not seem to be performing.
4d Where expectations are not met by an implementation, the 
success of the implementation is measured against the 
justification factors. This does not happen if expectations are 
met.
This could be fortunate, since in the experience of the writer many 
companies are over zealous when they estimate the savings to be 
made by introducing CAD.
Part of the fault for this has to be placed at the door of the CAD 
salesman, who may quote actual but inappropriate savings in order to 
secure an order. Part of the author’s role over the years has been to 
act as expert witness in disputes between CAD vendors and 
discontented purchasers.
4e Expectations are more likely to be met than are the factors for 
justification.
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5.2.5 The old adage "Good managers manage good companies" has more 
than a little truth in it. The style of the chief executive of a company 
can have a very significant effect on the managerial style of his 
managers and hence on the ethos of the company. This in turn can 
influence its ability to manage change.
5a A chief executive with good delegation skills or with a
participative style may create an environment which is conducive 
to successful implementation.
* ^
In the writer’s experience, the fear of failure is a significant barrier to 
change, and the chief executive who can remove this whilst 
maintaining visibility of the costs of failure will remove some of the 
obstacles to implementation.
Not all implementations are managed by the chief executive directly, 
and as with any other major endeavour, he must choose his deputy 
carefully and give him the authority to go with the responsibility.
5b The system "driver" needs the authority and drive to carry out 
the task effectively if it is to succeed.
The drive is important. Like any other project the CAD 
implementation must be managed actively.
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The CAD implementation "driver" is an important individual, but 
where he is one step removed from the Drawing Office he is 
vulnerable to the ability - and possibly the malice - of the Drawing 
Office Manager. This individual must have the skills to manage 
change within his department and must have the will to do so. •
5c Regardless of the position and authority of the "driver", the D.O. 
Manager needs to have the ability to manage the change 
effectively.
This was particularly evident in two cases. In Case 1 the D.O. 
Manager was a barrier to change because he did not possess the 
necessary skills. A change of D.O. Manager resolved this.
In Case 2 the D.O. Manager was totally resistant to the introduction 
of CAD and helped to cause its ultimate failure.
One may expect that companies with poor departmental definition 
and ill-defined boundaries would be more receptive to an integrating 
technology than those which had well-defined boundaries. This was 
not found to be the case. More relevant seems to be the level of 
inter-departmental interdependence and mutual assistance. Where 
departments have formed close working relationships, they appear to 
continue these in the face of change.
240
5d Companies with good inter-departmental relationships have 
more success in implementation than those where antagonism 
exists. This is regardless of the degree of boundary definition.
It could be argued that this is purely a reflection of the management
style of a company, and there may be something in that. W hat is
clear is that problems of implementation and integration can
sometimes only be solved by talking them out, often across functional
boundaries. This requires special skills on the part of the
■* ^
departmental managers and the co-ordinator.
5e An open management style which has authority challenge is 
more likely to resolve implementation problems.
What is at issue here is not the encouragement of challenge per se, 
but the acceptability of free discussion, which in itself can be a 
valuable aid to problem solving.
5.2.6 Much is made in the texts (Section 2.4) of the System or Project
Champion, and such an individual was in evidence in five of the six 
cases. In all five cases the Champion was in a very senior position in 
the Company. This is perhaps not too surprising considering the 
relatively small sizes of the companies, and perhaps the picture would 
be slightly different in large companies.
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This senior position gave the Champion the authority to manage the 
project without reference to others.
In the sixth case there was no Project Champion evident, although the 
Chief Designer (Mechanical) did his best to act in this role.
However, his authority was strictly limited.
6a A Project Champion who has authority and responsibility for the 
system makes the implementation move more smoothly.
There are two parts to this proposition. A Project Champion without 
authority is likely to have significant difficulty when implementation 
problems arise, as we saw in Case 2. The second part can be clarified 
by a further proposition.
6b The Project Champion does not have to be the Project Driver 
for the implementation to be successful.
As we saw in Case 6, the Project Champion and Project Driver can be 
different people. In this case, coming back to proposition 6a, the 
Project Champion does not have the responsibility for system 
implementation. There was evidence in Case 6 that the split role led 
to minor project slippage, predominantly because of communications 
problems within the Company.
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Whilst the implementation was successful, there was a classic 
symptom of bad management evident in Case 6 - responsibility 
without authority.
5.2.7 As described in 5.1.7, commitment to the implementation process or 
to the system itself is very difficult to measure and its m easurem ent is 
highly subjective. However, that may not be too im portant if we look 
at the changes in commitment rather than some absolute value. If at 
the same time we dismiss any attempt at cross-case comparison of 
"commitment level" then we may get some useful propositions out of 
the cases.
The first area of interest is the change of commitment of the various 
parties to the implementation during a crisis. If we look at the 
Project Champions in particular, we find that some exhibit a 
downward change during a crisis whilst others exhibit an upward 
movement. Some show no apparent change. There seems to be 
some correlation between the changes and the success of the 
implementation.
7a Implementation is more likely to be successful where the Project 
Champion exhibits a constant or increasing level of commitment 
in a crisis.
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Why this should be so is not clear. One explanation may lie in the 
type of person chosen as the Project Champion, particularly in a small 
firm.
These people are senior in the organisation, and have probably .fought 
hard for those positions. This is particularly the case for those 
companies where the Project Champion is the M.D. and possibly the 
owner of the company. This fighting spirit may engender a hunger to 
win the battle. The Thomas International Personal Profile Analysis, a 
psychometric analytical tool, shows the highly dominant individual to 
have an innate fear of failure. This can be a very compelling driving 
force.
Possibly for similar reasons, it would appear that the Project 
Champion’s level of commitment "rubs off' on his team. We should 
hardly find this surprising.
7b High commitment of the Project Champion can "rub o f f  on the 
user group. Low commitment can demoralise the user group.
The Project Manager is invariably senior in rank to the 
implementation team or user group. This seniority is reflected in the 
reaction of the team to a crisis. It would appear that even where the 
commitment of the user group falls, so long as that of the Project 
Champion does not, all is well.
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7c The commitment of the Project Champion to the project
overrides that of the user group when the project hits a crisis.
5.2.8 Two measures of success have been identified in Section 5.2.7, and 
there is clear evidence from the sue cases that the two need not be 
achieved at the same time.
8a Success in implementation as measured by hitting targets and 
timescales and success in application as measured by usage of 
the system need not co-exist.
These two measures could be argued to be under the control of 
different people within the organisation. Usage of the system is 
controlled to a great extent by the system users. If they are 
comfortable with it, and it provides them with benefits, then they will 
use it. On the other hand, the hitting of targets and timescales has 
more to do with change than with the status quo, and it is the 
management of this change which brings success or otherwise.
It is unusual, despite the above, to find the users and management 
holding different views on the level of satisfaction with the system. 
This is despite the inability of either group to define adequately the 
meaning of satisfaction.
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8b Satisfaction is a corporately held concept. Users and
management tend to hold similar views on the satisfaction level.
It would seem that we have group conformity at work here. There is 
a tendency for all individuals to follow the corporate "line", 
particularly where that joint view may be threatened or questioned 
from outside the group. Not surprisingly, the stronger members of 
the group influence the group thinking more then the weaker ones.
8c Satisfaction tends to be defined by the System Champion, who 
communicates it upwards and downwards.
Whether this communication is formal or informal, verbal or written 
may not be relevant.
5.2.9 As was described in 5.2.3, the level of consideration given to a system 
is important if it is to be successful. This consideration apparently 
needs to be extended into the implementation phase, and not stopped 
at the justification phase.
There is evidence that slow progress perpetuates slow progress, and 
that the ability to monitor progress can help the management to 
transfer resources.
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9a A phased implementation plan provides short-term targets which 
are more visible and hence easier to monitor than global targets.
9b A well structured implementation plan provides a means of 
measuring progress and hence enables the team to inject pace 
when progress is slow.
The latter proposition was particularly well illustrated at Company 1 
where the team size was adjusted at regular intervals in order to 
achieve the milestones. This also supports the former, since the 
milestones were sufficiently close together to enable precise 
monitoring.
Where several people or departments are involved in the 
implementation, the targets need to be visible to them all. There was 
also clear evidence from Company 5 that the inter-departmental team 
worked closely together to achieve the targets. One of the reasons 
propounded for this was that they had all had a say in the plan.
9c The more successful implementation plans tend to have input 
from all those involved. This provides a high level of 
commitment.
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No matter how small the company, CAD will have some influence on 
the inter-departmental relationships. As an integrating technology it 
crosses functional boundaries, and can leave people or sections 
feeling insecure or threatened. It comes as no surprise, then, to find 
that the companies who took note of this human problem and made 
moves to plan for it suffered least. They were able to make a minor 
cultural change within the structure relatively painless.
9d Redefining boundaries requires a rethink of the systems and 
procedures, but also a cultural change if the new systems are to 
be successful.
9e Pre-planning of the boundary changes to take into account the 
human aspects makes for a quicker and more effective 
implementation and a more harmonious working relationship.
Companies 1, 5 and 6 supported the former proposition, but Company 
1 was particularly good evidence for the latter. The project started 
with little recognition of human needs, and would probably have 
foundered had the implementation not stopped to take stock and 
entered a consultation period. Their methodology of proceeding in 
"bite-sized chunks" of implementation made this possible, since the 
symptoms were identified quickly.
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5.2.10 There is a growing recognition from Government downwards of the 
need for training. This comes as little surprise to academics and 
most industrialists who have gained benefit from a trained 
workforce. It therefore came as no surprise to find that training 
played a large part in the implementation success of all six 
companies.
Training took two forms. Firstly there was the formal 
vendor-supplied training which came as standard, but at extra cost, 
with all the systems in the six companies. Secondly there was the 
informal "sit alongside Nellie" training which happens throughout 
industry. All companies experienced both types during the 
implementation but in varying degrees.
It became clear on close investigation that vendor training had a 
higher value in learning terms than informal training.
10a Companies which take full advantage of the
training offered by the vendor make better progress in 
implementation than those which take only the minimal 
training.
More training - more progress. Not a surprising result.
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10b Draughtsmen who are trained by the vendor tend
to be more adventurous with the system and develop novel 
ways of saving draughting time.
It is the experience of the author that vendor trained draughtsmen 
often produce results which could not be produced by the trainer. 
The type of training offered often encourages a degree of 
individualism and generates confidence. On the other hand in-house 
training can stifle inventiveness and lead to rule-following.
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6.0 DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR A METHODOLOGY
This Chapter develops a framework for a methodological tool which 
could, if developed further, be used by small firms in the 
implementation of Computer Aided Design, or by consultants 
operating in that field. The first section deals with the initial 
conceptual framework developed from the propositions of Section 5.2.
Whilst the framework was developed inductively from the cases, it is 
inevitable that it was influenced not only by the experience of the 
author but also by the relevant theoiy, which to a certain extent 
focused the research (see Section 2.9). It is inconceivable that the 
same framework would have been developed without these three 
influences. Section 6.4 relates the elements of the model back to the 
relevant literature.
The framework was discussed in some detail with three former 
associates of the author, all of whom had worked or were working in 
Computer Aided Design. Their comments were recorded and 
incorporated into the framework as described in the second Section.
From the developed framework, the inputs and outputs of the stages 
were outlined in further detail and where possible the sources of the 
inputs were identified, as described in the third Section.
2 5 1
6.1 Initial Framework
The framework as developed initially is as shown in Figure 6.1. It 
shows a five-phase methodology, built on the propositions of Section 
5.2. The relevant Propositions are shown in Figure 6.2. The phases 
are:
1. Strategy
- answers the question "Where do we want to be?"
*
2. Company Audit
- answers the question "Where are we now?"
3. Design
- answers the question "How do we plan to get there?"
4. Action
- answers the question "What steps must we take?"
5. Systems Review
- answers the question "How well did we do?" and "How can we 
improve it?"
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As described, the phases are essentially sequential, with the output of 
one phase informing the next. The exception to this is the Strategy 
phase, which, along with the Company Audit, informs the Design phase.
6.1.1 Phase 1 : Strategy
Propositions la, lb, 3a and 3b address indirectly the issue of strategy, 
and are restated here for clarity and convenience.
la  The higher the level of integration the higher the cost o? the 
system and the higher the potential cost of failure in monetary 
and human terms.
lb  The higher the level of integration the higher the cost and the 
higher the level of consideration given to the system.
Consequently the higher the likelihood of eventual success.
3a The higher the degree of difficulty in achieving the target the 
more consideration has been given to the measure of success and 
therefore the better planned the project.
3b The higher the degree of difficulty in achieving the target the 
higher the likelihood of success.
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What these four propositions are describing is a scenario where more 
planning goes into a high cost enterprise than into a low cost one.
Since we can assume some sort of direct relationship between 
planning and success, it is the thought going into the project and not 
the complexity of the project itself that gives rise to the better success. 
If this is the case, then regardless of the complexity, improving the 
planning will improve the chances of success.
This points to the need for a CAD strategy prior to starting work on 
the project. A consequence of this is that a CAD budget is likely to 
be developed, even though it may be expressed informally. This will 
be seen to be important in the Design phase, discussed later.
The outcome of the Strategy phase, then, will be in one of two forms. 
Formally it will consist of a CAD Strategy and a CAD Budget. 
Informally, it will consist of a better understanding at the highest level 
within the company of the impact of a CAD system in financial and 
practical terms. This will take into account any prior research done 
by the company into CAD and the expectations of the key players. 
The outcome will also be in line with the overall company strategy, 
since it will have been formulated at the top level.
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6.1.2 Phase 2 : Company Audit
Six of the propositions address themselves to the need to take stock
of the current position. These are shown below;
2a The more people in design-related roles with prior computer 
knowledge and experience the higher the chance of acceptability 
and hence success.
2b The level of computer literacy elsewhere in the organisation has 
little effect on the success or otherwise of the CAD 
implementation.
4a Prior CAD knowledge causes justification and expectations of a
\
system to be broadly similar in scope and achieved within the 
same time frame.
5a A chief executive with good delegation skills or with a
participative style may create an environment which is conducive 
to successful implementation.
5d Companies with good inter-departmental relationships have more 
success in implementation than those where antagonism exists. 
This is regardless of the degree of boundary definition.
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5e An open management style which encourages challenge is more 
likely to resolve implementation problems.
The outcome of the Company Audit is a definition of where the 
company is in certain key areas. This has been called a Positioh 
Definition. Three key areas are indicated by the propositions.
The first area is broadly related to people and their skills, experience 
and knowledge. The management style of the key people is 
addressed (5a, 5e) and compared with the "preferred" open style with 
a participative leader or one with good delegations skills. Whilst this 
may be "preferred", the strength of the preference has not been 
addressed by the present study, and there is certainly room for further 
research in this area.
This investigation into management style can be loosely described as 
a Management Audit.
Propositions 2a, 2b and 4a address themselves to the knowledge of 
the people within the organisation, particularly in the related field of 
computer literacy. A "Knowledge Audit" seeks information in this 
area, and will identify members of the company who have a useful 
contribution to make to the implementation.
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On the wider front of the People Audit, those people who will be 
able to assist in the implementation by providing support, whether 
actively or passively, by acting as facilitators or by being retrained into 
another post will be identified.
The second area is related to the departmental structure and arises 
from proposition 5d. The Departm ental Audit seeks to clarify the 
position on departmental boundaries and inter-departmental 
relationships. It identifies any rivalries which may be relevant to the 
implementation. Proposition 5d suggests that the close working 
relationship across boundaries is key to a successful implementation, 
regardless of how well the boundaries are defined. However, where 
boundaries are to be removed, the Audit will reveal the implications 
of this.
The third area arises from a combination of all the propositions. The 
way in which the company operates in terms of systems, whether they 
involve computers or not, has a marked effect on the position of the 
company with respect to change. Since the Design and Action phases 
are about change and change management, the Systems Audit 
provides the platform on which to build that change.
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The outcome, then, is a Position Definition which describes where the 
company is in terms of people, organisation and systems. It also 
describes how the company matches up to the "ideal" company in 
these aspects, thus indicating changes which may need to be 
implemented before embarking on the CAD implementation. •
6.1.3 Phase 3 : Design
The outcome of the Design phase should be, in simplistic terms, a
*
plan of action, but in real terms there are several outcomes.
One outcome is the system selection. This consists of an argued case 
for purchasing a particular configuration of hardware and software 
from a particular vendor in defined stages. Together with this will be 
a financial justification where appropriate, or a non-financial 
justification.
The implementation plan is also an outcome of the phase. This 
defines the schedule for purchasing and installing the system and the 
benchmarks against which progress will be measured. An outcome 
which is closely related to this is expectations. This is not a planned 
outcome, but will inevitably arise in the people involved in the Design 
phase. This will become important later in the Review phase.
2 6 0
Finally, but by no means least important is the People plan. This will 
indicate who is to be involved in the implementation either indirectly 
or directly. It will address the selection of a System Champion 
and/or Driver, management of the system, user group, 
inter-relationships and training needs.
The nine propositions which relate to the design phase are:
4b A clear justification may be the result of prior CAD knowledge 
and is likely to lead to reasonable expectations.
4c Expectations are more important yardsticks of success than 
justification since they are formulated in the early stages of a 
project implementation against a background of better 
information.
5b The system "driver" needs the authority and drive to carry out the 
task effectively if it is to succeed.
5c Regardless of the position and authority of the "driver" the D.O. 
Manager needs to have the ability to manage the change 
effectively.
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9a A phased implementation plan provides short-term targets which 
are more visible and hence easier to monitor.
9b A well structured implementation plan provides a means of 
measuring progress and hence enables the team to inject pace 
when progress is slow.
9c The more successful implementation plans tend to have input
from all those involved. This provides a higher level of
*
commitment.
9d Re-defining boundaries requires a re-think of the systems and 
procedures, but also a culture change if the new systems are to be 
successful.
9e Pre-planning of the boundary changes to take into account the 
human aspects makes for a quicker and more effective 
implementation and a more harmonious working relationship.
It is clear from these propositions that the "people" perspective is 
fundamental to the Design phase. Whilst it may be obvious that the 
system selection, implementation plan and relationships with the 
vendor are all important aspects of the phase, this current work does 
not address itself to them.
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The reason for this, and a possible weakness of the ultim ate model, is 
that the author was instrumental in all three areas in all six cases, so 
that no cross-case comparisons could be made.
The Design phase is supported from several directions. Firstly it is 
bounded by the CAD Strategy and the CAD Budget, both developed 
in the Strategy phase. Secondly it picks up on the Position Definition 
from the Company Audit and thirdly it has as an input a V endor 
Assessment. More particularly this may be a software and equipm ent 
assessment in the first instance.
From the Position Definition it derives information on the people - 
their knowledge, managerial ability aptitudes and attributes. It also 
derives information on the organisation structure and departm ental 
boundaries and on the operating systems.
A successful Design phase will satisfy the key input requirem ents of 
the Action and Review phases and will, in particular, reflect the needs 
of the implementation as expressed by the propositions.
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6.1.4 Phase 4 : Action
All that has gone before is pre-planning, and the fact that there are 
four such phases indicates the magnitude and importance of this 
planning. This is supported by the fact that nineteen of the thirty-two 
propositions relate to the pre-implementation phases.
The fourth phase is all to do with getting the system as defined up 
and running successfully. The complexity of this phase and the time 
required cannot be overstated, and no fewer than eight propositions 
support the phase:
lc  The higher the level of integration the greater the number of 
people involved in the implementation and the higher the 
likelihood of speedy resolution of problems.
6a A Project Champion who has authority and responsibility for the 
system makes the implementation move more smoothly.
6b The Project Champion does not have to be the Project Driver for 
the implementation to be successful.
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7a Implementation is more likely to be successful where the Project 
Champion exhibits a constant or increasing level of commitment 
in a crisis.
7b High commitment of the Project Champion can ’rub off on- the 
user group. Low commitment can demoralise the user group.
7c The commitment of the Project Champion overrides that of the 
user group when the project hits a crisis.
* ^
10a Companies who take full advantage of the training offered by 
the vendor make better progress in implementation than those 
who take only the minimal training.
10b Draughtsmen who are trained by the vendor tend
to be more adventurous with the system and develop novel ways 
of saving draughting time.
The outcome of this fourth phase is threefold. First and foremost is a 
system implementation. We do not specify at this stage the 
effectiveness or otherwise of that implementation. The other two 
outcomes relate to the re-definition of inter-departmental boundaries 
and the culture change which goes with this.
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No timescale is put on the Action phase, since it will be defined in 
the Implementation Plan.
It is worth noting the number of inputs to the Action phase. There 
are no less than six, three of which, people selection, training and 
management are "people" inputs. This reflects the emphasis on 
people issues throughout the six cases. All three are components of 
the People Plan defined during the Design phase.
The other three inputs are no less important. The System Definition, 
derived from the Design phase, defines the system to be purchased, in 
hardware and software terms. It also identifies the vendor and the 
phasing of the purchases. Any maintenance contracts and /o r support 
will also be spelled out.
The implementation plan is also derived from the Action Plan. This 
will define the timescales for implementation, together with the 
resource requirements.
The final input is Finance. The Design phase develops the financial 
justification, and from this the capital expenditure plan can be 
defined. This will include the sourcing of capital and the phasing of 
capital spend in line with the Implementation Plan and System 
Definition.
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The Action phase is likely to be the longest in elapsed time, and its 
end point may not be clearly defined. One could reasonably argue 
that it never ends, but continues so long as the system is being 
developed. For our purposes, and for reasons which will become 
clear later, the Action phase can be regarded as having ended when 
the Review phase starts.
6.1.5 Phase 5 : Review
All implementations have to pass through a Review phase, whether it 
is formal or informal. Indeed, the review in Companies 3 and 4 was 
very informal, consisting of a brief meeting between those involved in 
the implementation, from which discussions were made on the 
system’s future. Companies 1, 5 and 6 had formal reviews a t frequent 
intervals. These reviews in Companies 1 and 5 had an agenda, and 
minutes were taken. In all three companies the required actions were 
recorded and distributed to interested parties.
Company 2 had only one review, and this was formal to the extent 
that it involved the whole team. The result of the review was that the 
system was reduced in size and mothballed.
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Five propositions refer the Review stage, and indicate some of the
thinking behind how the review team may view the implementation.
4d Where expectations are not met by an implementation, the 
success of the implementation is measured against the 
justification factors. This does not happen if expectations are 
met.
4e Expectations are more likely to be met than are the factors for 
justification.
8a Success in implementation as measured by hitting targets and 
timescales and success in application as measured by usage of 
the system need not co-exist.
8b Satisfaction is a corporately held concept. Users and
management tend to hold similar views on the satisfaction level.
8c Satisfaction tends to be defined by the System Champion, who 
communicates it upwards and downwards.
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These propositions are clearly important if the questions "How well 
did we do?" and "How can we improve it?" are to be answered. A 
comprehensive review will need to take into account the bias and 
prejudice of the key players if it is to serve a useful purpose rather 
than to give the team a warm glow.
The review needs to address the major issue of progress in three key 
areas:
* progress against expectations
* progress against the implementation plan
* progress against justification
It is clear from the foregoing that the outcomes may not be identical, 
and it is important to record and react to the outcomes.
Implementation effectiveness also needs to be reviewed. This is 
nothing to do with hitting targets or timescales, but is rather more 
mechanistic, relating to what the implementation team got wrong, and 
what they would have done differently with the benefit of hindsight.
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The People Review looks at how the management and staff coped 
with the change, and how they settled into their new roles. It should 
also look at the effectiveness of the System Champion, Driver and 
System Manager both during and after the implementation.
The final two inputs to the review are the Boundary and Culture 
aspects. This part of the review looks at the effectiveness of any 
changes to roles and boundaries, working relationships and the 
personal reactions to the changes. It also looks at the culture changes 
and their effect on the business as a whole.
The outcomes of the Review phase are threefold. Firstly it will 
almost certainly indicate broader and more far-reaching changes by 
feeding back into the Design phase. For instance a hardware upgrade 
may be indicated which requires further justification and a further 
implementation plan.
Secondly, the review could indicate broader and more far-reaching 
changes by feeding back into the Design phase. For instance, a 
hardware upgrade may be indicated which requires further 
justification and a further implementation plan.
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Thirdly the review may indicate changes which require a substantial 
rethink within the company at the strategic level. This could require 
changes to the Business Plan. Company 2 was a good example of 
this. Its decision to abandon the CAD system required a major 
rethink of company strategy which had an effect on the profitability 
and hence on the Business Plan.
6.1.6 Summary
The methodological framework developed in Section 6.1 has*five 
principal phases: Strategy; Company Audit; Design; Action; Review. 
Each of the phases is supported by a number of the propositions 
developed in Section 5.2, interpreted with logic and common sense. 
The five phases are best described by the questions which they seek 
to answer:
1. Strategy - Where do we want to get to?
2. Company Audit - Where are we now?
3. Design - How do we plan to get there?
4. Action - What steps must we take?
5. Review - How well did we do?
- How can we improve it?
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It is worth noting that the model concentrates on the inputs and 
outputs of the phases rather than on the processes undertaken within 
the phases. This is important, since inputs and outputs are tangible 
and can be measured and verified. The propositions point towards 
the features of the inputs and outputs which need to be measured or 
verified.
The framework as shown in Figure 6.1 consists of three sequential 
phases: Design, Action and Review, with two parallel phases,
Strategy and Company Audit feeding and informing the Desfgn phase. 
The philosophy behind this is that without knowing where we are and 
where we are going we cannot hope to decide how to proceed. This 
is almost too obvious to merit statement, but one of the case studies 
shows clearly that not all companies are aware of it.
In principle, these three phases have the same structure as the phases 
of the Business Plan of the company, and answer the same three 
questions; Where are we going?, Where are we now?, How do we 
get there? It is not surprising, then, to find the company Business 
Plan as one of the inputs to the model, or to find one of the Review 
outputs feeding back into the Business Plan.
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6.2 Primary Validation
Developing a model of this sort in isolation, it is very easy to become 
wrapped up in the propositions and their interpretation, to the 
exclusion of basic experience. For this reason, the framework: 
developed in 6.1 was submitted in draft form to three former 
associates of the author.
All three were working in the area of CAD implementation or had 
done so within the past six months, and had a track record of 
successful implementations elsewhere in the UK. The three 
Consultants were asked the following questions:
1. Does the framework address the major issues of CAD 
implementation? Are any major issues ignored?
2. Are the inputs and outputs of the phases as described complete 
and sufficient? What other inputs and outputs should be 
included?
3. Are any parts of the framework particularly helpful or unhelpful 
in implementing CAD?
4. Is there anything in the framework which is totally at odds with 
your experience in implementing CAD?
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5. Would a development of the framework into a methodology 
with its associated work books, charts and guidelines be useful in 
implementing CAD? In your experience would it be more 
useful to the small or large company?
6. Could such a tool be used by companies instead of their 
employing an external Consultant?
Smith et al. (1992) in a current TQ project identify five measures of 
validity: * "
Construct validity - does the model encompass those concepts 
which are seen as relevant to the study of culture elsewhere?
Face validity - does the model produce ways of categorising TQ 
activities and concerns which are meaningful to those involved 
as practitioners in implementing TQ?
Content validity - does the model encompass and incorporate 
those activities and concerns that are seen to be pertinent to the 
world of TQ by those who are involved in it?
Concurrent validity - does the model reveal a perspective on TQ 
culture change which occurs with other widely accepted views on 
implementing TQ?
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Predictive validity - does the model enable predictions to be 
made which can be empirically validated?
Whilst this exercise was aimed at checking Concurrent validity, the 
discussions and responses encompassed elements of Face and Content 
validity. Construct validity is demonstrated throughout, and 
particularly in Section 6.4, whilst Predictive validity cannot be tested 
until the model is fully developed.
The script and questions were submitted to the Consultants in writing, 
and all three were invited to prepare their replies for discussion. A 
meeting of the three Consultants and the author was then held to 
discuss the individual findings. It was considered that this group 
format may be useful in developing constructive criticism of the 
model.
In the event, the consultants were not so critical as the writer had 
hoped, but a number of useful features did arise.
The comments were subdivided into two types. Those which arose 
from a misunderstanding of the script or which required simple 
clarification were incorporated into the script and became part of 
Section 6.1. Those which required a development of the model or 
which were critical of the model are described below.
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The comments are described in the order in which the questions were 
asked.
6.2.1 Does the framework address the major issues of CAD 
implementation? Are any major issues ignored?
All three Consultants were satisfied that the major issues were 
addressed so far as most companies would be concerned.
Consultants AH and PC had both picked up the issue of competition. 
For some companies the fact that technology is increasing at a rapid 
pace is critical, in that their competitors have been driven to 
implementing CAD for a variety of reasons. In many cases the drive 
to introduce CAD then becomes more than just a knee-jerk "me-too" 
reaction, and may be a question of survival. For this reason they 
considered that the competitive environment should be considered as 
a major issue.
A second facet of the competition issue arose from subsequent 
discussion. Some companies look to CAD not as a reaction to their 
competitor’s introduction of CAD but in order to remain ahead of the 
field. It was considered that up to 25 percent of companies 
introduced CAD for this reason amongst others.
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6.2.2 Are the inputs and outputs of the phases as described complete and 
sufficient? What other inputs and outputs should be included?
From Section 6.2.1 it was agreed that Competition should be included 
as an input to the Strategy phase.
The Systems Audit of the Company Audit phase caused some 
confusion. In line with the propositions from which the model was 
developed, this was intended to refer to computer based systems 
elsewhere in the organisation. *
Consultants AH and SM both commented on the lack of audit of 
manual systems and procedures used within the company. This is a 
valid point and one which had been overlooked in the development of 
the framework. It is clear that an audit of systems and procedures is 
essential at the Company Audit stage, since in all probability several 
of these procedures will be changed during implementation. It could 
reasonably be argued that the audit need only take account of those 
systems and procedures which have an impact within those 
departments affected by the implementation. However, as was 
pointed out, it is not necessarily easy to define the impact of CAD at 
the Audit stage, so a thorough Systems and Procedures Audit would 
be preferable.
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Consultant PC saw the merit in a Financial Audit at the Company 
Audit stage. However, after much discussion it was agreed that the 
development of a CAD budget at the Strategy stage implied that the 
financial resources were available.
What did come out of the discussion was a general agreement that if 
the CAD budget were to be a useful input to the Design phase the 
financial position may need to be reviewed in the light of the phasing 
of the expenditure. This was covered to some extent by the Finance 
input to the Action phase. *
It is likely that some of the suppliers or customers of the company 
have CAD systems, and there may be benefit in considering the 
electronic transmission of design data. For this reason, Consultant PC 
suggested the need for an investigation of the systems operated by the 
major customers and suppliers where appropriate. This would not 
form part of the Company Audit, but would be an input direct to the 
Design stage.
Consultant AH raised the issue of physical resources, arguing that 
CAD has different resource requirements from manual draughting.
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It was agreed following lengthy discussion that the major aspects of 
the physical resources related to the environmental conditions. Such 
aspects as lighting, physical comfort, drawing office layout and 
furniture should all be considered, together with the more mundane 
features such as power supplies. These should be considered at the 
Company Audit stage.
6.2.3 Are any parts of the framework particularly helpful or unhelpful in 
implementing CAD?
The one point brought out by all three Consultants was the emphasis 
on the link between CAD implementation and Company Business 
Plan. It was felt that this was the most important pointer to 
successful implementation. All three had had experience of clients 
who had attempted to implement systems without regard to their 
impact on the company as a whole.
Consultants AH and SM found the emphasis on a wide ranging 
review of the company’s present position to be particularly helpful. 
Both admitted that they had on occasions omitted part of this review 
for the sake of expediency, but that this had introduced an element of 
risk at the design stage.
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Consultant AH found the concentration on people issues at the 
Action stage to be overstated. Whilst he acknowledged the need for 
a People Plan, he did not agree that this merited being split three 
ways, which gave the People issues an equal weighting in numerical 
terms to all the other inputs to the phase. Consultants PC and SM 
disagreed, on the basis that their experience suggested that at least 
half of the failures they had experienced had had people-related 
causes.
Consultant PC considered that the Culture Change output and the 
Culture input between Action and Review were unnecessary. 
Consultant SM supported this, but agreed that it was not only 
unnecessary but also impossible to measure. Consultant AH  agreed 
with the author that whether it was measurable or not did not negate 
the fact that culture changes could and did occur.
6.2.4 Is there anything in the framework which is totally at odds with your
experience in implementing CAD?
None of the Consultants could identify any such points.
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6.2.5 Would a development of this framework be useful in implementing 
CAD? Would it be more useful to the small or large company?
There was general agreement that such a development would be an 
exceedingly useful tool for consultants working in the field. A  danger 
was identified that such a tool could become too prescriptive, 
particularly if used by inexperienced consultants, and that the 
rationale behind the tool must be clearly understood before it could 
be used effectively.
Consultants AH and PC were particularly concerned about the testing 
of such a tool, since the effects of a poor implementation can often 
not be traced to their source. Conversely, some implementations 
could be successful despite the tool rather than because of it. Again 
this may not be easy to identify.
The outcome of the discussion was that provided a comprehensive 
testing programme could be developed for the tool prior to its launch, 
it would be of immense value.
So far as the size of company was concerned, it was felt that the 
smaller company would be most likely to benefit for two reasons. 
Firstly it had been developed from data gathered from small firms, 
and there could be no guarantee that the same data would be evident 
in large firms.
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Secondly, larger firms tend to have a different approach to the 
introduction of computer based systems. It is not uncommon for a 
large company to send out invitations to tender for equipment and 
then carry out development work on the selected system at their own 
expense prior to implementation. This means that a fully proved 
integrated system is installed, ready for fully trained and properly 
managed people to use.
Consultant AH also pointed out that a larger firm often has a culture 
of high technology which requires little change for CAD 
implementation.
6.2.6 Could such a tool be used by companies instead of their employing 
an external consultant?
This was not thought to be the case. It could be possible for a 
company to work through modules of the model, particularly at the 
Company Audit and Design stages, and possibly at the Review stage. 
However, the Consultants did not consider this feasible at the Action 
stage and particularly at the Strategy stage.
The single most difficult problem for companies at the Strategy stage 
is, in the view of Consultant AH, knowing what the questions are that 
they should be asking.
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In order to develop a CAD strategy, they need to have a detailed 
awareness of CAD not commonly found in small firms. They have, in 
plain terms, to know what CAD can do before they decide what they 
want it to do.
Consultant SM supported this by suggesting that without a knowledge 
of the CAD marketplace a meaningful budget could not be 
developed.
The point agreed by all the Consultants was that the Research input 
to the Strategy phase could only be provided by a specialist in CAD.
At the Action stage, having all the inputs in place was not considered 
to be sufficient for success. Consultant AH  suggested that knowing 
what to do was important, but knowing how to do it was equally 
important. Experience of having done it before could be vital if 
timescales and milestones were to be met.
Overall, the Consultants did not fear a do-it-yourself implementation 
manual.
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6.3 Amended Framework
In deference to the considered and valued opinions of potential users 
of the eventual methodology in the form of three colleagues of the 
author, the framework was amended to that shown in Figure 6.3.
From this framework, the primary and secondary inputs were derived, 
and are listed in Figure 6.4. Primary inputs are defined as those 
derived by reference to the external environment, whilst secondary 
inputs are the result of an output from a previous stage of the 
implementation.
It is important to note that the framework is not terminal. In other 
words, the outputs all feed back into the model as adjustments, 
amendments or modifications to the implementation. One possible 
output which has not been shown on this framework would be a 
report, for instance to the Board. This could conceivably result in 
further inputs.
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6.4 Source Material for the Model
A framework such as the one described is of limited use in the real 
world, and needs to be developed into a methodology. Whilst this is 
beyond the scope of the present work, some expansion of the inputs 
will be helpful to anyone embarking upon the task. It may also help 
to bring together some of the thoughts of the writer and others 
expressed throughout the work.
It has been decided to develop the inputs in the order shown in 
Figure 6.4, starting with the primary inputs and moving on to the 
secondary inputs.
6.4.1 Strategy
(a) Business Plan
The Company Business Plan is a familiar management tool, although 
in the experience of the writer it is often incomplete in small firms. It 
should contain the following:
* a mission statement
* a statement of what the company hopes to achieve in a
particular timescale
* a statement of where it is starting from
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* defined actions for achieving the strategy
* estimates of the financial implications
Embedded in the plan will be an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the company and of the opportunities and threats 
facing it.
All major change within a company will be affected by and will have 
an effect on the Business Plan, and it is difficult to envisage CAD 
implementation without such a plan.
(b) Research
A very significant problem facing a Chief Executive embarking on 
CAD is, in the experience of the author, how it will fit into his 
Business Plan. Before he can answer this he must make himself 
aware of the potential for CAD in all its facets.
Research at this stage will enable the Chief Executive and his team to 
develop a concept of what the eventual system will do for the 
company, and hence how it should fit in in strategic terms. This is 
the first stage of definition of a CAD strategy.
The research may take many forms, including background reading, 
seminars, exhibitions, discussions with users and so on.
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Whatever the form, the propositions have shown that detailed 
consideration improves the chance of effective implementation.
(c) Competition
As described in 6.2.1, the competitive position of the company can 
provide a compulsion to implement CAD. For this reason an 
investigation of the competitor’s CAD position would be wise, and 
may have a marked influence on the scale and speed of 
implementation.
(d) Expectations
Whilst expectations undoubtedly influence the CAD strategy, they 
tend to be the results of the research and competition elements 
described above. Nevertheless, it is important that these expectations 
be considered, even though they may change as a result of later 
phases or in line with the fast-moving development of CAD.
So far as tools are concerned to measure the inputs to the Strategy 
phase, none has been suggested. There are no "standard" or 
"preferred" ways of developing strategy, so long as all the elements 
have been taken into account, and it is considered sufficient to define 
these elements.
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6.4.2 Company Audit
(a) People Audit
This encompasses the Management Audit and the Knowledge,Audit.
The Audit is intended to review the position of the company vis-a-vis 
the people requirements of the CAD implementation. In terms of 
management, we are seeking to establish whether the Chief 
Executive’s style is appropriate to rapid progress as required by 
Proposition 5a. In other words we are looking for good delegation 
skills and a participative management style. The implication of this is 
that since we desire these two characteristics, should they not exist we 
should be prepared to do something about it. This ties up well with 
the work by Collins & King (1988) described in Section 2.3 and leads 
on to the training aspect of the people outcome of the Position 
Definition, which will be discussed further in the Action phase.
We may also, during the People Audit, be seeking suitable candidates 
for the System Driver and assessing the capabilities of the Drawing 
Office Manager. Haywood & Bessant (1987) and Tranfield & Smith 
(1988) give pointers in this direction, as described in Section 2.4.
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In the Knowledge Audit we are seeking evidence of prior computer 
experience, particularly in the Drawing Office and related areas, 
where Propositions 2a and 2b suggest benefits could be obtained. 
Evidence of prior CAD knowledge is also sought.
There are several methods of assessing the style of management and 
staff personnel, but possibly one of the quickest and most reliable 
would be a psychometric analysis. Together with a team-type analysis 
valuable information could be obtained on the necessary action. This 
could be conveniently supplemented by a training needs analysis to 
define where training would address the shortfalls and the appropriate 
training medium.
It has to be said that psychometric testing and training needs analysis 
would not have been the first tools to spring to mind when 
considering CAD implementation.
(b) Departmental Audit
The team type analysis may also come in useful when looking at 
departmental teams and boundaries. What we are really seeking, 
though, is good inter-departmental relationships.
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This may seem somewhat obtuse when we are considering breaking 
down the boundaries, (Haywood & Bessant (1987), Marchrzak et al. 
(1987) Arnold (1983)), but it is precisely for this reason that the 
working relationships need to be good.
Where antagonism is found, the roots and reasons must be found and 
removed if there is any merit in Proposition 5d. One method of 
dealing with this is the Intergroup Team-Building Meeting, as 
described by Fordyce & Weil (1971 p 124ff).
(c) Systems and Procedures Audit
This looks at all systems and procedures excluding the computer 
information system (if any). It aims to identify any procedures which 
have become obsolete or are replicated by different people.
Flow charting is a particularly effective way of identifying the systems 
and procedures in terms of the way in which they influence 
information or production flow. By displaying the flow chart in 
departmental format the interactions between departments can be 
identified and analysed, providing further data for the Departmental 
Audit.
Once this has been completed, it may be useful to display the flow 
chart in process format, so that the critical path may be identified.
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Whilst this may add little to the CAD implementation effectiveness, it 
may provide significant information for efficiency improvements.
Further expansion of the process flow chart may allow detailed 
process investigations to be made. The questions:
"why is this done?" and
"why is it done by this person?" and
"could it be done better by others?" will lead to a questioning of 
the status quo, and possible efficiency benefits.
(d) Physical Resources Audit
The objective of this Audit is to identify those resources which may 
have an influence on the implementation of CAD.
Since we are dealing with a relatively narrow view of physical 
resources, a checklist could be developed for this Audit. 
Manufacturers’ literature often identifies the particular resources 
which need to be reviewed, but the checklist would probably need to 
address the following issues:
Building Design - proximity of the Drawing Office to those
departments with which it will interact 
- proximity to the computer information 
system (if any)
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Environment - lighting and heating
- space requirements
- Drawing Office layout
- furniture
- physical comfort
Power - availability of clean power supplies
(e) Systems Audit
This is an adjunct to the Systems and Procedures Audit, and will 
probably be carried out at the same time and by the same means. 
However, there are fundamental additional requirements related to 
the level of integration required. The Systems Audit will therefore 
require an investigation in depth of the interfaces and protocols 
available with the existing CAPM software. It will also be necessary 
to investigate the availability of software which may not have been 
implemented, but which would have a bearing on the CAD software, 
such as Bills of Materials and Databases.
The hardware will also need to be investigated, since the platform on 
which the existing software sits may influence the choice of CAD 
hardware and software.
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6.4.3 Design
(a) Vendor Assessment
One outcome of the Design phase is the selection of a CAD system. 
This is prompted primarily by the CAD Strategy and CAD Budget.
Once a system specification has been developed, i.e. the company 
knows what it expects of a system (or thinks that it knows), the 
specification can be passed to vendors and their proposals dan be 
obtained. Alternatively, a checklist can be produced which contains 
all the essential and desirable features. Against this, the method by 
which the several vendors would provide the features can be marked, 
producing a systems matrix. Such matrices already exist, and the 
writer has used one which he developed some five years ago. The 
matrix must include not only the draughting features, but also the 
communications and integration features, operating system, peripheral 
software, hardware options and peripherals and maintenance details. 
Last, but by no means least, it must include a detailed cost breakdown 
which relates to the system offered, giving estimates for any bespoke 
development work involved.
2 9 5
This checklist covers the mechanics of vendor selection, but there is a 
second, equally important facet which must not be ignored. The 
company will have to work with the vendor for some years to come, 
and it must assure itself of the stability of the vendor, its technical 
and support capabilities and the attitudes of the key executives. This 
can only be done by personal contact at a high level.
(b) Customer/Supplier CAD
There are significant benefits to be obtained by integratingThe CAD 
system with that of the company’s customers and/or suppliers. This 
reduces the number of drawings passed between the companies in 
hard copy form in favour of electronic data interchange. The 
questions to be answered before choosing a CAD system are:
1. Do my customers/suppliers have CAD systems?
2. Can I reasonably exchange data electronically?
3. What protocols will I need to support?
(c) CAD Strategy
This will be derived from the Strategy phase, and will be in line with 
the company’s Business Strategy.
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Whilst it may be global in format, it should contain certain vital 
information:
* where the company expects to be going with its CAD and in 
what timescale
* what milestones are expected to be achieved
* what resources are expected to be needed
* what major changes are anticipated as a result of CAD 
implementation
* what benefits are expected from the implementation "
This information will be key to the development of the 
Implementation Plan.
(d) CAD Budget
This complements the CAD Strategy and could be argued to be an 
integral part of it. It defines the finances available for CAD 
development and the phasing of the expenditure. See Section 2.1 on 
System Justification, and particularly the work of Senker (1984), 
Primrose et al. (1985) and Meredith & Hill (1987).
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(e) Position Definition
This is the only secondary input to the Design phase from the 
Company Audit phase. It defines the present position of the company 
in certain key areas such as management, knowledge, people, systems 
and procedures, physical resources and departmental organisation.
In particular it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the company 
in those areas, and outlines the necessary changes required to address 
the weaknesses.
It is vital that the input is well documented, since any weaknesses and 
actions will need to be taken into account during the Action phase, 
which may take place some time later. A simple tabular format has 
been found to be successful for this type of activity. Headings could 
be:
* Audit Area
* Strengths
* Weaknesses
* Corrective Action
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6.4.4 Action
(a) Management
The Design phase will have detailed who should take charge of the 
implementation and his terms of reference (see references in Section 
2.4). The input is a clear definition of the scope of the management 
role. The Implementation Manager will hopefully have been 
appointed on merit following the design of his role and taking into 
account his personal characteristics. -
(b) People Selection
The People input to the Company Audit phase will have identified 
the key characteristics of the people available, and these will have 
been matched to the requirements of the job(s) at the Design phase. 
The input will be a clear definition of who will be required to do 
what during the implementation.
(c) Training
As described in 6.4.3 above, there will be certain weaknesses which 
have been identified and which can be addressed by training. The 
Design phase will have developed a training needs analysis based 
upon this, which will be an input to the Action phase.
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Evidence of a comprehensive training needs analysis related to CAD 
and specifically to the people involved should be sought. Training of 
those peripheral to the system who may nevertheless interact with it 
or experience its effects should also be addressed.
(d) System Definition
At this stage, all the investigation work should be complete, and the 
system should be fully defined in terms of:
* hardware
* software
* maintenance
* consumables
* environmental requirements
* system implementation phasing
* upgrades
* operational issues
This will provide the input to the Action phase which, together with 
the available finance will enable the system to be purchased.
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(e) Implementation Plan
This is a development of the CAD Strategy into an Action Plan which 
spans the length of the Action phase. It provides the detail of how 
the system sf to be developed to provide maximum benefits. ,
This input will define the following:
* phasing and boundaries of usage
* physical resource requirements '  ^
* people requirements
* benchmarks and timescales
* measurement techniques
* links to other internal systems
* links to external systems
* environmental requirements
* departmental requirements
* vendor relationships
(f) Finance
This input is tangible. It represents the funding required to 
implement the system in line with the Implementation Plan.
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6.4.5 Review
(a) Progress Against Expectations
The expectations defined here are not those which inform thef 
Strategy phase, but the more detailed expectations which emerge from 
the Design phase. Here we have a problem, in that expectations are 
rarely if ever committed to paper, unlike the justification.
Nevertheless, the paper demonstrates that the expectations provide a 
valuable target against which satisfaction with the system can be 
measured (see Bikson et al. (1981) and Voss (1988b) in Section 2.5).
As it is possible that expectations may change during the Action 
phase, as knowledge of the system improves, it may not be feasible to 
document the expectations. In that case, the measurement of 
progress against expectations will be subjective.
(b) People
Even in a small to medium firm, it is unlikely that the selection of 
people and managers will have been perfect, or that all the people 
selected have remained in post. This input provides details of the 
performance of the people involved during the Action phase.
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The most logical way of producing this input is to develop 
performance standards during the Design phase which can form part 
of the People Plan and then to appraise those involved against those 
performance standards. Standard appraisal techniques can be used 
for this.
(c) Boundaries
In many firms the inter-departmental boundaries will be moved or 
removed during CAD implementation. The success of the change 
provides the input. Measurement will consist of determining:
* whether the barriers to effective implementation were removed
* what the cost of this was in financial and people terms
* whether the people have settled into their new roles
* whether inter-departmental communication has improved or 
suffered
* whether the newly defined boundaries are stable 
No standard techniques are available for this input.
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(d) Implementation Effectiveness
This input has little to do with progress, but looks at how well the 
system was implemented. In other words, what problems if any were 
encountered with the hardware, software or communications? *
Did the system actually perform as it was intended to do? What did 
the implementation team get wrong?
(e) Culture
This input is much more difficult to define, and hence to measure.
We are seeing a change in attitudes which will enable CAD to 
become an accepted part of the company. We therefore need to 
identify any cultural blocks to progress which have been thrown up 
during the Action phase. Techniques for assessing this are described 
by Schein (1985) in Chapter 5 (p. 112).
(f) Progress Against Plan
The Implementation Plan as defined during the Design phase will be 
quite specific and will normally be well documented. This input takes 
the milestones laid down by the Plan and compares them with the 
achievements. In particular, it will compare actual progress against 
the items defined by the Implementation Plan in Section 6.4.4 (e).
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(g) Progress Against Justification
This is a financial measure, and as such it should be relatively easy to 
assess. The input seeks to compare the actual phasing of costs and 
benefits against those produced when justifying the system.
In the author’s experience, companies rarely meet the measures of 
justification, but this work suggests that this is less important than that 
the system meets expectations.
6.4.6 Other Inputs
Three other inputs are worthy of discussion, although they are not 
shown as such in Figure 6.3. These are the outputs of the Review 
stage.
(a) Business Plan Review
A technology so far-reaching as CAD can cause major change within 
a company to the extent that the Business Plan is affected. For 
instance, the system may allow the company to enter markets formerly 
closed to it, or the integrative nature of CAD may reduce costs to 
such an extent that the business targets need to be changed. This 
outcome of the Review stage will therefore feed back into the 
Strategy phase via the Business Plan.
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(b) Action Modification
CAD implementation rarely goes quite as planned, and one outcome 
of the review is likely to be to change the short term actions, perhaps 
to get the project back on line or perhaps to bring forward the 
planned benefits.
Either way, this outcome will feed back to the Action phase via the 
Implementation Plan.
(c) Further Design
Once an implementation has "finished" there is the potential for 
further phases of implementation or integration. Where these were 
not part of the original plan, the review will indicate that the 
company is ready to enlarge the system. This outcome therefore 
feeds back to the Design phase via the CAD Strategy.
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6.5 Conclusions
This section reviews the main findings of the research and outlines 
the contribution that it makes to theory. It then highlights the ways in 
which further research may be useful.
6.5.1 Main Findings of the Research
The six case studies have yielded a wealth of features which have 
enabled propositions to be constructed. This has been achieved 
without resorting to very large scale studies, and without seeking 
"typical" cases. In this respect the research supports the work of 
Mitchell (1983), who argues that hypotheses may be developed from a 
small number of cases. In Mitchell’s words (p.200):
"...the features present in the case study will be related to a 
wider population not because the case is representative, but 
because our analysis is unassailable."
Unlike Mitchell’s work, the research did not seek to draw the analysis 
from a single case, but from a small number (six) of cases. This, as 
Pettigrew (1988) noted, allowed cross-case comparisons to be made to 
advantage, eliminating or reducing the risk of spurious but well 
argued findings.
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The research was relatively focused, as described in Section 3, looking 
particularly but not exclusively at issues which had featured widely in 
the texts. This was not done in order to validate or invalidate the 
work of others, but rather to provide a well-documented platform 
from which to develop the investigation. In the event, there was a 
great deal of support of former texts.
The six cases were to some extent self-selecting from an initial 
shortlist of around 20, and offered a wide variety of experiences in 
implementation. Having a case which proved to be an unsuccessful 
implementation was a bonus, since little or nothing has been written 
about lack of success, and many of the propositions arose from the 
ability to draw comparisons between success and failure. This may 
well be the first well documented failure of CAD implementation, 
and a great deal of useful information was gleaned from it.
Whilst the research by no means concentrates on the elements of 
failure, the ability of the author to observe and document the cases 
from selection to full running enabled the high and low points to be 
investigated equally and to good effect.
The cases were analysed under ten headings, each prompted by 
earlier work in CAD or related fields such as Information Technology 
implementation.
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Level of Integration looks at the degree to which the Companies 
aspired in terms of cross-functional integration, from a stand­
alone electronic drawing board to a two-way CAD/CAPM  link.
It does not venture into the integration levels of Open Systems, 
since none of the companies aspired to this.
Computer Knowledge Base investigates the extent to which 
computers were used within the companies, and particularly in 
the drawing and design sections.
Expectation of the System considers the expressed aspirations of 
the system proponents prior to the start of the implementation, 
and the estimated degree of difficulty in reaching the target.
Prior Justification differs from expectation in that it relates to 
financial or "survival" measures of success rather than to 
technical measures.
Management and Organisation investigates the structure of the 
companies, their management styles and internal relationships. It 
also investigates the inter-departmental boundaries.
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Management "Ownership" is to do with the level of commitment 
of the senior management to the CAD implementation. It looks 
at the formation of the implementation team, and the sources of 
power and authority.
Commitment to the System assesses the commitment of the 
"System Champion" and "User Group" at four key stages; 
selection, before a major setback, immediately after the setback 
and after the setback had been resolved. These stages were 
chosen with care and represent critical periods of development.
Level of Satisfaction shows the consensus of the implementation 
team at various stages during the implementation. It compares 
the ultimate satisfaction level with the measured success in 
implementation and success in application.
Implementation Planning looks at the extent to which the 
companies committed resources to planning the implementation, 
and the apparent effect of this.
Vendor Relationships and Training investigates the level of 
training taken up by the companies from their vendor, as an 
indicator of the relationship between the company and the 
vendor.
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Using the outcomes of these ten analyses, no fewer than 32 
propositions were developed. Whilst they were developed under the 
same headings as the analyses, it became clear that they fell into four 
categories:
those propositions relating to planning of the CAD system
and its position in the company
those propositions relating to existing features of the
company such as organisation, management, people,
knowledge and training * ^
those propositions relating to preparation for the CAD
system
those propositions relating to the achievement and 
monitoring of targets.
A review of the propositions suggested a parallel between their 
sequence and what may be regarded as a "traditional" business plan, 
which addresses the questions:
where are we now ?
where do we want to get to ?
how do we plan to get there ?
what steps must we take ?
how will we know when we get there ?
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To find a series of derived propositions pointing so clearly to a formal 
plan came as something of a surprise, yet the link was undeniable.
The consequence was clear. If the propositions indicate a structure, 
then by developing that structure to incorporate the propositions, we 
should end up with a methodology for implementation.
This methodology should, if followed through, avoid the pitfalls and 
provide the benefits described in the propositions, and hence lead to 
a successful implementation.
With this in mind, a framework for the methodology has been 
developed, based around five distinct stages or phases:
Strategy 
Company Audit 
Design 
Action 
Review
The framework has been validated using three former associates of 
the author and amended accordingly.
The framework represents a significant step forward in the 
understanding of CAD implementation, despite the fact that it holds 
no surprises.
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Firstly it is built up from information gathered by a CAD specialist 
during actual implementations, giving it credibility.
Secondly it provides firm guidance on a "best" way of implementing 
CAD, encapsulating elements of advice and best practice described by 
other authors.
Thirdly it forms the basis of an "implementation toolkit" for use by 
small firms and their advisors when planning a CAD project.
Fourthly in concentrating on small firms, it addresses the sector of 
industry which can least afford failure yet equally can least afford 
external specialist help.
The following sections highlight the ways in which further research 
may be useful. Section 6.5.2 outlines the way in which the 
methodology for implementation may be developed to a point where 
it becomes an implementation tool. Section 6.5.3 picks out some of 
the areas described earlier which would make interesting or 
productive research in themselves.
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6.5.2 Development of a Methodology
The framework for the methodology described in earlier sections is 
the bare bones of a potential implementation tool which, if 
developed, could be useful for the Consultant and /o r the company 
wishing to implement Computer Aided Design.
Section 6.4 suggests some possible sources for material which may be 
used for inputs to the model, but stops far short of detailing the 
method of collecting the material. " ^
The next stage would be to produce a workbook consisting of the 
necessary guidelines and checklists. For instance, when looking at the 
people aspects of the Company Audit, psychometric testing had been 
suggested for analysing management styles. This in itself raises 
several questions.
Firstly, what in detail do we want to achieve by the psychometric test? 
Secondly, which of the several tests available would therefore be most 
appropriate? Thirdly, what quality of information will be made 
available by that particular analysis? The same questions could be 
asked when seeking a suitable team type analysis and training needs 
analysis methodology.
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Several of the inputs require the collection and analysis of 
information, some of which will be subjective, some will be value 
judgement and some will be deliberately or innocently misleading. 
Any questionnaires developed for collecting such information will 
need to take this into account.
For instance, when attempting to identify the quality of 
inter-departmental relationships, it would not be surprising for a 
relatively wide spectrum of opinions to be obtained.
Collecting data for the inputs is clearly important to the model, but 
since it relies on a particular quality of input, the researcher will 
inevitably be faced with the problem of what to do if the analysis is 
unfavourable. For instance, it has been suggested that 
inter-departmental antagonism can cause implementation problems.
So, having found such antagonism, the workbook will need to suggest 
actions which may be taken, and a method of identifying whether and 
when these actions have had sufficient effect to remove the potential
barrier to implementation. This "what to do if. " type of guidance
is seen as fundamental to the success of the package.
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This type of guidance is also important in other areas. For instance, 
the environmental aspects of CAD such as lighting, layout, physical 
comfort and rest periods have been well researched, and a checklist 
can be produced to compare present/proposed practice against best 
practice.
What may not be so clear is the minimum acceptable standards, and 
the effects of falling short of the ideal. Clearly, many companies will, 
for a variety of reasons, fall short of the ideal environmental 
standards, and not all will face failure in implementation. ^
Several of the inputs have no obvious method of standardised 
assessment, and this will be an obstacle to the developer of a 
methodology. For instance, to what extent is the presence of a 
Business Plan fundamental to the creation of a CAD Strategy? 
Clearly there should be some relationship, but the author knows of 
several installations where the Business Plan has only existed in the 
mind of the Chief Executive or owner, yet CAD has been 
implemented.
The extent to which this is important as an issue needs to be 
explored. All we are attempting to do with the methodology is 
remove barriers and potential barriers to implementation.
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If this requires the explicit definition of a written Business Plan, then 
so be it, but there are probably those Chief Executives or owners who 
would dispute it.
The methodology, in its finished format, should:
(a) Define the inputs at each stage.
(b) Check that they have been verified.
(c) Suggest action if they are inadequate.
(d) Define the action required by the stage.
(e) Define the outputs required.
(f) Check that the standards of output are achieved.
It should lead the Consultant/company stepwise through the 
procedures, explaining at each stage the rationale and reasoning 
behind the steps being taken and measurements being made. It 
should also provide for comprehensive reviews at each stage, not just 
at the post-implementation Audit stage, to ensure that the project is 
proceeding to plan.
As with all new tools, the test will be a dry-run on a number of 
companies. Two possible outcomes should be observed.
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(a) If the company follows the methodology from beginning to end, 
it should achieve a successful implementation in the terms 
expressed elsewhere in this paper.
(b) If the company deviates significantly from the methodology it 
should experience relevant problems with the implementation 
which may be addressed by remedial action within the 
methodology.
Only when this has been demonstrated on a significant number of 
cases and the necessary amendments made to the methodology, can it 
be considered to be a success. At this stage, it can be developed into 
a packaged "toolkit" and launched on an unsuspecting market.
6.5.3 Further Research Opportunities
a) Section 6.1.2 identifies the need for a particular style of management 
in the implementation of CAD, but notes that this is a "preference". 
The work does not identify the precise relationship between 
management style and implementation effectiveness, and this would 
benefit from further investigation.
A suitable title which would encompass this would be "The effect of 
management style on the implementation of advanced technology in 
small and medium enterprises".
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b) This work, as noted in Section 6.1.3, does not address itself to the 
effects of vendor relationships, system selection and implementation 
plan on the implementation. This is acknowledged to be a weakness 
of the model brought about by the author’s involvement as consultant 
in all cases.
There is therefore significant potential for at least two research 
projects in this area. One could deal with the vendor relationships 
and system selection, which are almost inextricably bound together, 
whilst the second could deal with the implementation plan. useful 
title could be "The effects of a detailed implementation plan on the 
success of implementation of advanced technology".
c) The Audit phase described in Section 6.1.5 addresses progress against 
three key measures:
* progress against expectations
* progress against implementation plan
* progress against justification
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It makes the point that the outcomes of these measures may not be 
the same, and gives some reasons for the possible differences. This 
area of study has been neglected in the texts, and merits further 
investigation. It would be most interesting to look into the psychology 
of this type of decision making, and why one measure should be 
subjugated with respect to another. Why, for instance, does the 
measure of justification have less importance once the decision to 
implement has been taken?
d) All the cases studied for this research have been UK basecTBritish 
owned companies. It would be most interesting to carry out a similar 
exercise in other European countries, but particularly interesting in 
Japan and the United States, using companies of a similar size and 
similar stage of development. The Japanese research would be of 
particular interest in the Organisational and Managerial aspects, 
because of the differences in culture and hierarchical style.
e) Probably the most significant area of research lies in investigating the 
relevance of the framework outside the scope of the cases from which 
it was developed. For instance the current research does not address 
whether the framework is only valid for small firms, and if so, how 
small, or is equally valid for larger firms.
The more integrating the technology (CAD /  CAM /  CAPM etc.) the 
more lines of demarcation it cuts.
3 2 0
This is particularly true in large companies which tend to be more 
strongly divisionalised, and less so in small companies which 
coordinate by mutual adjustment. The larger firm may therefore 
experience significantly different problems in the organisational 
aspects of implementation.
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IMPLEMENIATICH OF CAD/CAM IN SMALL FIRMS 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
COMPANY OODE NUMBER
INFORMANT'S POSITION
All information collected during this interview will be treated as 
confidential. The Company agrees to publication of extracted information 
as part of a research project provided tliat the identity of the Company is 
not. divulged.
SECTION 1. THE COMPANY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
1. Please describe briefly the history of the Company frcan its 
formation, including its ownership.
2. Is the Company part of a Group? If so, please give the name of the 
Group.
3. How many people does the Company employ on the site(s) involved in 
the Implementation Project?
4. What is the turnover of the operations on that site or sites? 
£______________________________________________
5. Please describe the manufacturing facilities available.
-  1 -
6. Were any computer systems in use prior to the CAD implementation? 
If so, please describe them.
7. How does the Company normally obtain capital for investment 
projects?
8. Hew are decisions on capital expenditure normally made, and by whom?
9. Please provide a management structure diagram.
-  2 -
10. How would you describe communications within the management 
structure? Tick the appropriate box(es).
INFORMAL FORMAL
VERTICAL
HORIZONTAL
11. How would you describe the effectiveness of the communications 
network? What are the problems?
12. Did you have a person or people with skills in operating, 
implementing or managing computer systems prior to the 
implementation? Please indicate the numbers below. Hew many of 
these had specific CAD experience?
No. of people No. with CAD 
experience
Operator
Analyst
Programmer
System Manager
External Consultant
-  3 -
SECTION 2. COMPANY PRODUCTS/PROCESSES AND MARKETS
1. What is the main function of the site in broad terms?
2. What are the major product lines of the Company? Please estimate 
the percentage turnover of each?
Description Percentage
Product 1 %
Product 2 %
Product 3 %
Other Products %
100 %
3. Which three product lines require the heaviest input from the
Drawing Office (D.O.), and what percentage of the D.O. time do they 
take up?
Description Percentage
Product 1 %
Product 2 %
Product 3 %
Other Products %
100 %
- 4 -
4. What share of the available market do you enjoy for the three major 
products of Q3, and for your products as a whole? Is this share 
rising, falling or static?
Product 1 % Rising/falling/static
Product 2 % Rising/falling/static
Product 3 % Rising/falling/static
Whole range % Rising/falling/static
5. Can you estimate the position of the three products on their 
life-cycle?
New
Market
Market
Growing
Market
Static
Market
Declining
Product 1
Product 2
Product 3
6. How often is it necessary to prepare an estimate or tender to obtain 
an order? (Please tick)
Never   50% - 69% ____
0% - 9%   70% - 89% .....
10% - 29%   90% - 99%.......
30% - 49%   Always.........
-  5 -
7. How many tenders or estimates would you expect to produce in a
12-month period? ____________________________________________
8. How many hours of Drawing Office time will be required for
these proposals? ________________________________________
9. What is your approximate conversion rate from proposals to orders?
q ,
_____________________________  "o
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SECTION THPEE. DRAWING OFFICE OPERATIONS
1. Haw many people are involved in the Drawing Office operations?
2. Please describe the functions of these people using the grid below.
Electronic Electrical Mechanical Hydraulic Pneumatic Other
Clerk
Tracer
Apprentice Draughtsman
Draughtsman
Senior Draughtsman
Designer
Senior Designer
Design Draughtsman
Chief Draughtsman/Designer
Other (Specify)
3. What CAD system experience had been obtained before the implementation 
by the above, in-house, at other companies or in further education. 
Please list the people and describe their experience.
-  7 -
4. Please describe the work of the Drawing Office by indicating against the 
items belcw - and any others you may wish to add - the number of hours 
per year spent on each:
Man Hours/Year
Creative or Graphics Design
Original Design
Modification of a Design
Creation of 'Similar' Designs
Creation of Sketches
Tracing
* -n
Part Listing
Drawing Checking
Non-Graphical Design (eg Calculations)
Non-Graphical Manufacturing Paperwork
Preparation of Data for Manuals
Production Support
Supervision and Management
Other (Specify)
5. Please indicate who in the management structure takes responsibility for 
the quality of the Drawing Office output, and what is his/her job title.
-  8 -
6. Why did the Company decide to investigate the use of CAD? Please tick 
one or more:
Pressure from customers.......................................
Major competitors already had C A D ..............................
Shortage of draughtsmen.......................................
Shortage of Drawing Office space...............................
Quicker response to enquiries..................................
Need to reduce order lead time.................................
Reduced clerical time in the preparation of parts lists e t c ....
Parts of the work could not be done manually...................
Other (please specify) .........................................
-  9 -
SECTION 4. CAD SELECTION
1. Who was the instigator of the investigation into CAD? (Position in 
Organisation)
2. Who was given the delegated authority for controlling the selection 
process? (Position in Organisation)
3. What were the terms of reference for the person nominated in (2) above? 
Please attach any documents.
-  10 -
How was the external consultant retained to select the system chosen? 
Please tick as appropriate:
He had worked with the Company previously . 
He was recommended:
* by another Company..................
* by the Department of Trade and Industry
* by P E R A .............................
* by a trade association.............. .
* by another consultant............... .
* by an employee...................... .
He knocked on the door at the right time
Other (Please Specify)
Were other consultants considered? If so, how many?
6. What terms of reference were given to the consultant prior to the
selection process?
a) None, because we wanted a totally independent audit of ----
our CAD and CAM requirements. ----
b) Very broad guidelines on the areas on which we wished him ----
to concentrate, but no detailed instructions of budget. ----
c) Detailed guidelines on what we expected of the system, the ----
payback we were looking for, the projected expansion path ----
and the level of integration we were expecting. * "
Please select one of the above or indicate the terms of reference below.
If a written specification was prepared, please attach it.
7. Did you have any criteria for acceptance or rejection of the consultant's 
reccannendations? If so, please state them.
8. What justification was expected for a decision to proceed with
implementation? How was this justification decision reached, and 
by wham?
9. Did you have a budget for the purchase of the CAD system before the 
selection took place? If so, how much had been allocated for:
a) initial hardware and software £.........
b) annual costs £.........
c) staff training £.........
10. Was it envisaged that the CAD system would have an impact on the areas of 
the organisation than the Drawing Office? If so, which?
11. Were other departments listed in (10) consulted prior to retaining the 
consultant? If so, which?
-  13 -
SECTION 5. IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING
1. How many systems were involved in the final selection process?
2. Who was involved in setting up the guidelines for final selection?
3. Was a benchmark test developed for the selection? If so, please give 
details.
4. Were formal guidelines and criteria prepared and declared to the system 
vendor prior to demonstration? If so, please give details.
- 14 -
5. Who was 'in charge1 of the system demonstrations? (Position in 
Organisation)
6. Hew did the system demonstrated differ from the system which had been 
quoted? Was this different from the system quoted after the 
demonstration?
7. How long did the demonstration take? Was the chosen system demonstrated 
once or more than once?
8. Were any significant questions raised in the selection guidelines
left unanswered after the demonstration? If so, please detail them.
- 15 -
9- Who was involved in the final selection? Was the decision made by a 
team?
10. What part did the consultant take in the final selection process?
11. What part did the consultant take during the pre-irrplementation period?
12. What changes took place in your views of systems integration as a 
result of:
a) the initial selection
b) the final selection process
- 16 -
SECTION 6. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
1. Please describe the final hardware configuration planned.
2. Hew did the initial purchase of hardware relate to this? Was it:
a) A single workstation with no immediate expansion plans.
b) A single workstation with plans to expand within 
twelve months.
c) More than one workstation (please state how many) 
with no immediate expansion plans.
d) More than one workstation (please state how many) 
with plans to expand within twelve months.
e) One or more workstations (please state how many) 
with plans to integrate the system with 
Ccsiputer Aided Production Management (CAPM), 
design calculation software, Numerical Control (NC),
Finite Element Analysis (FEA) or other CAD systems 
(please specify).
f) Other (please specify).
4. How much money was spent on the Initial purchase? £___
5. How did this relate to the budget shorn in Section 4 Q9?
6. If the expenditure was higher than budget, please explain why.
7. How was the initial purchase financed?
8. Was the inplementation managed by an inplementation team? If so, what
was its makeup? If not, who was responsible for the installation 
process?
9. What brief was given to the implementer(s)?
-  18 -
What external assistance was given by:
a) consultants
b) the vendor
c) • the system suppliers
11. Please describe the relationship with the vendor before, during and 
after the inplementation.
12. What were the criteria for the success of the system inplementation? 
Were these expressed explicitly before inplementation?
13. What were the expected benefits from a successful inplementation?
14. What was the timescale of the inplementation from purchase to the
achievement of the criteria for success? Hew did this relate to the 
expected timescale?
15. On the continuum belcw, please describe the success of the inplementation.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9
Total Moderate Total
Failure Success Success
20 -
16. If the inplementation was not a total success, please explain where the 
system fell short.
17. What action was taken during the inplementation to try to make the 
system a success? . _
18. To what degree was the software tailored to meet the requirements of
the Company (other than programming using the software tools provided)?
19. What organisational changes tock place during the implementation phase?
-  21 -
20. What training was provided:
a) in CAD draughting and design
b) in system support
c) in non-CAD but related activities
d) in system management
e) other
21. Please describe the integration between CAD and other systems which was 
carried out during the implementation.
22. What were the major problems encountered:
a) with CAD inplementation
b) with integration
23. What specific 'people* problems were encountered during the 
implementation, and hew were they overcome?
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SECTION 7. POSI^IMIIl^riATiaT ANALYSIS
1. In retrospect, what are your measures of success?
2. Hew did the implementation match up to these measures?
3. Hew meaningful was the implementation plan?
4. Hew reasonable were the implementation timescales?
-  24 -
5. How would you describe the support you received from your vendor?
6. What disputes, if any, arose, and hew were they resolved?
7. How effective was the training supplied by the vendor?
8. Were any unforeseen benefits obtained? If so, what?
- 25 -
9. Was there anything you got conpletely wrong?
10. Overall, what would you have done differently?
!
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SECTION 8. IHE FUTURE
1. What are your expansion and/or integration plans?
2. What further training do you envisage?
3. Do you have a policy for improving the system? If so, please describe 
the proposed improvements.
i - 27 -
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APPENDIX 3
ORGANISATION STRUCTURE
COMPANY 1
MANAGING DIRECTOR
FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR
(CAPM)
PRODUCTION
MANAGER
PRODUCTION
CONTROL
MANAGER
PRODUCTION
SUPERVISORS
(PLANNING)
COMPANY 2
MANAGING DIRECTOR
FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR
TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR
PRODUCTION
DIRECTOR
DO CONTRACTS
MANAGER DESIGNER
CHIEF CHIEF
DESIGNER DESIGNER 
(MECH) (ELEC)
PLANNERS FOREMEN
DO (6) DO (1)
TECHNICAL
MANAGER
D O MANAGER
D O (8)
WORKS
DIRECTOR
PUMPS
DESIGNER PRODUCTION 
MANAGERS
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COMPANY 3
MANAGING DIRECTOR
CHIEF
DESIGNER
(ACCOUNTS
SYSTEM)
COMPANY 4
MANAGING DIRECTOR
WORKS DESIGNER
SUPERVISOR
FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR
PRODUCTION
MANAGERS
(PLANNING)
ACCOUNTS
MANAGER
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COMPANY 5
FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR
MANAGING DIRECTOR
WORKS
DIRECTOR
SALES
DIRECTOR
INSTALLATIONS LIGHTING
MANAGER ENGINEER
PRODUCTION
CONTROL
MANAGER
INDUSTRIAL
ENGINEER
(CAM)
(PLANNING)
DO
MANAGER
PURCHASING
MANAGER
WORKS
MANAGER
DEVELOPMENT
MANAGER
DO
SUPERVISOR
PRODUCTION
MANAGERS
EX) (5)
COMPANY 6
MANAGING DIRECTOR
FINANCIAL
DIRECTOR
DO
MANAGER
SPECIAL
PROJECTS
MANAGER
PRODUCTION
MANAGER
(PLANNERS)
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